Full Professor Mislav Ježić

Member of Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts;
University of Zagreb, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Zagreb

Abstract title:
"What can we deduce about the antiquity of philosophy from the comparison of the earliest documented Ancient Indian and Ancient Greek philosophy?"

In Vedic thought, especially in the Upaniṣads, one finds ontological and physiological/cosmological (and partly psychological or epistemological) terminology, with which the concepts and terminology of the Pre-Socratics, and partly up to Plato, shows etymological correspondences. This means that the same basic concepts are repeatedly called by genetically corresponding expressions. These can be lexemes, but also equally formed grammatical forms of words, sometimes even syntagms. Complete correspondences in content and expression can be supplemented by some in which the expression is not completely coincident, but the content is. In the presentation and the paper, corresponding examples will be examined and an attempt will be made to assess what these correspondences mean in relation to the thought content, the way it developed, and the time of its emergence. 

Abstract title:
"Originality or mutual influence: The concept of Oneness in Greece and India"

The concept of Oneness was develop through history of ideas, passing many phases, from unclear introduction to mature form. This development could be noticed, from the early stages in the Egyptian and Mesopotamian theological ideas, to later philosophical forms which could be find in Greece and India. A comparison of the emergence, development, and meaning of the concept of Oneness raises the question of the originality of both philosophical traditions, whether Indian and Greek philosophy are original or there is mutual influence between them, also which teaching could be older. Interpretations of the authenticity and description of thematic similarity of Oneness in Greek and Indian philosophy could be coincidental, product of the influence of one philosophy on the other, or the synchronous, separate origin of each philosophies. Author claims for the last option, with the understanding development of concept of Oneness in Greece and India as sign of the homogeneity of human thought, which should not be divided into separate compartments of specific cultures, but should be seen as the achievements of the whole general human culture and belong to it.

Abstract title:
"Eternality and Human Consciousness:Resolvinng Augustine's Two Views of Time"

Augustine offers two seemingly conflicting views of time in Conf., Book XI and in De Civitate Dei, Book XI. In Conf. he treats the nature of the human experience of time, or phenomenological time.

That is to say, human beings and time came into existence simultaneously. However,  in De Civitate Dei he contends that time existed, as the entire tradition of ancient philosophy held, outside of the consciousness of the individual. In Conf., the "whatness" of time is proffered as a psychologically phenomenon. In order for time to be, it cannot be unless it is not; if nothing passed away,  t would be no time; and if nothing were still coming, there would be no future; and if there were nothing at all,  there would be no present time. For Augustine, time is coupled with non-being. It would seem to follow that time is within human consciousness, not outside of it. I argue that the view of time in the Conf. is a description of how human consciousness measures time but it is quite another to say that such measurement determines its very existence. Augustine's primary concern is the relationship between the.  changing and the unchanging; the mutable and the mutable. In De Civitate Dei the existence of time is governed not by human consciousness, but by the changing relations of mutable beings.  Time is necessitated by the mutability of created beings that stand in contradistinction to eternality.  It is the distinction between the immutability of eternity and the changeableness of temporal events that is the key to the Augustinian concept of time and which resolves and inconsistency between the view of time in the Conf. and the De Civitate Dei. 

Abstract title:
"Speech, Personification, and Friendship in Plato's Crito"

I shall begin my presentation with three questions: (1) Why does Socrates choose to answer Crito in the second part of the conversation by using a speech?; (2) Why does Socrates employ personification in this speech?; and (3) Why have the Laws, specifically, been personified? As I will show, posing each of these questions independently will improve our understanding of the dialogue. 

Regarding the first question—why does Socrates choose to respond to Crito in the second part of the conversation with a speech—let us recall that some of Plato's dialogues, especially the so-called 'early dialogues', such as the Euthyphro, and the Laches, include no speeches at all. Not only is the existence of the speech in the Crito of interest, but also its length and centrality to the dialogue. While the speeches in other dialogues seem to serve a mostly clarificatory role (e.g., the myth of Er at the end of the Republic), in the Crito, the Laws' speech constitutes nearly half of the dialogue and presents Socrates' final response to Crito's offer to jailbreak him. The second question—why does this speech employ personification—seems to be subsumed within the first, but it is not. Socrates could have delivered a speech without personifying anything or anyone. In such a case, he himself would have been the speaker, like he is in the Phaedrus. Concerning the third question—why are the Laws, specifically, personified—the Laws are not the only candidate for personification. Three other possibilities present themselves: a god, a renowned Athenian speaker, or the polis. 

In what follows, I argue that the answers to the aforementioned questions define Crito as the protagonist and prototypical person Plato wanted to explore in composing the Crito. There are individuals who value good deeds with no regard to their potential negative consequences or the need to employ illegitimate means. Crito in the Crito is a different kind of person. He believes that trying to jailbreak his friend is a good act. But his evaluation of himself as a just and moral man concerns not only what he does but also how he does it. This concern is manifested in two ways. Crito not only performs an act of justice (helping his friend); he ensures that this good action entails neither harming others nor using illegitimate means. On the surface, such a Crito seems entirely positive. But perhaps his is a facade, behind which things are completely opposite. He would then become a most dangerous person. It is such a person, I argue, that interests Plato in the Crito.

