The fractious history between Armenia and Azerbaijan dates back to the dissolution of the Russian Empire in 1917. However, by 1920, both republics were absorbed into the Soviet Union. Fighting between Soviet Armenians and Soviet Azerbaijanis began in the 1980s, and when both republics regained independence in 1991, problems immediately ignited over ownership of the Karabakh and Nakhchivan regions, both of which were an internationally recognized part of Azerbaijan.
The First Karabakh War was fought from 1992 to 1994 and resulted in the loss of the mountainous Karabakh region to Armenia. Since that time, tensions remain high along the line of contact (LoC) that separated the combatants, and violations of the cease-fire have broken out episodically along the LoC.
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On 2 April 2016, taking advantage of a minor provocation, Azerbaijani Special Forces (SF) attacked across the LoC to seize two villages, Talish and Madagis, three kilometers beyond the LoC.4 They were successful in seizing eight square kilometers of territory, including Talish, but took heavy casualties including the SF brigade commander. Although Azerbaijani losses were severe, the operation provided proof that the army could operate its weapons systems and manage a modern close battle. A small and costly victory, perhaps, but one that clearly indicated that Azerbaijan was on the right track to modernize its armed forces.
Turkey and the newly independent Republic of Azerbaijan established a formal agreement for mutual military cooperation in 1992.5 Further agreements in 1996 and 1999 extended financial aid to Azerbaijan and brought Azerbaijani soldiers to Kosovo under Turkish command. In 2000, Turkey began to export modern weapons to Azerbaijan. This was followed by a major effort of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense to modernize and reform its armed forces, a belated recognition that the Armenian armed forces maintained a qualitative edge over Azerbaijani forces.6 The priority of this effort was to recast the military from a Soviet-style force to a NATO-style force, including embracing NATO-compatible doctrine and acquiring modern equipment. Oil and gas revenues subsidized these efforts.
In terms of capacity, the Azerbaijani air force had a large and robust UA fleet including thirty-six Turkish Bayraktar TB2 UAs (armed with Roketsan MAM-L laser-guided munitions), forty-eight Israeli Harop loitering munitions, and a large number of Israeli Orbiter 1K loitering munitions, Elbit Hermes 450/900, SkyStriker, and Aerostar UAs.20 Additionally, Azerbaijan locally manufactured Israeli UAs under license as well. The Azerbaijani air force missile inventory included the modern Israeli LORA ballistic missile (four launchers and fifty missiles), old Soviet SS-11s, and the Israeli EXTRA guided missile system (six launchers and fifty missiles).21
Unlike the United States that has a chairman/joint staff system, Azerbaijan employs a classic general staff following the Turkish and German models.24 The chief of the Azerbaijani General Staff leads a joint staff composed of staff officers from the army, the air force, and the navy, as well as officers specializing in SOF, personnel, and logistics.25 The commanders of the army and the air force report to the chief and serve as his principal deputies. A professional war college supports the education and training of the officers of the general staff.
Importantly, over the past thirty years, the Azerbaijani General Staff has been transformed from a Soviet-style general staff to a more western NATO-style general staff.26 This transformation is largely due to the influence of the Turkish military through cooperation that implemented officer exchanges, provided training teams, and educated Azerbaijani officers in Turkish professional military educational institutions. As the reader will come to understand, the Azerbaijani military staffs planned and executed a remarkably successful operational-level campaign, which may be seen as the latest form of operational art that recovered much of Armenian-occupied Karabakh.
At the strategic level, the Republic of Azerbaijan clearly is more powerful in every meaningful measurement than the Republic of Armenia. In 2019, Azerbaijan had 10.3 million citizens, a median age of 32.6 years, a youth unemployment rate of 13.4 percent, a population below the poverty line of 4.9 percent, a real GDP of $145.2 billion, and an industrialized economic sector of 53.5 percent.27 Azerbaijan exported around 720,000 barrels of crude oil a day as well as produced large amounts of natural gas. According to the CIA, in 2019, Azerbaijan spent 4 percent of its GDP on defense, which provided approximately 67,000 total active military personnel: 56,000 army, 2,500 navy, and 8,500 air force.28
The demographic, economic, resource, and military advantages enjoyed by Azerbaijan are immediately evident. In terms of the operational military balance, the force disparity was equally lopsided. Azerbaijan outspent Armenia by a factor of three to one, resulting in a proportional overmatch of conventional military systems.31
Unlike Azerbaijan, which modernized its forces for precision strike-based offensive operations, Armenia put the bulk of its available defense funds into defensive forces. In the twenty-first century, the Armenian air force purchased and deployed S-300 SAMs, Buk-M1-2 SAMs, and Tor-M2KM SAMs, giving them a robust and integrated air defense system.33 Armenia augmented these by purchasing large quantities of shoulder-launched man-portable SAMs as well.
