Research
Publications
Gender differences in re-contesting decisions: New evidence from French municipal elections
with Marc Sangnier
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2023) , Volume 214, pp.5 74-594. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2023.06.022
Abstract: This paper studies differences across genders in the re-contesting decisions of politicians following electoral wins or defeats. Using close races in mixed-gender French local elections, we show that women are less likely to persist in competition when they lose compared to male runners-up, but are equally or more prone than male winners to re-contest when they win. Differences in observable characteristics or in the expected electoral returns of running again cannot fully account for these gender gaps in persistence. In contrast, the heterogeneity of the results across political ideology, age, experience and occupation suggests that behavioural explanations are at play. Additionally, we provide evidence that a woman's victory encourages former female challengers to re-contest but does not trigger the entry of new female candidates.
The wise, the politician, and the strongman: Types of national leaders and quality of governance
Journal of Comparative Economics (2022), Volume 50, Issue 4, pp. 849-895. ISSN 0147-5967,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2022.06.001. - Paper | 2022 Working paper
Abstract: This paper assesses how national leaders’ quality of governance varies with their career and education. Using a sample of 1,000 rulers between 1931 and 2010, I identify three types of leaders: military leaders, academics, and politicians. Military leaders are associated with an overall negative performance, while politicians who have held important offices before taking power tend to perform well. Academics have on average non-significant effects. These results are partially driven by differences in policy decisions and in leadership styles. Military leaders spend less in health and education, are more likely to establish a personalistic regime, to disrespect the constitution, and to move towards a non-electoral regime, while the reverse holds for politicians. Additionally, this paper highlights the weakness of using educational attainment as a proxy for politicians’ quality, and of growth as a measure of national leaders’ performance.
Working papers
Corporate Contributions and Political Selection: Evidence from Brazil (Job-market paper)
Submitted [New version] - SSRN working paper
Abstract: This paper studies the influence of corporate contributions on political selection and electoral outcomes. To identify the effects, I analyse a Brazilian reform that banned firms' contributions using a difference-in-differences strategy, exploiting variation in candidates' reliance on corporate funding prior to the reform. I find that the ban fosters political competition by encouraging challengers and new candidates to run for office. Instead, the reform penalizes incumbents funded by firms by decreasing their likelihood of re-election. These adverse effects are particularly pronounced among underperforming incumbents. Lastly, I show that firms tend to donate more to corrupt mayors, unlike other donors.
Audits and Bureaucratic Corruption: Evidence from Brazilian Municipalities
with Romain Ferrali and Galileu Kim
Working paper upon request
Abstract:
While previous studies have found that anti-corruption audits effectively discipline politicians, the extent to which they discipline bureaucrats is unclear. We provide a framework to analyze the impact of this popular policy instrument on bureaucratic careers and use it to evaluate a well-known, randomized audit program of Brazilian municipalities. We show that audits cause increases in career interruptions that are particularly pronounced for likely patronage hires and in municipalities displaying intermediate levels of corruption, suggesting that audits are relatively effective at punishing corrupt bureaucrats. Increased dismissals are concentrated among mayors who cannot run for reelection, suggesting that electoral accountability mechanisms shown to discipline politicians do not trickle down to bureaucrats; rather, mayors tend to clean their accounts before leaving office. Structural estimates indicate that the increased resignation rates observed after audits owe to reduced rent-seeking opportunities rather than increased risk of dismissal.
Abstract:
Understanding how to tackle clientelism is crucial for enhancing political accountability. This paper explores whether stronger state institutions can disrupt local clientelistic networks by studying geographic and temporal variations in the enforcement of labor regulations in Brazil. To address endogeneity concerns, we use an instrumental variable approach, relying on within-municipality changes in proximity to labor offices and variations in the number of labor inspectors across states. We show that enhanced enforcement capacity significantly reduces the electoral success of clientelistic parties and curtails practices such as patronage and vote-buying. These effects are largely due to a notable decline in the proportion of informal workers, whom we find exhibit a higher propensity to vote for clientelistic parties. Overall, our findings underscore that centrally-driven investments in state capacity can effectively break the cycle of entrenched clientelism and lead to substantial improvements in municipal governance.