Research
Fields of Interest
Applied Microeconomics; Urban, Labor, and Environmental
Publications
[Written in English]
[2] "Uncertainty and Household Portfolio Choice: Evidence from South Korea" [Journal Article]
With Dong Hyun Suh (Ph.D. Student in Economics, University of Virginia)
Economics Letters, Vol. 180, July 2019, pp. 21-24
<Abstract>
We examine the effect of policy uncertainty on the household portfolio choice using the Korea Labor Income Panel Study (KLIPS). Policy uncertainty significantly reduces the share of risky assets in the household's portfolio, as well as the probability of holding risky assets. On the top of that, we alleviate possible endogeneity problem by leveraging lottery-related questionnaire in KLIPS. Furthermore, we investigate the interaction between policy uncertainty and labor income volatility. Labor income volatility offsets the effect of policy uncertainty, which is statistically and economically significant.
[1] "Testing for the Conditional Geometric Mixture Distribution" [Journal Article]
With Jin Seo Cho (Professor, Yonsei University) and Sang Woo Park (Master's Student in Economics, Yonsei University),
Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics, Vol. 29, No. 2, June 2018, pp.1-27
<Abstract>
This study examines the mixture hypothesis of conditional geometric distributions using a likelihood ratio (LR) test statistic based on that used for unconditional geometric distributions. As such, we derive the null limit distribution of the LR test statistic and examine its power performance. In addition, we examine the interrelationship between the LR test statistics used to test the geometric and exponential mixture hypotheses. We also examine the performance of the LR test statistics under various conditions and confirm the main claims of the study using Monte Carlo simulations.
[Written in Korean]
[2] "Joint Recruitment of Public Institutions: Who Gains and Who Loses" (Korean Title: 공공기관 합동채용: 누가 이익을 보고 누가 손해를 보는가?)" (written in Korean) [Journal Article]
With Jaeok Park (Professor, Yonsei University)
Journal of Economic Theory and Econometrics, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2020, pp.14–65
<Abstract>
Recently, the Korean government is promoting the joint recruitment of public institutions, in which public institutions performing a similar task set a common date of written tests for entry-level employment. In this study, we analyze the effects of this policy on job seekers and institutions. Using a game-theoretic analysis, we derive the following results. First, when job seekers’ preferences for institutions are identical, lower-ranked institutions are less likely to participate in joint recruitment than higher-ranked ones, because joint recruitment decreases both the quantity and quality of applicants that lower-ranked institutions face. Second, when job seekers’ preferences for institutions are diverse, joint recruitment can improve the overall utility of job seekers by increasing the likelihood that job seekers enter their preferred institutions. Third, when the desirability of employment is not much different across institutions, top job seekers lose and average ones benefit from joint recruitment. Based on these results, we evaluate the policy of joint recruitment and discuss policy alternatives.
[1] "Deferring Graduation as Job Market Signaling (Korean Title: 취업시장에서 신호로서의 졸업유예)" (written in Korean) [Accepted Version]
With Doo Hyung Yun (Master's Student in Economics, Yonsei University) and Jaeok Park (Professor, Yonsei University)
The Korean Journal of Economics, Vol. 26, No. 2, December 2019, pp.245-275
<Abstract>
Due to the tough Korean job market for college graduates, it has become a universal phenomenon in Korea for college students to defer graduation. In this paper, we perform a game-theoretic analysis on delayed graduation, interpreting it as a signal sent by job applicants to the firm. We show that, when the job market is tough, there can exist a separating equilibrium in which applicants with high productivity put off graduation and those with low productivity graduate on time. In addition, there can exist pooling equilibria in which applicants of both types graduate or defer graduation. We compare the payoffs of participants in the three kinds of equilibria. We also discuss how the equilibrium will change as it becomes more difficult to get a job and as the cost of deferring graduation gets lower.
Working Papers
[1] "Do Working Wives Increase Husbands' Marriage Wage Premium in Korea?" [Working paper verison]
with Myungkyu Shim (Professor, Yonsei University) and Hee-Seung Yang (Professor, Yonsei University)
Works in Progress
[(Preliminary) Drafts are available upon request]
[2] "Public Sector Employment and Higher Education: IV approach" (Tentative Title)
With Hee-Seung Yang (Professor, Yonsei University)
[1] "Inference of Unobserved Heterogeneity in Strike Duration" (Tentative Title)
With Sang Woo Park (Master's Student in Economics, Yonsei University)
Presentations
[4] The 7th Student Workshop in Economics, Yonsei University, Seoul, Republic of Korea (Sep. 2019)
[3] The 2nd Junior Scholar Club Economics Workshop, Yonsei University, Seoul, Republic of Korea (May 2019)
[2] The 13th Joint Economics Symposium of Six Leading East Asian Universities, Fudan University, Shanghai, China (Jan. 2019)
[1] The 2018 conference of Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (held by Korea Labor Institute and Supported by Ministry of Employment and Labor), Seoul National University, Seoul, Republic of Korea (Oct. 2018)