Abstract title:

 "True Health Will Never Fade: Three Insights into the Body from the Antiquity"

Ever since its inception in Western culture in the 5th century BCE, rational medicine has been playing a significant role in almost every aspect of human life; so much so that a considerable amount of resources, energy, and skills have been oriented either to relieve the pain or to provide the means of preserving the body in a sound condition. As to the latter, and as there seems to be room to pose an active agency of the individual in the pursuit of their health, such early forms of a “biopower” are certainly at odds with the Stoic assumption of health as an indifferent, namely for challenging the Stoic consideration of health as a worry which is « beyond our power ». This drive to health, however, has roots in the dawn of medical art and is to be found at the basis of a good deal of contemporary behavioural patterns which seek out well-being.

Notwithstanding this, the possibility of giving a feasible answer to the notion of health is spiked with difficulties of an epistemological nature.  When the surgeon R. Leriche provided a definition of health as the state whereby the organs silently fulfil the necessary functions, he was pointing out that there cannot be a science of health as such, or rather suggesting —  recalling Kant’s opinion about this very issue —  the matter to be better off reducing to a sort of popular concern: one can be perfectly happy but seriously ill, and in the other way round, terribly sad and in constant sorrow but healthy and fit as a fiddle.

In this proposal we wish to shed some light upon the notion of health in Antiquity by delving, in the first instance, into some of its general implications. In the second place, attention will be shifted to considering what  was it deemed to be in the field of medical practice in the Classical and the Hellenistic-Roman periods. To do so, the aforementioned considerations will be put in reliance with the main anatomo-physiological paradigms which can be singled out from the opinions held by the most influential ancient physicians; namely, and for the purpose here: the humoral paradigm, with Hippocrates of Kos as the most salient representative beside Polybus of Kos; the pneumatical paradigm, whose major figure and contributor was Erasistratus of Kos; and the atomical paradigm, promoted by Asclepiades of Bithynia and his heirs.

From the analysis above it is expected to yield evidence of the survival of these three views of the body. It will be argued that, despite the centuries passed, none of them has been definitively superseded, but each one is still on to a some extent and severally contributing to the actual understanding of this slippery concept of health.

Abstract title:

 "On the Philosophical Aspects of Time Reversal in Classical Physics and Engineering"

The paper deals with several aspects of time reversal in physical systems grasping mathematical formalism, laws of nature and particularly philosophical implications. The concept of time reversal is presented for mechanical and electromagnetic systems in classical physics. Note that time reversal or T-symmetry is related to the symmetry of physical laws under a time reversal transformation: t→-t. While time reversal is in a mathematically formal manner rather successfully used in many areas in engineering such as acoustics or electromagnetics there are few deeper issues to be tackled in physics and philosophy, e.g. if the time reversal is actually change or motion reversal respectively. 

Thus, this paper also aims to address the notion of time reversal invariance of physical theories, the character of such time reversal operators, and how physical properties change under time reversal. Some disagreement among philosophers of science if classical electromagnetics is time-reversal invariant is discussed, as well. Particular emphasis is also focused on symmetry principles resulting in conservation laws, principles of causality in natural phenomena and time arrows. A question whether time reversal symmetry is compatible with the asymmetry of cause and effect is discussed. Some illustrative examples arising in classical mechanics and electromagnetics are given.

Abstract title:

 "Creativity: Computationalism, Embodiment, and Plato"

Contemporary approaches to creativity in cognitive science and philosophy often reduce it to mechanistic or algorithmic processes, framing it as the result of unconscious randomness, computational recombination, or, as in Margaret Boden’s theory, the transformation of a particular conceptual space. This paper offers an alternative account by addressing the ontological conditions of creativity in general and the creativity of thinking in particular. Through a critique of the contemporary naturalizing framework in creativity research, it highlights the need for an adequate conception of the intelligibility of thinking itself.

The paper explores the problem of novelty in creative thinking as a hermeneutical paradox that contemporary naturalizing approaches fail to resolve. Specifically, I propose a noetic interpretation of creativity, where shifts in understanding are irreducible to the mere addition of new information or the expansion or refinement of existing concepts. These shifts occur to us, even as we actively enact the conditions for their possibility. Using examples such as scientific revolutions and Picasso’s artistic process, I argue that creatively novel understandings of the world cannot be achieved through the conscious combination of ideas or as the result of random unconscious processes.

This paradox is shown to constitute the essence of the Meno problem in Plato, revealing its presence in all thinking that leads to novel understanding. The paper then examines alternative solutions from the 4E perspective, discussing their advantages over computational approaches. However, I argue that even 4E approaches assume the paradox of creative novelty (and thus the Meno problem) is solvable, without offering a true resolution.

Finally, I critique the mainstream interpretation of Plato’s theory of Forms, which also contradicts the possibility of genuine creativity—understood as the ability to interpret phenomena in different, yet equally valid, ways. I suggest that resolving this paradox requires a hermeneutical reinterpretation of Plato’s theory, supported by a trans-rational ontology as later developed by Plotinus.

Abstract title:

 "Politeias demiourgoi. The theoretical transfiguration of the constitutional legislator in the practical epistemology of Aristotle"

The figure of the constitutional legislator plays a central role in shaping the collective identity of the Greek poleis. Personalities with mythological contours, such as Solon or Lycurgus, are portrayed by the sources as “demiurgic” characters (Vegetti 2015). Indeed, they are represented as wise creators of legislations named after them, which have given a definite shape to collectivities. In this way, they transformed the conflicts that run through them into components of delicate balances, the breaking of which may require the intervention of a new “demiurge.”

