Research
Job Market Paper
The National Football League (NFL) represents its 32 member teams when bargaining with broadcasters over NFL broadcasting rights. Current broadcasting contracts restrict access to NFL Sunday games based on a viewer's location. I develop an endogenous disagreement payoffs extension to the standard bargaining model to describe the interaction between the NFL and broadcasters when allocating broadcasting rights. The disagreement payoff is found by calculating profits under the counterfactual when the broadcaster does not win. This is done by estimating viewer and advertiser benefits in a full two-sided equilibrium model of advertiser-consumer interaction mediated by channel ad choices and then changing broadcast programs. I conduct simulations for when NFL bargaining is decentralized to the division level. The estimates suggest that while the price of contracts increases, broadcasters’ profit increases due to the flexibility in bundling games.
Works In Progress
(1) Steering in Bargaining Models: Evidence from Bankruptcy Fillings (joint with Jessica Montgomery, UVA)
(2) Structure and Performance of Illicit Markets: A Counterfactual Policy Analysis of Underground Sex Work (joint with Jessica Montgomery, UVA)
(3) The Role of Business Models on Media Bias (joint with Max Schnidman, UVA)
(4) Multi-Homing Consumers and Bundling of Contents: Theory and Evidence from Streaming Services (joint with Moonju Cho, UVA)
**Abstracts are coming shortly for all above works in progress