Disconnecting Financial Misconduct: Social Connectedness and Misconduct in Financial Advising (with Bill B. Francis and Raffi E. García)
This paper investigates how strong social ties affect agent-regulator relationships and financial misconduct in U.S. registered investment advisories. Using difference-in-differences to exploit the quasi-experimental properties of the Dodd-Frank Act, we find that the change in regulatory purview increases the fraudulent malpractice in mid-sized advisory firms compared to large advisories. Financial misconduct increases at advisories more socially connected to regulators, even after controlling for geographical distance. The results show a disrupting agent-regulator relationship effect when the officer belongs to the largest homogeneous group, white males, and insignificance among female and under-represented minority groups. Consequently, the change in regulators and misconduct affect advisory firms' performance and services.
Challenges and Insights in the U.S. Initial Coin Offering Landscape (with Aparna Gupta and Oshani Seneviratne)
Gender and Racial Behavior in Consumer Payment Methods under Economic Uncertainty (Raffi E. García) [AEA Papers and Proceedings]