This role of defining the institutional framework of the polis acquired a central theoretical significance in Aristotle, not only at the political level but also at the ethical one. In his view, the primary task of the legislator is to educate citizens to virtue. The constitutional legislator therefore, insofar as he defines the fundamental laws, is also the one who provides his citizens with the value framework for their ethical conduct.

However, archaic Greece did not feel the need to explain the origin of the knowledge that characterizes these figures, since at that time “there is no distance between Truth and Justice,” and Truth is basically a concession of the divine to certain exceptional men (Detienne 1992). Aristotle, instead, is called upon to find an explanation for this form of knowledge. He must therefore introduce in the legislator's action a dialectic between the properly political dimension of his action, which implies specific situational and contextual knowledge, and a more universal dimension, which comes to be identified with nature, particularly the nature of man.

The present paper aims to first investigate the pivotal role of the constitutional legislator in Aristotelian practical epistemology, and then to study the epistemological condition of the legislator's own operation. This point of view will make it possible to see the importance of the dialectic between the political and natural dimensions in an innovative way compared to interpretations that, only focusing on practical epistemology, have led various authors to choose whether to consider Aristotelian ethics as purely naturalistic or contextualist.

Abstract title:

 "Contemporary Anti-Materialism and Hellenistic Philosophies"

The ontological dilemma of modern philosophy is whether reality is fundamentally material or mental in nature. This means that one has to choose between materialism and idealism. But in recent times, materialism has an alternative not only in idealism, but also in what is now called panpsychism. Panpsychism, however, is a term that is used in different meanings: not all panpsychists share the same ontological position. Thus, the panpsychism advocated by Federico Faggin is a kind of idealism, but the usual form of panpsychism is not idealistic. In addition, there is a type of panpsychism, the so-called cosmopsychism, for which it is not clear whether it belongs to idealism or to some other form of anti-materialism.

Our presentation aims to draw attention to the fact that in Hellenistic times there were also more ontological positions than the traditional dilemma of “materialism or idealism” suggests. The only Hellenistic philosophy that can be called materialistic was Epicureanism, while idealism was represented by the neo-Pythagoreans and Hellenistic Platonists. But Stoicism is far from both materialism and idealism. The Stoic ontological position was usually labeled as materialism, but now, with the long-neglected Hellenistic philosophy finally coming into the spotlight, it has become clear that such a label is inappropriate. Stoicism is opposed to materialism in everything except the initial ontological premise that reality is fundamentally corporeal in nature. Therefore, Stoicism is now preferred to be labeled as corporealism or somatism, but this has resulted in a category that is equally valid for Epicureans as materialists. Both Stoics and Epicureans are somatists, but the latter are materialists, while the Stoics are anti-materialists, just like modern panpsychists. But while in antiquity the difference between Stoic and Platonist anti-materialism was very clear, the same cannot be said for the contemporary philosophical scene: panpsychism is the name for ontological positions that are no less opposed to each other than the Stoics and Platonists.

It seems to us that with a somewhat better terminologization of Hellenistic ontological positions, the clarity needed to cope with the newly created confusion can be achieved. We propose the term psychophysicalism for the Stoic form of somatism and want to show how contemporary anti-materialism can be viewed more clearly from the perspective of Hellenistic ontological paradigms.

Abstract title:

 "Delights of Temperance: On the ‘supervenient’ pleasures in NE II.3"

Integral to Aristotle’s conception of the virtuous person’s state is the enjoyment of her own virtuous activity. This is as true for virtue in general as it is for the individual virtues of character; we should not say of someone that she is temperate if she does not enjoy acting temperately (Nicomachean Ethics I.8, 1099a7–20). Yet it remains unclear what the content of the temperate person’s characteristic pleasure is. In other words, when the temperate person is pleased as a result of her temperate comportment towards the bodily pleasures of eating, drinking and sex, what is it that she enjoys? Current scholarship is united by a focus on the rational part of the temperate person’s soul; thus, the temperate person is said to be carved out by her enjoyment of her own activity as temperate (Curzer 1997, Frede 2009, Gottlieb 2021), the fineness of her fine action (Coope 2012), or in general the pleasure intrinsic to abstaining from bodily goods (Jimenez 2015). 

However, Aristotle’s assertion that temperance is a virtue of the nonrational part of the soul (III.10, 1117b24) suggests that these accounts overlook a crucial aspect of the nature of temperance. In contrast to the literature, the paper defends the importance of characteristic pleasures of temperance which belong to the nonrational part of the soul, arising as a result of the agent’s pursuit of bodily goods beneficial for her physical welfare. As such, the role of appetitive desire for bodily pleasures is the independent identification of particulars beneficial for the agent’s bodily state. Looking particularly towards the text of NE II.3, I suggest that this ability constitutes the pleasures distinctive to temperance as a character state. There, Aristotle briefly discusses the pleasures and pains which he says ‘supervene’ on our actions. The passage in which these are mentioned is commonly read as affirming two things about the temperate person’s state. First, that the characteristic enjoyments of temperance – those which carve the temperate person out as the character she is – are the pleasures of abstaining from bodily goods. Second, the passage is taken to suggest that the supervenient pleasures mentioned are of a ‘moral’, or at any rate rational kind, such that their content is the very fact that the action which the person performs is temperate. 

