Peer-reviewed articles (with abstracts)
Comments on Amir Saemi’s Morality and Revelation in Islamic Thought and Beyond: A New Problem of Evil, Agatheos: European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2025, Vol.2, No.3, pp.19-33 (open access)
ABSTRACT: In this article, I offer a friendly engagement with Amir Saemi’s recent publication, Morality and Revelation in Islamic Thought and Beyond: A New Problem of Evil. In this book, Saemi introduces what he terms the “Problem of Divinely Prescribed Evil,” which arises from the apparent conflict between the divinity of Scripture, the existence of seemingly prescribed immoral actions, and the reliability of human moral judgment. To resolve this conflict, Saemi proposes and defends what he calls the “Legal Interpretation” solution, which reframes morally problematic scriptural injunctions as historically contingent legal measures intended to resolve the social challenges of a nonideal community. In what follows, I argue that this solution is vulnerable to two significant objections. First, it risks being appropriated by traditionalist or fundamentalist perspectives that resist claims of moral progress (the “Absāl’s Island” objection). Second, it fails to resolve the underlying moral tension, merely relocating the problem without dissolving it (the “Illusory Solution” objection). I conclude my discussion by noting that my criticisms should be viewed as constructive and part of a larger, ongoing conversation about Saemi’s important work.
The unreality of traditional Islamic theism's views on belief, providence, and eschatology: a rejoinder to Tabur, Religious Studies, 2025, 61(4):951-971 (open access)
ABSTRACT: In a previous work, I argue that traditional Islamic theism's understanding of the world, when juxtaposed with key facts of our world's religious diversity, is implausible. On this understanding, roughly, the truth of tawḥīd (Islamic monotheism) is universally evident, as is belief in its truth. Faithful Muslims act appropriately on knowledge of tawḥīd and are rewarded with heaven, whereas non-Muslims culpably refuse to do so and are eternally punished in hell. Such a view of the world, I argue, is not borne out by empirical observation and philosophical reflection. In a recent article, Ayşenur Ünügür Tabur criticizes this argument, presenting a number of objections to it. In this rejoinder, I argue that her objections, which primarily consist of misstatements and irrelevancies, fail to refute my argument. Since traditional Islamic theism's understanding of the world includes the view that some people will be eternally punished in hell, Tabur augments her discussion of my argument by attempting to solve the Problem of Hell. In my rejoinder to Tabur, I further argue that her proffered solution to this problem is woefully inadequate.
The 'Diderot Objection' to Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology, Religious Studies, 2024, 60(1):123-146 (open access)
ABSTRACT: In response to Pascal's famous wager argument for adopting Christian belief, Denis Diderot noted that ‘An Imam could just as well reason this way’. In this article, I will show how Diderot's observation about Pascal's argument can legitimately be made about Alvin Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology (RE) and its use in defending the rationality of Christian belief. Plantinga's RE can, with some minor adjustments, easily be adopted by Muslims. I shall argue that an Islamic analogue of Plantinga's Christian RE presents an undercutting rationality defeater for Christian belief for those reflective Christians who adopt Plantinga-style religious epistemology. I call this defeater the ‘Diderot Objection’ to Plantinga's RE. As part of my discussion, I will consider how Plantinga attempts to respond to this sort of objection and will show why his response runs into difficulties.
The Philosophy of Antiphilosophy in Islam, The European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 2022, Vol. 18, No. 2, 5-24 (open access)
ABSTRACT: In this article, I will examine Aristotle’s protreptic argument for the necessity of philosophy as it was deployed by Al-Kindi. I will show how a Muslim critic of philosophy, primarily one who is aligned with the theological outlook of Ibn Hanbal, can reasonably reject the protreptic argument as Al-Kindi presents it. The argument can, however, be reworked in a way to circumvent common criticisms of it presented by Hanbalī-style opponents of philosophy. Indeed, I will argue that, once the argument is properly clarified with reference to what constitutes ‘philosophy’, its soundness is incontrovertible. In closing, I will briefly discuss why Muslim critics of philosophy need not see the protreptic argument as threatening, as the inevitability of philosophy does not necessitate a commitment to all sorts of philosophical positions, however problematic these may be for Islamic doctrine.
The Sceptical Muslim, Religious Studies, 2023, 59(3):495-514 (open access)
ABSTRACT: Many Muslims take the position that religious doubts constitute a serious problem for anyone who regards himself or herself as a Muslim, arguing that such a predicament may even result in apostasy. According to this position, the main problem with a Muslim who harbours religious doubts, a ‘Sceptical Muslim’, is that he or she is culpable for failing to respond appropriately to epistemic certainty about fundamental Islamic doctrine, primarily the existence of God and the Prophethood of Muhammad. I shall argue that, contrary to what many Muslims have asserted, the position of the ‘Sceptical Muslim’ is a viable one in an Islamic context.
