Horng Chern Wong

Research

WORKING PAPERS

Understanding High-Wage Firms: Monopoly, Monopsony, and Bargaining Power 

Conditionally accepted @ American Economic Review

Abstract: I study how firm market power and worker bargaining power shape wages and welfare. Using French micro-data, I document patterns linking wages and firm market power that existing models cannot explain. A model in which firms produce vertically differentiated goods and share profits with workers explains those patterns. The model (a) reveals new challenges in estimating monopsony and bargaining power, proposing an alternative approach; (b) shows that the passthrough of firm-specific shocks to wages depends on the type of shock; (c) explains how markups shape firm wage premia; and (d) formalizes how strengthening worker bargaining power affects wages and welfare.

Urban-Biased Structural Change (with Natalie Chen, Dennis Novy, & Carlo Perroni)

Abstract: Using firm-level data from France, we document that the shift of economic activity from manufacturing to services over the last few decades has been urban-biased: structural change has been more pronounced in areas with higher population density. This bias can be accounted for by the location choices of large services firms that sort into big cities and large manufacturing firms that increasingly locate in suburban and rural areas. Motivated by these findings, we estimate a structural model of city formation with heterogeneous firms and international trade. We find that agglomeration economies have strengthened for services but weakened for manufacturing. This divergence is a key driver of the urban bias but it dampens aggregate structural change. Rising manufacturing productivity and falling international trade costs further contribute to the growth of large services firms in the densest urban areas, boosting services productivity and services exports, but also land prices.

The Labor Market Consequences of Acquisitions (with Jakob Beuschlein and Jósef Sigurdsson)

Abstract: We study the effects of corporate acquisitions on workers using Swedish administrative data and document substantial, persistent earnings losses following acquisitions. These losses reflect both displacement and wage cuts among stayers from target firms. We find no evidence that increased monopsony power accounts for these wage cuts. Instead, they are concentrated in acquisitions where the acquiring-firm CEO sat on the board of the target prior to the transaction. Such acquisitions increase acquiring-firm profits and CEO pay, without affecting total employment or revenue, consistent with rent redistribution. Overall, acquisitions reduce wages and disrupt employment, with profit gains partly extracted from workers.

Teaching

2022 - present: Labor IV (Ph.D.) 

2024 - present: Topics in International Trade (Ph.D.)

2022 - present: International Economics (B.Sc.)