My aim is to argue against these two readings of the passage, in favour of a view on which the temperate person’s enjoyment of abstaining should be understood as de re rather than de dicto. On my view, the supervenient pleasures are nonrational in nature and have as their content the very activity which occasions them. Thus, the temperate person of NE II.3 enjoys that which temperate actions consist in – namely, moderate engagement with bodily pleasures, which sometimes includes abstaining from them – quite independently from her rational recognition of the fact that such a comportment is temperate.

Abstract title:

 "Madhubani Painting: Embodied Creation and Perception of feminine divine in Hinduism"

Celebrating the divinity in every woman, in Hinduism (one of the oldest religious traditions of Indian subcontinent) the concept of Shakti meaning the power within originates with the female being, whether of Gods or human beings.  Madhubani folk art is embedded with themes of Hindu religious tradition and mythology. There is a legend that for his daughter Sita’s marriage with Lord Rama, king Janak of Mithila commissioned native women artists to decorate the wedding venue with beautiful paintings. And Madhubani painting as we know it today was born.  Icons of Goddess like Durga, Saraswati, Lakshmi, Kali, flora and fauna, often intertwined with contemporary socio-political commentaries, especially from women’s gaze   drawn on mud walls and floors with bright colours is a vibrant folk art practiced primarily by women as traditional means of expression within their assigned sphere of ritual and worship.  Madhubani art sustains the valuable features of Hindu religion while minimizing or refining out the unpleasant. The roots linking everyday practices of Hinduism in the Mithila region of Bihar, India has ancient lineage. Madhubani paintings are integral to the identity of Mithila region. The complexity of relations between evolution of Hinduism and the accompanying cultural practices, is in fact questioned herein by what is meant by a religion as the classical Indian language Sanskrit does not have a word that defines Hinduism as religion or even religion per se. Thus, they are intertwined to an extent where neither the religious practices nor the art can be differentiated from each other. Madhubani art is more than an art form—it is a site of women’s engagement with religious practices and rituals and a way of attaining God- guided by their sense of aesthetics of beauty. This art form is embedded in indigenous traditions of Mithila’s visual language that embodies women lived experiences, asserting their agency through intricate motifs and vibrant art compositions telling of religious stories, myths and poetry. These paintings are a collective experience of women in the community – one that metaphorically reflects the religious tradition of society through women’s subjective gaze.  Madhubani paintings are not just pretty drawings, but a lot more. They are expressions of folk legends, mythology and Indian religious and spiritual traditions that are unified by adherence of karma (action, intent and consequences), and dharma (ethics/duties). This paper explores how Madhubani art functions as a mapping of the women artists’ engagement with Hinduism and its evolution through their subjective gaze to the version of Hinduism they practice today.

Abstract title:

 "Hybrid formulation of physicalism"

Physicalism may be the metaphysical darling of analytic philosophy—paraded as the worldview that best flatters our scientific self-image—but there's still no settled consensus on what, exactly, physicalism is supposed to mean. I will attempt to demonstrate—by analyzing the most prominent approaches to defining physicalism—that its most compelling formulation is as a hybrid hypothesis, both metaphysical and scientific, concerning the fundamental nature of our world. 

As a metaphysical stance, especially in the philosophy of mind, physicalism has evolved through distinct taxonomical strategies. Depending on the degree of abstraction, we encounter two dominant formulations: the via negativa approach that defines physicalism in terms of what it is not - not fundamentally mental or fundamentally normative (Levine 2001; Montero 2005; Montero & Papineau 2005; Worley 2006; Tiehen 2016) and the theory-based model (Dowell 2006, Brown 2024) says that something is considered physical if it’s described or accounted for by our most advanced physical theories. Both aim to circumvent Hempel’s dilemma (Hempel 1969), yet neither escapes philosophical challenges. The via negativa risks the untenable task of distinguishing between physicalism-friendly and physicalism-unfriendly forms of mentality, while the theory-based path is left to struggle with the dilemma’s two horns—questioning either the completeness of future physics (Ney 2020) or the adequacy of current physics as a basis for metaphysical claims (Bayne 2022). In the same vein, Melnyk (2016) presents physicalism as a (purely) scientific hypothesis sufficiently supported by empirical evidence. This claim, however, brings into focus the Duhem–Quine thesis regarding the underdetermination of theory by evidence—an issue to which Melnyk offers no compelling solution, apart from the assertion that a hypothesis's higher probability justifies its acceptance. On the way to a formulation of physicalism that evades Hempel’s dilemma and is not negative, I argue that we must retain the metaphysical dimension of the physicalist hypothesis.

The question of how a metaphysical thesis like physicalism can rely on empirical data finds its best answer in philosophical naturalism, as initiated by W. V. O. Quine. He argued that science and philosophy form a continuum—methodologically and ontologically—allowing philosophy to propose testable hypotheses and interpret empirical findings. Within this framework, physicalism emerges as a hybrid stance: both metaphysical and scientific. It can appeal to empirical support while maintaining conceptual depth. Fields like physiology and neuroscience underscore this position: they have found no evidence of non-physical forces in the brain or body—the very sites where immaterial consciousness would presumably manifest (Mørch 2023). The interplay between philosophical analysis and scientific inquiry strengthens physicalism’s claim. Despite its counterintuitive look, it remains the most promising framework for explaining mind and consciousness.