Traditional Islamic Exclusivism - A Critique, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2014, 6 (2), 185-209
ABSTRACT: In this paper, I give an account and critique of what I call ‘Traditional Islamic Exclusivism’ – a specific Islamic interpretation of religious exclusivism. This Islamic version of religious exclusivism rests on exclusivist attitudes towards truth, epistemic justification and salvation. After giving an account of Traditional Islamic Exclusivism by explaining its theological roots in the Qur’an and ahadith (reports of sayings attributed to the Prophet Muhammad), I proceed to critique it. I do so by arguing that Islamic epistemic exclusivism, which forms the main core of Traditional Islamic Exclusivism, is implausible. This criticism subsequently opens up further lines of criticism and discussion of both salvific and alethic exclusivism in an Islamic context. I conclude with some remarks about the implications and significance of my criticisms of Traditional Islamic Exclusivism.
Burdens of Proof and the Case for Unevenness (with Jonathan McKeown-Green & Aness Webster), Argumentation, 2013, 27, 259–282
ABSTRACT: How is the burden of proof to be distributed among individuals who are involved in resolving a particular issue? Under what conditions should the burden of proof be distributed unevenly? We distinguish attitudinal from dialectical burdens and argue that these questions should be answered differently, depending on which is in play. One has an attitudinal burden with respect to some proposition when one is required to possess sufficient evidence for it. One has a dialectical burden with respect to some proposition when one is required to provide supporting arguments for it as part of a deliberative process. We show that the attitudinal burden with respect to certain propositions is unevenly distributed in some deliberative contexts, but in all of these contexts, establishing the degree of support for the proposition is merely a means to some other deliberative end, such as action guidance, or persuasion. By contrast, uneven distributions of the dialectical burden regularly further the aims of deliberation, even in contexts where the quest for truth is the sole deliberative aim, rather than merely a means to some different deliberative end. We argue that our distinction between these two burdens resolves puzzles about unevenness that have been raised in the literature.
Some ruminations about inculpable non-belief, Religious Studies, 2013, 49(3):399-419 (open access) [This article was included in a special issue edited by Mohammad Saleh Zarepour, (Ed.), Islamic Problems and Perspectives in Philosophy of Religion, Religious Studies Archives, (2021), No. 5]
ABSTRACT: This article presents a discussion of the concept of ‘non-belief’, focusing on a variety of difficulties it raises for the theist. After considering how the notion of ‘non-belief’ may be construed, I catalogue five major problems facing the theist who insists on maintaining the traditional notion of ‘non-belief’. Those theists who insist on maintaining this traditional notion sometimes appeal to the ‘sin defence’ in an attempt to defend their position. I critique this defence and conclude with a mention of how rejecting the traditional notion of ‘non-belief’ will lead us towards revisionary theologies.
Divine Hiddenness and Discrimination: A Philosophical Dilemma (with Markus Weidler), 2013, Sophia, 52, 95–114
ABSTRACT: Since its first delivery in 1993, J.L. Schellenberg’s atheistic argument from divine hiddenness keeps generating lively debate in various quarters in the philosophy of religion. Over time, the author has responded to many criticisms of his argument, both in its original evidentialist version and in its subsequent conceptualist version. One central problem that has gone undetected in these exchanges to date, we argue, is how Schellenberg’s explicit-recognition criterion for revelation contains discriminatory tendencies against mentally disabled persons. Viewed from this angle, our present critique imparts Schellenberg’s position with a philosophical dilemma: (1) endorsing divine discrimination to the effect that God does not love ‘cognitive-affective outsiders’ or (2) giving up on explicit recognition. Either way, the hiddenness argument does not succeed.
Belief, Providence and Eschatology: Some Philosophical Problems in Islamic Theism, Philosophy Compass, 2008, 3, 231-253
ABSTRACT: Traditional Islamic theism gives us a certain picture of the world, in which the concepts of belief, providence and eschatology are involved. According to the traditional picture, belief in God is a universal phenomenon. This is because God has providentially arranged the world in such a manner that the signs of God are everywhere and which lead to knowledge of His existence. And, because the world is ‘providentially unambiguous’, those who do not have faith in God are culpable for their lack of it, and therefore deserve eternal punishment in hell. In this paper, I argue that this traditional picture is simply false, or at the very least seriously contestable. I also explore the implications of my argument for those who might be interested in assessing the viability of some form of (Islamic) ‘revisionary theism’, in which the concepts of belief, providence and eschatology feature.
