When Authoritarians Embrace Democracy: The Hidden Hand of Pre-Existing Oligarchies in Brazil's Transition
When Authoritarians Embrace Democracy: The Hidden Hand of Pre-Existing Oligarchies in Brazil's Transition
Political regimes rarely emerge in a vacuum, instead building upon and often incorporating pre-existing societal and political structures. This paper investigates how the strength of historically entrenched, pre-regime regional elites shapes the strategic behavior and persistence of newer authoritarian elites. It argues that both the career survival of authoritarian-era politicians, and their inclination to strategically endorse democratization, are significantly contingent upon the power of these pre-existing regional structures. These propositions are empirically examined using Brazil's extended transition from military rule (c. 1974-1985). The analysis leverages an original dataset encompassing the entire universe of Brazilian politicians active from 1945 to 2023 (approximately 13,000 individuals). Utilizing a difference-in-differences approach centered on Brazil's 1974 regime liberalization, supplemented by analyses of complete career trajectories and key democratization votes ten years later, this paper finds that authoritarian elites from regions with strong pre-existing regional oligarchies exhibited greater career longevity and a higher likelihood of strategically supporting the democratic transition. Ultimately, this research underscores that the resilience of deep-seated local power structures is a critical factor determining how authoritarian elites navigate democratic transitions, thereby influencing the persistence of elite networks and the character of emerging democracies.
What Happens with Authoritarian Economic and Political Elites After Democratization? The Role of Revolving Doors and Voting Strategies During Democratization
Transitions to democracy compromise certain levels of elite replacement to gain legitimacy, with certain levels of elite continuity to be functional. This paper studies what happens with authoritarian economic and political elites once democracy arrives. First, I discuss the possible mechanisms that could lead to the replacement and maintenance of economic and political elites. Second, to estimate the fate of authoritarian elites and their children after democracy, I use an original panel dataset and develop a new measure of individual's importance-per-year that captures the changes in the professional trajectory of more than 4.000 leading figures of the dictatorships of Spain, Chile, Peru, Argentina, and Brazil, as well as the professional career of 10.000 children of these elites - in total, more than 40.000 jobs over 50 years and approximately 200.000 importance-per-year observations. By running mixed linear regressions, multinomial logit models, and event studies, I show that a general pattern emerges regardless of the case: political elites decrease their power and economic elites, regardless of whether they were collaborators of the regime or benefited from the dictatorship economic policies, remain equal. Further analyses show that the kind of transition model only affects the variation in the fate of political elites. The last part of the paper deals with the strategies political elites followed to remain in powerful positions in democracy. I analyzed the role of revolving doors and voting strategies during the last years of the dictatorship. I find that those who voted in favor of moving to a democratic regime in Brazil and Spain did considerably better during democracy than those who opposed it.
What Affects The Fate of the Children of Authoritarian Elites in Democracies?
Using a new dataset on the professional careers of 1.000 children of 200 dictators in 80 countries that transitioned to democracy, I explore how democratic countries can cut the link with their previous authoritarian elites. Children of countries with more robust transitional justice measures are less likely to occupy influential positions in democracy. Moreover, by comparing the fate of 10.000 children of 4.000 authoritarian political elites in Brazil, Spain, Chile, Argentina, and Peru, I show the individual factors explaining the maintenance of authoritarian legacies. Overall, I find that the children of those authoritarian elites who are able to remain in powerful positions after democratization are more likely to have relevant professional careers.
It Takes a Village to Remember: The Role of Local Repression Awareness in Post-Civil War Spain
With Joe Kendall and Pedro Martín
Remembrance of repression represents a challenge in the long term for post-conflict societies. Institutions, local repression, or demographic changes affect the intergenerational transmission of past collective memories. Specifically, institutions favoring victors may prevent the (re)generation of local collective memories through victim-blaming, ideological indoctrination, or mere unawareness of local-level repression. This study examines the impact of localized historical awareness on collective memory and political behavior in areas of Spain that supported the fascist coup during the civil war. We leverage the fact that the Spanish civil war evolved differently across regions depending on initial local support by society and key institutional actors, most notably the army. In the Pro-Francoist areas, more conservative on average, we document a diminished collective memory of war-time repression by the victors. Following previous research on the importance of familial repression genealogies to trigger empathy towards out-groups, we investigate whether enhancing awareness about local repression can alter political attitudes and behaviors. In a survey list experiment, we provide participants with information about the civil war repression in their familial or childhood municipalities. We then measure changes in a set of variables measuring their current political views, their support for far-right parties, and their willingness to support memory recovery initiatives. Our findings demonstrate the potential of targeted educational efforts in addressing historical amnesia and shaping informed political engagement in post-conflict societies.
The Spillover Effects of Center-Periphery Dynamics on Politically Disenfranchised Regions
With Alberto López Ortega and Álvaro Canalejo-Molero
What effect do center-periphery dynamics have on the political attitudes of citizens from third regions? This study develops a theoretical model to answer this question and tests it with an original survey and two embedded experiments. The first experiment exposes participants to randomized video vignettes showing hypothetical negotiations between the Spanish government and (some/all of) its regions over devolution. The vignettes randomize whether devolution occurs for all regions or only for one peripheral region (Catalonia), which receives special treatment. Moreover, the vignettes vary by the tone of the negotiations -cooperative or conflictual. The results show that giving special treatment to Catalonia increases demands for devolution for the own region, while conflictual scenarios increase support for authoritarian practices. In addition, the second experiment shows that citizens from third regions are willing to admit more decentralization if they are included among the regions with special treatment, whereas citizens from peripheral regions become less supportive of it when third regions are included in the delivery of decentralization. These findings have implications for the design of asymmetric federal institutions in fragmented nation states with distinct levels of regions' enfranchisement for political autonomy.