Abstract title:

 "The Curability of Plato’s Tyrant in Republic IX"

In Republic IX Socrates presents his account of the tyrannical character. Characterised by a powerful eros for bodily pleasure and power, in the right social circumstances the tyrannical character will amass the support of the demos and take control of the city to become a political tyrant (Rep, 575d). Most commentators argue the severe moral degeneration of this tyrant’s soul – hereafter distinguished as Plato’s tyrant – renders him incapable of undergoing moral reform (Johnstone 2011, Larivee 2012, Arruzza 2018, Scott 2020). Further motivating this view are several instances in Plato’s corpus where tyrants are offered as the primary example of morally incurable individuals. This is most notable in Plato’s eschatological myths of the Gorgias (525b9-c4) and Republic X (615d3-e3), where the disembodied souls of the tyrants Archelaus and Ardiaius are judged to be irredeemably wicked and thus sentenced to eternal punishment in the underworld. 

This paper argues, in contrast to prevailing views, that some tyrants in Plato’s corpus have the potential to undergo moral reform. In particular, it aims to show that Plato’s tyrant in Republic IX could be reformed. There are two reasons for such a reading; the paper focuses on the second. First, the account of Plato’s tyrant in Republic IX concludes when the tyrannical man takes political power and becomes a tyrant (575d). However, according to Socrates, a tyrant becomes more wretched the longer he holds political power (576b6-c2). This, I suggest, is one reason to doubt that Plato’s tyrant, as seen at 575d when he establishes political power, is morally incurable, since being a newly established tyrant his soul must have further degeneration to experience.

Second, I argue that scholars cannot characterise Plato’s tyrant as morally incurable without establishing that which makes a person – specifically some tyrants – morally incurable for Plato. Only once we answer this question will we then be able to examine whether all tyrants, including Plato’s tyrant, fit this profile. To answer this question, I compare three accounts of morally incurable individuals in the eschatological myths of the Phaedo, Gorgias, and Republic IX. I identify four characteristics common to incurable persons in these dialogues: (1) the incurable person acts on lawless desires, (2) they do not experience remorse (metameleia), (3) they have permanently destroyed their most important interpersonal relationships by personally killing immediate members of their family and (4), they are in a position of political power. 

Applying this profile of the incurable person to Socrates’ account of the tyrant in Republic IX, I argue that this person should not be considered morally incurable as they fail to meet each of the listed criteria. Most notably, Plato’s tyrant has not permanently destroyed his interpersonal relationships, and he is still capable of feeling metameleia (Rep, 577d-e). Thus, I conclude that there are tyrants within Plato’s corpus, specifically Plato’s tyrant of Republic IX, that are curable.

Abstract title:

 "Radical Scepticism and the Dream Hypothesis: Wittgensteinian Resolution to Cartesian Doubt"

The philosophical investigation of dreams and dreaming has occupied a central place in epistemology, ontology, ethics and in contemporary times, also in the field of philosophy of mind and cognitive science.  From antiquity to modernity, dreams have served as a powerful tool in discussions surrounding the limits of knowledge and reliability of perception. We find discussions of scepticism, as early as  Theaetetus (157e), where Socrates discusses about defects in perception and argues that knowledge cannot be defined through perception. Since the time of the Greeks, radical scepticism in various forms has been regarded as a main threat to epistemic certainty. To this end  the arguments regarding the deceptive nature of sense organs are used in standard sceptical arguments by Sceptics.  Moreover, medieval philosopher Augustine argued that we can distinguish both dreams and illusions from actual perception. 

In the Meditations, Descartes acknowledges that dreaming casts a unique epistemological threat. Descartes builds up the Dream skepticism, the most powerful and radical version of scepticism, by first considering familiar cases of sensory illusions which make us first doubt the external world and then our own existence. Dream skepticism challenges the difference between dream experience and hypothetical illusion. Argument from illusion discusses the deception caused by sensory experiences and builds up the argument by questioning whether everything one has experienced and known is a reality or just a dream. There is no way to distinguish between the two. Descartes argues that “there exist no certain marks by which the state of waking can ever be distinguished from sleep.” Over the years, scholars have pursued strong and weak reading of the dream hypothesis. 

Ludwig Wittgenstein turned from critiquing the generalized form of scepticism in Tractatus Logico-Philosophiacus, to a discussion of Dream Hypothesis of Descartes in his later writings. The paper argues that the Dream hypothesis represents a phenomenally different challenge to certainty in knowledge and his work, On Certainty – also called “the Third Wittgenstein” by scholars like, Danièle Moyal- Sharrock, marks a radical argument in defusing this specific version of Scepticism. Furthermore, G.E. Moore has assumed that scepticism represents a coherent position and hence it should be systematically refuted. In a radical contrast to Moore who answered Sceptic by offering a “Proof of an External World” and “A Defence of Common Sense” Wittgenstein emphasized that Dream skepticism was senseless, and required no formal refutation. The paper analyses the depth and thrust of Wittgenstein’s objection, that the statement ““I may be dreaming,” if taken literally, as Descartes does, is a form of nonsense.”

Through an investigation of the expression, “I know” and its functioning within everyday language games, the paper elucidates how On Certainty reflects on understanding the limits of knowledge, doubt, and epistemic justification. Ultimately, the paper highlights how the dream hypothesis, while posing a historically persistent challenge to certainty, is deflated by Wittgenstein’s radical re-conception of epistemic discourse.