Armenia also purchased a few Russian ground attack aircraft to replace aging Soviet-era aircraft. However, the Armenian ground forces spent its available funds upgrading old Soviet tanks and artillery, improving communications equipment, and enhancing antitank systems. In terms of new capability, the Armenian Army purchased a small number of modern Russian Iskander-E (SS-26) surface-to-surface short-range ballistic missile systems to complement their aging fleet of Scud-Bs (SS-1C) and Scarab (SS-21) surface-to-surface ballistic missiles.
Separately, at the tactical level in Armenian-occupied Karabakh (known to the Armenians as the Republic of Artsakh), the Armenian army maintained an independent division-size force called the Artsakh Defense Army. (Armenian names for geographic locations will hereinafter follow Azerbiajan names in parentheses.) The headquarters of this force is in the Artsakh capital, Stepanakert (Xankndi), and the force was composed of three motorized rifle brigades, a tank regiment, and supporting elements.34 The Artsakh Defense Army reportedly received priority with light arms, heavy artillery, tanks, and armored vehicles from its parent Armenian army.
Over the past thirty years, the Armenian army in Karabakh invested heavily in fortifications such as bunkers, strongpoints, entrenchments, and protected positions for armored vehicles and artillery. This seemed to be a good investment because the fortifications significantly enhanced the defensibility of the naturally rugged mountainous terrain in eastern Karabakh. In fact, the difficulties that the Azerbaijani army encountered in the April 2016 clash seemed to validate the expenditure and effort.
The geography of Karabakh is critical to understanding the parameters of the Azerbaijani campaign plan (see figure 1). The Aras (Araxe) River originates in Turkey and flows east to the Caspian Sea. As the river leaves the mountainous region along the Iranian border, it forms a wide and flat valley in southern Karabakh. Even though the LoC and villages behind it were heavily fortified by the Artsakh Defense Army, the Aras Valley is an operational-level avenue of approach. Large-scale forces can mass and maneuver through the open terrain. To the north, and centered on the capital city of Stepanakert, the remainder of Karabakh is composed of high, rugged mountains that are unsuitable for large-scale conventional military operations.
While the rugged terrain favored the Armenians, it also imposed a significant strategic and operational liability on the Artsakh defenders in the form of the Lachin (Lan) corridor. The corridor contains a single, all-weather, southwest-to-northeast road that runs from the town of Lachin bordering Armenia to Stepanakert; it is the only major road between Armenia and Karabakh. Assuming that one controls the Aras Valley, possession of the Lachin corridor (or the ability to interdict the corridor) effectively blocks the entry of goods into Artsakh itself. It is essential at this point to understand that the town of Shushi (ua/Shusha) sits on high ground adjacent to, and dominating, the Lachin-Stepanakert road.36 Therefore Shushi became a key geographic feature that could be controlled in order to assure operational success.
It is obvious that Azerbaijan drew different conclusions from these actions, and the government prepared for war. In a speech on 16 September, Azerbaijani minister of defense Col. Gen. Zakir Hasanov announced that his forces stood ready to liberate the Armenian-occupied territories and had achieved a high state of readiness.40 Azerbaijani media and news sources increased their coverage of reported Armenian provocations along the LoC. On 19 September, Hasanov met with his staff and ordered his forces to prepare for winter operations and to prepare logistically for combat operations, including instructions for COVID-19 precautions for military personnel.41 Ministry of Defense officials inspected military border detachments the next day, and the Turkish Foreign Ministry announced that Turkey would back Azerbaijan if Armenia violated its territory. Azerbaijan called up reservists for active duty on 21 September and announced that serious provocations were increasing by the day.42 The Azerbaijani army held tactical exercises two days later that included tanks and artillery units conducting live-fire training. On 26 September, the Ministry of Defense reported that Armenian forces had violated the cease-fire forty-eight times within the previous twenty-four hours.43 The accuracy of these reports is contested and may have been part of an Azerbaijani information campaign to rally public support. In any case, the next day, Hasanov reported that Armenia had attacked Azerbaijan and that fighting erupted along the entire LoC. President Ilham Aliyev declared a state of martial law in western Azerbaijan and announced that seven villages had already been liberated. 152ee80cbc
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