Publications

Peer-reviewed papers

Balg, D., & Dung, L. (Forthcoming). Text selection for philosophy courses: A topic-sensitive guide. Teaching Philosophy.

Dung, L., & Balg, D. (Forthcoming). Right in the feels: Academic philosophy, disappointed students and the big questions of life. Teaching Philosophy.

Dung, L., & Kersten, L. (Forthcoming). Implementing artificial consciousness. Mind & Language.

Dung, L. (2024). Is superintelligence necessarily moral? Analysis, anae033. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anae033

Dung, L. (2024). The argument for near-term human disempowerment through AI. AI & Society. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-024-01930-2

  Dung, L. (2024). Evaluating approaches for reducing catastrophic risks from AI. AI and Ethics. https://doi.org/10.1007/   s43681-024-00475-w

Dung, L. (2024). Understanding artificial agency. The Philosophical Quarterly, pqae010. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqae010 (Preprint)

Dung, L. (2024). Preserving the normative significance of sentience. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 31(1–2), 8–30. https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.1.008 (Preprint) Reply: Kammerer, F. (2024). Sentientism still under threat: Reply to Dung. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 31 (3–4), 103–119. https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.31.3.103

Dung, L. (2023). Tests of animal consciousness are tests of machine consciousness. Erkenntnis. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00753-9

Dung, L. (2023). Current cases of AI misalignment and their implications for future risks. Synthese, 202(5), 138. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04367-0

Dung, L. (2023). How to deal with risks of AI suffering. Inquiry. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2023.2238287

Dung, L. (2023). Dimensions of animal wellbeing. Philosophy and the Mind Sciences, 4, 9. https://doi.org/10.33735/phimisci.2023.9878

Dung, L., & Newen, A. (2023). Profiles of animal consciousness: A species-sensitive, two-tier account to quality and distribution. Cognition, 235, 105409. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105409

Dung, L. (2022). Why the epistemic objection against using sentience as criterion of moral status is flawed. Science and Engineering Ethics, 28(6), 51. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-022-00408-y

Dung, L. (2022). Assessing tests of animal consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 105, 103410. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2022.103410 (Preprint)

Dung, L. (2022). Against the explanatory argument for enactivism. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 29(7–8), 57–68. https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.29.7.057 (Preprint)

Dung, L. (2022). Does illusionism imply skepticism of animal consciousness? Synthese, 200(3), 238. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03710-1

Commentaries

Dung, L. (2023). From animal to plant sentience: Is there credible evidence? Animal Sentience, 8(33). https://doi.org/10.51291/2377-7478.1784

Other

Dung, L. (2023). Animal consciousness and beyond: Animal experience, feeling machines and moral weight. Dissertation at the Ruhr-Universität Bochum. https://doi.org/10.13154/294-9975

Dung, L. (2024). William James: The subtraction argument for the bodily feeling theory of emotion (argumentation.online, in German, peer reviewed). Link: https://argumentation.online/reconstructions/Dung_ArgOnl-2024-09

Dung, L. (2023). Philosophy and Ethics. How can philosophy and ethics research help solve global problems? Effective Thesis. URL: https://effectivethesis.org/philosophy/

Press release by Julia Weiler (2023). How consciousness in animals could be researched. URL: https://news.rub.de/english/press-releases/2023-03-02-philosophy-how-consciousness-animals-could-be-researched