Abstract title:

 "Subordination, consent, succession: The inner complexity of the human being in De institutione virginis by Ambrose of Milan"

This paper examines a passage from De institutione virginis (sections 10-20) by St Ambrose of Milan (4th century AD), in which the human being is portrayed as inherently dichotomous. Ambrose identifies three key divisions: (i) soul and body, (ii) inner and outer man, and (iii) old and new man. Each dichotomy generates tension and internal conflict, thereby demanding resolution. Ambrose proposes distinct approaches for navigating these divisions: the body must be subordinated to the soul; the inner man must engage with the outer man as an equal partner; and the old man must yield to the new. These solutions transcend a purely agonistic framework. Rather than relying solely on struggle and victory, Ambrose emphasizes reconciliation, openness to transformation, and the pursuit of internal harmony. The passage reveals two central insights: (a) the inner complexity of the human being cannot be fully captured by a single anthropological model – such as the soul-body dichotomy – and (b) internal conflicts are more effectively addressed through a multifaceted strategy than by exclusive adherence to one approach. To contextualize this analysis, I will draw on additional text from the Corpus Ambrosianum, situating this passage within the broader scope of Ambrose’s anthropology. 

Abstract title:

 "Unveiling Consciousness in Advaita Vedānta: A Textual Study of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and Gauḍapada’s Māṇḍūkyakārikā"

The paper undertakes a critical textual analysis of the nature of Self/Consciousness as  articulated in the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad/Māṇḍūkyakārikā which is unravelled through a rigorous  investigation/examination of the three states of consciousness universally experienced by all  human beings, namely wakeful (jāgrat), dream (svapna), and deep sleep (suṣupti). When  manifesting as the wakeful state and attaching itself to external objects, ātman is referred to as  Viśva/Vaiśvānara, signifying the existential being who experiences the phenomenal world as  gross and tangible and transient, in the mode common to all beings. Taijasa (‘the luminous’)/ dream consciousness is called antaḥprajña, i.e., ‘aware of internal objects’ (that constitute the  dream world); it is subtle because it manifests as the observer not in any relationship to any  gross object whatsoever. Prājña, whose sphere is deep sleep, who remains one and totally  without the distinction of seer and seen, undifferentiated (ekībhūtaḥ), prājña is a dense mass  of consciousness (prajñānaghanaḥ), which remains blissful (ānandamayaḥ), experiencing  bliss (ānandabhuk) and which is the doorway (cetomukhaḥ) to the experience of the dream and  wakeful states. The methodology exhibits that the Self is non-dual, continuous, the  metaphysical substratum, and the pure witness of the cyclic manifestations, alternations, and  displacements of three states of consciousness (avasthātraya). 

The seminal texts unfold the nature of the Self as unattached to the three states and remains  unaffected by them. While the waking, dreaming, or sleeping jīva (individual self) negotiates  between the fluctuating continuum of the states, the Self, the Fourth that is the source, support,  and resolution of jīvatva stands immutable. This is corroborated by the jīva’s innate ability to  recall the experience of being asleep/dreaming spontaneously and its irrefutable experience of  a particular jīvatva. The absolute certainty the “I” that woke up is the same “I” that was  asleep/dreaming. The same ātman is present in all three states of awareness and is absolutely  non-relational, even though it appears enmeshed with the perceived gross or subtle objects of  the waking and dream states. The text emphasizes that the three states are imagined and  projected in dualistic relationships to transmit knowledge of the non-dual Turīya. Turīya is the  essence of the knowledge of one’s Self (ekātmapratyayasāraṃ). It is that into which the entire  world gets resolved (prapañcopaśamaṃ). The Fourth comprises all that is peaceful (śāntaṃ),  auspicious (śivam); and non-dual (advaitaṃ). It is that which is to be known (sa-vijñeyaḥ). When the supreme Knowledge is realized and the jīva is “awakened” from profound ignorance,  then the epistemic triad has no further purpose. At this moment, all the dualistic relationships  as well as all the categories of dualisms and duality itself extemporaneously, instantaneously,  and simultaneously cease to exist (jñāte dvaitam nā vidyate).

Abstract title:

 "Metaphysics of Mortality: The Upanisadic Discourse on the End of Embodiment"

The Bhagavadgītā says “Of the born, death is certain, equally certain is the birth of the dead.” This puzzle of death which has haunted human thought across civilizations and centuries is not just about the biological end of life, it is an intense metaphysical, epistemological and ethical problem which demands a deep philosophical inquiry.  What is death? Why does one have to die? Like an existentialist one deliberates, if death is inescapable and all living beings are finite whether life is to be cherished as a gift or despised as a compulsion never consented to. Also, the randomly bestowed sufferings and joys only corroborate Camu’s idea of the absurd, that life is a search of meaning in a meaningless universe. And rightly so, because despite our awareness of the fact of the inevitability of death we have a strong urge to live and be born again. How are we to make sense of this tension between the awareness of our impending death and our intransigent desire to continue, endure and survive.  Camu says that the awareness of death does not nullify life rather it intensifies it. The point is to live with the absurd. 

