My research focuses on international security, with particular interests in nuclear weapons, alliance politics, and international institutions. I study why military capabilities and security relationships have different consequences across political and institutional contexts. One strand examines how domestic and alliance institutions shape the effects of military capabilities on international conflict. The second examines asymmetric security relationships, asking when security dependence generates political influence and how security commitments are implemented and interpreted.
My dissertation, Three Essays on Military Capabilities and Security Relationships, brings these two strands together through research on nuclear latency, allied reconnaissance satellites, and security dependence in the United Nations General Assembly.
Military Capabilities and International Conflict
This strand examines why similar military capabilities can have different effects on international conflict depending on the political and institutional contexts in which they operate.
Manuscript under review
When does nuclear latency—the ability to rapidly build nuclear weapons following a political decision—embolden states to initiate conflict? I argue that institutional veto players make the political path to weaponization longer and less certain, reducing the deterrent protection leaders expect from latent capabilities and weakening latency’s emboldening benefits relative to its restraining costs. Using cross-national data, I find that latency’s conflict-initiating effect declines sharply as political constraints increase and ultimately reverses under strong constraints.
Manuscript under review
Can states derive deterrent benefits from reconnaissance satellites possessed by their defensive allies? I argue that satellite-capable defenders have incentives to support allies with reconnaissance, which can strengthen deterrence through denial and punishment; more institutionalized alliances are better able to translate these informational advantages into coordinated defensive action. Using cross-national data, I find that targets protected by satellite-capable defensive allies face lower risks of challenger-initiated serious militarized disputes, with conflict risk declining further as alliance institutionalization increases.
Work in progress
The Politics of Asymmetric Security Relationships
This strand examines how asymmetric security relationships create opportunities for political influence and shape how security commitments are implemented and interpreted.
Manuscript under review
When can a powerful state influence whether other governments condemn a third party? I argue that security dependence gives patrons potential leverage over allies, but that leverage becomes more consequential when the patron places greater importance on an outcome and actively seeks support. Using UN General Assembly condemnation votes, I find that U.S. defense-pact allies become substantially more aligned with Washington on votes the United States designates as important.
Work in progress
Work in progress, with Neil Narang and Kyungwon Suh
Data
UNGAInsight (UNGA-I)
I co-developed UNGAInsight, a dataset of United Nations General Assembly resolutions from 1990–2023 that provides detailed information on resolution topics, targeted countries and associated demands, and the political context of voting absences. The data and codebook are available on the UNGAInsight website.
Coggins, Bridget L., Jungjae Hong, Julia C. Morse, and Annjulie Vester. “Introducing UNGAInsight (1990–2023): New Data on the United Nations General Assembly’s Agenda.” Journal of Peace Research. Accepted for publication.
Public Writing
Coggins, Bridget L., Jungjae Hong, and Julia C. Morse. 2025. “Two Ways Trump May Attack the UN.” Global Policy at a Glance, UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation.
Coggins, Bridget L., Julia C. Morse, Jungjae Hong, and Annjulie Vester. 2024. “At the United Nations, the United States May Not Be as Isolated as It Thinks.” Global Policy at a Glance, UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation.