Abstract: This paper studies how the design of debt restructuring programs shapes labor market outcomes. Using administrative data from Sweden and a novel examiner IV design, I find that participation reduces labor income and employment on average, with effects that persist after the program ends. These average effects mask substantial heterogeneity. This heterogeneity reflects differential exposure to upward repayment adjustments, which discourage unemployed participants from seeking work. I use a calibrated labor supply model to show that modest changes in program structure can improve welfare for both debtors and creditors. These findings challenge the practice of substantially adjusting repayment plans in response to income changes.

Abstract: Using Swedish administrative data and a stacked difference-in-differences design, we estimate substantial, persistent worker earnings losses following corporate acquisitions. Losses reflect displacement and lower earnings among target-firm stayers. We find no evidence that increased monopsony power explains stayer losses. These losses concentrate in acquisitions with pre-existing connections between the acquirer and target, particularly when an acquirer employee served on the target’s board before the transaction. In acquisitions with these board connections, acquirer profits and CEO pay rise while combined employment and revenue remain broadly stable. This joint pattern is consistent with rent redistribution from target workers toward executives and shareholders.