Traditional Indian theories have long wrestled with the concept of life and death. Interestingly the Upaniṣads do not treat death negatively. As opposed to Camu and even Nietzsche the Upaniṣads challenge the fear of death by focussing their attention towards the unborn, eternal, everlasting consciousness permeating all beings. Death is an illusion, a mistaken identity with what is ephemeral and subject to decay. 

The purpose of this paper is to understand the age old yet significant Upaniṣadic explorations of the concept of death from the metaphysical, epistemological and ethical perspective to solve the mystery of death.   

Abstract title:

 "Paradoxes of the Law of Karma in the Theistic Purānic Traditions: A Critical Exploration"

The present research paper undertakes the critical exploration of the doctrine of karma in the Purāṇas traditionally regarded as the Smṛti which constitute a significant part of the post-vedic Hindu scriptural corpus.  While the law of karma—the principle of cause and effect governing all actions and their consequences—is a cornerstone of Indian philosophy, its application in the theistic and narrative-driven Purāṇas introduces significant theological and philosophical complexities. It is argued that the Purāṇas do not present a monolithic or purely mechanistic view of karma, but rather grapple with a series of inherent incongruities that constitute the ""problem of karma"" within this literary tradition.

The primary problem examined is the relationship between an impersonal, deterministic law of karma and the Purāṇic emphasis on divine intervention and grace (prasāda). In a purely kārmic universe, consequences are a direct and unalterable result of actions. However, the Purāṇas are replete with narratives where gods, goddesses, and divine incarnations actively mitigate, alter, or even negate the kārmic destinies of their devotees. The paper analyzes how texts such as the Padma Purāṇa, Bhāgavata Purāṇa and the Skanda Purāṇa present divine grace as a means to transcend kārmic bondage, thereby creating a paradox: is karma an absolute, cosmic law, or can it be superseded by a deity's will?

A secondary problem is the reconciliation of karma with human free will. The Puranas introduce the concepts of destiny resulting from past actions (prārabdha) and actions performed in the present life (kriyāmāna). This distinction attempts to resolve the question of whether a person's life is a pre-scripted fate or if they retain the agency to shape their future. By examining specific Purāṇic narratives, this research demonstrates how the texts navigate this complex interplay, often portraying heroic or divine figures making choices that defy a predetermined fate while still acknowledging the accumulated effects of their past.

Finally, the paper also addresses the ethical dilemma of kārmic retribution, where virtuous individuals suffer while the wicked prosper. The Purāṇas discusses this by elaborating on the complex, multi-lifetime nature of kārmic fruition, proposing that the effects of an action may not manifest until future births. This non-linear causality, while solving the problem of immediate justice, makes the karmic chain complex and difficult to verify, a point that the texts themselves acknowledge. In conclusion it is establishes that the Purāṇas do not abandon the doctrine of karma but rather expand it into a dynamic, theistic framework. By integrating it with concepts of divine grace, free will, and multi-generational effects, they transform karma from a rigid law into a flexible and morally comprehensive system that justifies the workings of the universe while leaving room for hope and spiritual effort.

Abstract title:

 "An Overlooked Fragment on Aristotelian Mathematics: Revisiting Aristotle’s Fragment 161R3 "

Aristotelian fragment 161 Rose (=R3) addresses a controversial instance of ancient Homeric  exegesis, specifically Iliad X 252-253, where Odysseus declares: “The stars have advanced, the  night has passed by more / than two parts, and a third part still remains.” Ancient scholars such as  Apion, Chrysippus, and Aristotle offered interpretations of this puzzling passage, later compiled  by Porphyry in his Homeric Questions and preserved in an ancient scholium to the Homeric text.  Porphyry highlights a mathematical inconsistency: if more than two-thirds of the night have passed,  how can a third still remain, rather than less than a third? 

The scholium has received a new annotated edition by Verhasselt and Mayhew.1 This paper  aims to expand the previous commentary, offering a comprehensive reading that situates the  fragment within its philosophical context. Our aim is twofold: (i) to reconstruct Aristotle’s  argument in detail, drawing on his broader metaphysical framework and ancient mathematical  theory, in order to highlight its significance for Aristotelian arithmetic; and (ii) to challenge the  fragment’s traditional attribution to the Homeric Problems. 

Aristotle’s interpretation notably diverges from Porphyry’s framing. Instead of engaging  with the contradiction in Homer’s verses, Aristotle examines a different mathematical issue. He  considers a scenario in which a whole is divided into two parts, and one part increases until the  other is reduced to one-third of the whole. At that point, the larger part makes up more than half—but by how much? Aristotle’s goal is to determine the precise amount of the increase. While this  reasoning may appear straightforward to modern readers, as it relies on familiar frameworks of  rational numbers and proportional reasoning, ancient Greek conceptions of number operated on  fundamentally different principles.  

Drawing on Aristotle’s corpus and ancient mathematical sources, we show that the  fragment reflects a sophisticated engagement with numerical increase. Aristotle distinguishes  between increase by a whole unit (ὅλῃ μονάδι) and by part of a number (μορίῳ ἀριθμοῦ), a  distinction grounded in his metaphysics: the unit is indivisible, while numbers are pluralities of  such units. This distinction informs his analysis and reveals the fragment’s deeper philosophical  stakes. It also highlights a key contrast between ancient and modern arithmetic, particularly in how  ancient thinkers conceptualized number growth and proportionality. 

