Production Network Diversification and Economic Development (2024)
Co-Authors: Jorge Miranda-Pinto & David Fleming-Muñoz
Published in the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. You can view the article here.
The Effect of Feedback on News-Verification Demand: Experimental Evidence from Mexico
Co-Authors: Dario Trujano-Ochoa
Latest draft here
Summary: This study examines how feedback, overconfidence, and political bias influence individuals' ability to detect and respond to misinformation in politically charged contexts. Using a combination of fieldwork, surveys, and interviews in Mexico, the research explores how personal and group feedback affect participants' willingness to verify information and their accuracy in identifying falsehoods. The preliminary findings indicate that group feedback can significantly influence perceptions and behaviors around misinformation, while political alignment affects individuals' willingness to pay for information verification. This research aims to inform strategies for mitigating the spread of misinformation in politically sensitive environments.
Public Goods Misallocation & Voter Perceptions in the Philippines
Co-Authors: Junbeom (Paul) Bahk
Summary: This project examines how political favoritism in local procurement contracts impacts voter perceptions in the Philippines. By presenting voters with scenarios of development projects endorsed either by an international institution or a politically connected mayor, the study explores how perceptions of corruption and favoritism shape trust in government and political participation. The research aims to understand the broader political consequences of resource misallocation and the influence of political connections on voter behavior, providing insights into governance and accountability in public resource allocation.
Dynasties in Distress: Elite Adaptations to Economic Vulnerability and Political Distrust in the Philippines.
Summary: This paper develops a model of elite adaptation in electoral democracies, using the Philippines as a case. It theorizes that political clans strategically shift between clientelist and programmatic spending in response to economic vulnerability and electoral fragmentation. High-resource elites rely more heavily on clientelism during periods of poverty, while low-resource elites are more likely to adopt programmatic policies in fragmented political environments where traditional clientelist enforcement is weakened. I test this theory using a novel dataset linking local budget allocations, political networks, and a fractionalization index derived from subnational electoral results. The initial findings show that high-resourced elites are more sensitive to poverty shocks, while low-resourced elites are more responsive to competitive fragmentation, consistent with theoretical expectations.