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Job Market Paper
Job Market Paper
Image Source: Benis Arapovic, Vecteezy.com
Bargaining for Exclusive Rights in Two-Sided Markets:
The Case of the NFL and Broadcast Channels
The National Football League (NFL) represents its 32 member teams when bargaining with broadcasters over NFL broadcasting rights. Current broadcasting contracts restrict access to NFL Sunday games based on a viewer's location. I develop an endogenous disagreement payoffs extension to the standard bargaining model to describe the interaction between the NFL and broadcasters when allocating broadcasting rights. The disagreement payoff is found by calculating profits under the counterfactual when the broadcaster does not win. This is done by estimating viewer and advertiser benefits in a full two-sided equilibrium model of advertiser-consumer interaction mediated by channel ad choices and then changing broadcast programs. I conduct simulations for when NFL bargaining is decentralized to the division level. The estimates suggest that while the price of contracts increases, broadcasters’ profit increases due to the flexibility in bundling games.
new draft coming soon, undergoing revision
Works In Progress
Works In Progress
(1) Steering in Bargaining Models: Evidence from Bankruptcy Fillings (joint with Jessica Montgomery, U. Kentucky)
Abstract: The insolvency process in Canada provides consumers with two alternatives: traditional bankruptcy or consumer proposal in which the filer's debt obligation is negotiated and settled with creditors by a Licensed Insolvency Trustee (LIT). Regardless of the option selected, consumers must meet with an LIT whose role is to assist individuals in choosing the best option for their financial situation in addition to helping them through the filing process. However, LITs have an incentive to steer individuals towards consumer proposals as they are paid a percentage of the remaining debt amount after bargaining with creditors as opposed to a flat fee for bankruptcy filings. This payment structure can also create an incentive for LITs to negotiate smaller reductions in the final debt amount paid to creditors. Using data on the universe of consumer bankruptcy and consumer proposal filings for the past ten years in Canada, we use a structural bargaining model to estimate the extent to which LITs may be steering consumers toward filing consumer proposals and/or negotiating smaller reductions in debt settlements. Using this model, we also examine whether spatial restrictions in competition affect steering and bargaining outcomes and estimate the welfare effect of removing spatial restrictions in the Canadian insolvency market.
(2) Structure and Performance of Illicit Markets: A Counterfactual Policy Analysis of Underground Sex Work (joint with Jessica Montgomery, U. Kentucky)
(3) The Role of Business Models on Media Bias (joint with Max Schnidman, Microsoft)
(4) Multi-Homing Consumers and Bundling of Contents: Theory and Evidence from Streaming Services (joint with Moonju Cho, UVA)
**Abstracts are coming shortly for all above works in progress
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