My research focuses on international security, with particular interests in nuclear weapons, alliance politics, and international institutions. I examine how states pursue and provide security and how these efforts shape international politics. My research has two interconnected strands: one investigates how political institutions and strategic conditions shape military capabilities and their consequences for interstate conflict, while the other examines how alliances facilitate security cooperation, strengthen deterrence, and create opportunities for political influence.
This strand examines how political institutions and strategic conditions shape the development, deployment, and use of military capabilities and their consequences for international security.
Under review
When does nuclear latency—the ability to rapidly build nuclear weapons following a political decision—embolden states to initiate conflict? I argue that institutional veto players can delay or block the political decisions required for weaponization, reducing the deterrent protection leaders expect from latent capabilities and weakening their emboldening benefits relative to the costs of conflict. Using cross-national data, I find that the conflict-initiating effect of nuclear latency declines sharply as political constraints increase and ultimately reverses under strong constraints.
Work in progress
Why do nuclear-armed states withdraw nuclear weapons deployed abroad despite continuing strategic incentives to maintain them? I argue that domestic instability and external threats can increase the risks of seizure, sabotage, or destruction, creating incentives for withdrawal even when forward deployment remains strategically valuable. Combining cross-national analysis with historical evidence, this project examines how threats to deployed weapons shape decisions to maintain or withdraw nuclear forces abroad.
Work in progress
This project develops a new measure of nuclear latency that incorporates technical capabilities alongside political and organizational conditions affecting weapons development. Existing measures largely emphasize technological capacity, but states with comparable capabilities may require different amounts of time to acquire nuclear weapons because of institutional constraints, bureaucratic coordination, and organizational capacity. By accounting for these factors in estimating weaponization timelines, the project seeks to improve assessments of nuclear proliferation risks and their implications for international security.
This strand examines how alliance institutions and asymmetric security relationships shape security cooperation, deterrence, the credibility of commitments, and political influence beyond the military domain.
Under review
Can states derive deterrent benefits from reconnaissance satellites possessed by their defensive allies? I argue that satellite-capable defenders have incentives to provide reconnaissance support, which can strengthen deterrence through denial and punishment. These benefits should be greater in more institutionalized alliances, where established communication, planning, and military coordination help translate intelligence into collective defense. Using cross-national data, I find that states protected by satellite-capable defensive allies face lower risks of challenger-initiated serious militarized disputes, with the estimated risk declining as alliance institutionalization increases.
Under review
When can a powerful state influence whether another government condemns a third party? I conceptualize international condemnation as a triangular political process in which security dependence gives powerful patrons potential leverage over their allies, while the patron's stakes in an outcome shape its incentives to exercise that leverage. Using UN General Assembly condemnation votes, I find that U.S. defense-pact allies become substantially more aligned with Washington on votes identified as important to U.S. interests, where heightened U.S. stakes coincide with extensive lobbying.
Work in progress, with Neil Narang and Kyungwon Suh
How do different forms of reassurance shape allied perceptions of U.S. security commitments? We are developing a conjoint survey experiment in Japan to compare military, diplomatic, alliance-institutional, and economic reassurance instruments. By systematically varying the forms and designs of these instruments, the project seeks to identify which approaches most effectively strengthen allied confidence in U.S. security commitments.
Data
UNGAInsight (UNGA-I)
I co-developed UNGAInsight, a dataset of United Nations General Assembly resolutions from 1990–2023 that provides detailed information on resolution topics, targeted countries and associated demands, and the political context of voting absences. The data and codebook are available on the UNGAInsight website.
Coggins, Bridget L., Jungjae Hong, Julia C. Morse, and Annjulie Vester. “Introducing UNGAInsight (1990–2023): New Data on the United Nations General Assembly’s Agenda.” Journal of Peace Research. Accepted for publication.
Public Writing
Coggins, Bridget L., Jungjae Hong, and Julia C. Morse. 2025. “Two Ways Trump May Attack the UN.” Global Policy at a Glance, UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation.
Coggins, Bridget L., Julia C. Morse, Jungjae Hong, and Annjulie Vester. 2024. “At the United Nations, the United States May Not Be as Isolated as It Thinks.” Global Policy at a Glance, UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation.