Publication

This article probes the performance and mechanisms of the Maoist economy from 1950 to 1980, a period commonly regarded as a turning point that ushered in a new path for China’s industrialisation and modernisation. Commonly, however, the welfare effect of this new path has been overlooked. The present research aims to fill this gap.

Methodologically, this article re-conceptualises, re-examines, and re-assesses the Maoist economy with qualitative and quantitative evidence. This study applies a holistic two-pronged approach with (1) capital accumulation and re-investment, material production and consumption, and (2) mathematical conceptualisation and empirical modelling. The key findings suggest that the Maoist economy was a closed one with industrial dependence on agriculture in an urban-rural zero-sum game with inevitable constraints on workers’ incentives for growth to continue. In the end of the Mao’s era, agriculture declined, the size of industrial workforce stagnated, and the population was poor.

This was not the end of the story, however. This failed industrial transition was itself highly influential as a subsequent point of reference used to justify the post-Mao reforms and opening up as a radical game changer that put China on a very different trajectory of growth and development.

This study identifies overoptimism of farmers as an important cause of factor misallocation and inefficiency in agriculture. Annual deviation of rainfall from the local normal is exogenous, unanticipated, and transitory, but we find that farmers substantially adjust labor and land allocation in response to a lagged positive rainfall shock. By examining the response of more than 10,000 farmers in China over 11 years, we show that a lagged positive rainfall shock significantly reallocates labor from high-income off-farm work to low-income farm work, reallocates farmland from high-productivity farmers to low-productivity farmers, and reduces the average rural income by 8.1 percent. We also found that these effects are primarily driven by the irrational responses of low-productivity farmers and that farms with good irrigation conditions are generally not damaged.

A fundamental governance challenge facing central authorities is how to mitigate the prevalent local protection against non-local firms. We document that judicial fiscal centralization—transferring local courts’ budgetary power from local governments to provincial finance departments—significantly increases the winning probability of non-local plaintiffs (defendants) against local defendants (plaintiffs) if lawsuits are tried in the defendant’s (plaintiff’s) jurisdiction. However, such centralization exhausts local governments’ information advantage in keeping local courts accountable. Specifically, the reform shifts local courts’ expenditures from public affairs to private welfare and breeds judge corruption. Interestingly, as gifts in the form of pro-local rulings from courts to governments disappear, governments’ day-to-day support to courts also weakens, deteriorating the courts’ performance. Overall, our paper highlights the depth of the judiciary’s political embeddedness and the complexity of fighting against local protection. 

This paper exploits a novel and unique opportunity to reveal the evolution of income volatility and consumption insurance from 1992 to 2014 in urban China. We found that (i) the average household experienced a downward trend in income and consumption volatility. Although the global financial crisis in 2008 caused a slight spike, it did not reverse the downward trend. (ii) Households’ ability to smooth income shocks improved signifi cantly, and the consumption insurance against permanent (transitory) income shocks increased from 0.6172 (0.8307) to 0.7453 (0.8742) – that is, the transmission of permanent (transitory) income shocks to consumption decreased by 33.46 (25.69) percent from 2004 to 2014. (iii) Welfare analysis indicates that the positive insurance effect counteracted the negative effects of lower economic growth in the 2010–2014 period. Income and consumption volatility, and consumption insurance were heterogeneous across income sources, consumption categories, and various demographic characteristics, which have important implications for understanding China’s economic transition .

A central challenge in economic development is market segmentation (MS) within countries, which largely arises from judicial local protection(JLP). By taking advantage of China’s establishment of interprovincial circuit tribunals (ICTs) that separate the judicial system from local governments, we find that: (1) ICTs significantly rectify the JLP provided by lower-level courts. (2) A micro-mechanism analysis shows that ICTs decrease transportation costs of cases involving small and private enterprises as plaintiffs and increase their probability applying for retrials in the Supreme People’s Court (SPC). In combination with the fact that these enterprises are more likely to be discriminated against by lower-level courts, the rectification effect of ICTs becomes significant after the reform. (3) Consistently, although ICTs significantly decrease the MS between provinces within the same circuit area, the MS between provinces of different circuit areas barely changes. Our paper provides timely implications and potentially actionable insights for countries facing similar concerns.