Some critical reflections on the hiddenness argument (with Markus Weidler), International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2007, 61, 1-23 (open access)
ABSTRACT: J.L. Schellenberg’s Argument from Divine Hiddenness maintains that if a perfectly loving God exists, then there is no non-resistant non-belief. Given that such nonbelief exists, however, it follows that there is no perfectly loving God. To support the conditional claim, Schellenberg presents conceptual and analogical considerations, which we subject to critical scrutiny. We also evaluate Schellenberg’s claim that the belief that God exists is logically necessary for entering into a relationship with the Divine. Finally, we turn to possible variants of Schellenberg’s case, and argue that the modifications necessary to accommodate our criticisms leave those variants with much less of a sting than originally suggested by his provocative formulation.
How to answer the de jure question about Christian belief (with John Bishop), International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2004, 56, 109-129
ABSTRACT: Our aims in this paper are (1) to argue that Alvin Plantinga’s Reformed epistemology (PRE) does not provide a categorical affirmative answer to the ‘de jure question’ about Christian belief; (2) to argue that – on the assumption that our total independent evidence leaves it open whether Christian belief is true or false – a categorical affirmative answer to the de jure question requires defending doxastic venture in favour of Christian belief; and (3) to suggest that PRE’s appeal to epistemological externalism may play a significant role in defending the epistemic propriety of doxastic venture in favour of Christian belief. By a ‘doxastic venture in favour of a certain belief’ we understand taking that belief to be true in one’s actions and way of life beyond the support of evidence for the truth of the proposition believed – believing by ‘a leap of faith,’ as is popularly said.
Book chapters (with abstracts where available)
'Islamic Faith and Knowledge of God', 'Reply to Jonathan L. Kvanvig', 'Reply to Nehama Verbin', in Global Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion: From Religious Experience to the Afterlife, Yujin Nagasawa and Mohammad Saleh Zarepour, (Eds.), Oxford University Press, 2024 (open access)
'Islam and the Problem of Divine Hiddenness', in Islamic Philosophy of Religion: Analytic Perspectives, Mohammad Saleh Zarepour, (Ed.,), Routledge, 2024, 181-202
'Opening Position Statement (Sunni Islam)', 'First Reply', and 'Second Reply', Interreligious Philosophical Dialogues, Vol. 2, Graham Oppy and N.N. Trakakis, (Eds.), Routledge, 2018, 3-24, 85-92, 125-133
The Islamic Problem of Religious Diversity, Religious Perspectives on Religious Diversity, Robert McKim, (Ed.), Brill, 2017, 162-175
ABSTRACT: According to traditional Islamic theology, Islamic belief counts as an instance of knowledge or, at the very least, is accompanied by very strong epistemic justification. A consequence of this view is that there is no rational and inculpable non-acceptance of Islamic belief. But this seems grossly implausible, in light of very strong evidence to the contrary. Surely, some instances where people do not accept Islamic belief are rational and inculpable. Trying to resolve this problem constitutes what I call ‘The Islamic Problem of Religious Diversity’. In this chapter, I provide a critical discussion of the problem, considering but ultimately rejecting a standard Islamic response to it.
Islamic Conceptions of Divinity, The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, Graham Oppy, (Ed.), Routledge, 2015, 114-126
ABSTRACT: Islam is a monotheistic religion, where belief in the divine involves belief in the existence of one God, or Allah (literally ‘the God’ in Arabic). The principal source that informs Islamic understanding of God is the Qur’an, followed by the collection of the ahadith: reports of the sayings or actions attributed to the Prophet Muhammad. In many cases, the ahadith provide further elaboration on matters stated in Qur’anic verses, including those that mention God. In addition to what one finds in these two sources, the concept of God in Islam has been thoroughly discussed and debated in the works of many Muslim theologians and philosophers. In this chapter, I will begin by outlining the concept of God as it appears (primarily) in the Qur’an and ahadith. After that, I will comment on whether the concept of God that emerges from a reading of the Qur’an and ahadith mirrors, or falls in close proximity to, the dominant conception of God discussed by contemporary philosophers of religion. Next, I will provide a summary account of some important discussions and debates among classical Muslim thinkers about a number of divine attributes, such as God’s power, oneness, and knowledge. In the penultimate section of this chapter, I will touch on the Islamic understanding of God’s transcendence, as discussed by both classical and contemporary Muslim thinkers; I will argue, using the divine attribute of transcendence as an example, that how we understand the concept of God will have important implications when it comes to religious practice. In this chapter’s concluding section, I will end with a few brief remarks about the direction in which Muslim philosophers must take their thinking about the concept of God, if commitment to Islamic faith is to be regarded as reasonable.
'Philosophy of Religion in Islam', The Biographical Encyclopedia of Islamic Philosophy, Oliver Leaman, (Ed.), Bloomsbury, 2015, 406-424