However, a crucial detail complicates the fragment’s usual interpretation. Aristotle appears  to presuppose a different version of the Homeric line: “The stars have advanced, most of the  night—two parts—has passed, and a third part remains.” This version avoids the contradiction  noted by Porphyry. As a result, Aristotle’s reasoning, while mathematically sound, entirely  sidesteps the exegetical problem Porphyry sets out to resolve. 

Since the defining feature of Aristotle’s Homeric Problems is that the Homeric text  presents an ambiguity requiring resolution, yet the text Aristotle presupposes contains no such  ambiguity, we argue that the traditional attribution of this fragment to the Homeric Problems should be reconsidered. Instead, this fragment gains its true significance as a contribution to  Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics.

Abstract title:

 "Epistemology in the Puruṣa Sūkta of Ṛgveda"

The Puruṣa Sūkta stands as a pivotal hymn within the Vedic literature, firmly situated within  the texts of the Ṛgveda, specifically Manḍala 10, Sūkta 90, and is also found in other Vedic texts such  as the Śukla Yajurveda and Atharva Veda. It is widely recognized for its profound cosmological and  philosophical depth, offering a foundational narrative for the creation of the universe. At its core, the  hymn explores the nature of the cosmic being- Puruṣa, and about the emanation of the universe through  a primordial sacrifice, known as Yajña. As it says in its first mantra (verse) itself, Om sahasraśīrṣā  puruṣaḥ sahasrākśaḥ sahasrapāt ׀ Sa bhūmiṁviśvato vṛtvā’tyatiṣṭaddaśāngulam ׀׀ 

The text also presents a controversial account of the origin of societal order through the varṇa system,  and consistently emphasizes the radical interconnectedness of all existence. The Puruṣa Sūkta is  significant across various Vedic traditions, including Vaiśṇavism and Vedānta, as almost all the systems  of Indian philosophy base their studies on its concepts. It also establishes its spiritual and cultural  centrality through its continued recitation in rituals underscoring its divine and spiritual benefits. 

This paper argues that the Puruṣa Sūkta, beyond its overt cosmological, sociological and philosophical narratives, implicitly and explicitly engages with fundamental epistemological questions concerning  the nature of ultimate reality, the sources of valid knowledge, and interpretation of complex dialect and  terminology inherent in the texts. It will highlight comprehensive epistemology of Vedic literature that  embraces revelation, intuition, speculation and interconnectedness suggesting a holistic framework for  understanding reality. 

The Puruṣa Sūkta holds the status of a "significant hymn" integral to Vedic rituals and worship. Its  epistemic foundation is found in origin story and ritualistic application of the Puruṣa Sūkta. The hymn  is described as having been "remembered by Brahmā during Yajña preparations" and used by "gods  when they worshiped Lord Viśṇu". This narrative suggests that the knowledge contained within the  Sūkta is not merely an intellectual construct but is revealed and ritualistically activated. The primordial  act of Yajña, the cosmic sacrifice, is presented not just as a creation event but implicitly as a source of  knowing the ultimate reality- truth. This elevates its epistemic status to Sruti, which refers to revealed  truth, with its ritualistic efficacy and its capacity for moral purification. The understanding here is that  the hymn's origin and its function in sacred rituals serve as the ultimate justification for the knowledge it conveys, establishing a foundationalist epistemological claim. 

Abstract title:

 "Analysis of Love in Plato’s Symposium and Phaedrus: Erotic, and Yet Non-Sexual and Non-Romantic"

 This paper analyses the concept of erôs / love as formulated by Plato in his works, the Symposium and the Phaedrus, and concludes that ‘Platonic love’ is a misnomer since that implies a non-erotic, and hence, a non-romantic and a sexual detachment. On the contrary, the Dialogues that I have mentioned recurrently delineate the concept of love as a passion of the reason (as in Symposium), and as a Zealous passion, almost akin to Madness of the Divine kind (as in Phaedrus). It is also notified, in the paper, that the word erotic, as commonly understood has an altogether different denotation in Plato’s analysis of love. His formulation and analyses did not imply either a sexual activity or a romantic relationship. His arguments, put forth dialectically, are that love is an activity which is aimed at gaining a rational and a spiritual ascent, and this is non-sexual, non-romantic, yet passionate to the extent of incessant desiring or erotic. I have differentiated between erotic and sexual/romantic in Plato based on my inference that for Plato love implies the zeal or a passionate desire for personal growth, in the realm of both intellectual capability and spiritual release. Love or erôs should not be aimed at an inter-personal union between the man and his beloved. The beloved doesn’t refer to a  personal agency, but to a conceptual principle like the Beauty, as in the Symposium.  Plato, in my understanding, aimed on cognitive and non-cognitive grounds of perfection and imperfection; of knowledge and ignorance; of divine and human; of Soul and body and of reality and unreality. In the Symposium, Plato changes the notion of Erôs to erôs, i.e., from being a God of love to an act/ method of loving to reach the intellectual height to pursue the Beauty/ wisdom in itself.  In Phaedrus, despite using all the epithets that overtly read like madness etc., he establishes the method of love as a zeal that equals madness. In this Dialogue, he distinguishes between madness of the divine kind which enables the lovers to reach spiritual heights from the humane one which causes the downfall of a person. Plato's concept of erôs addresses the enabling and ennobling of only the lover, and the lover always refers to a male. Women are neither accorded the agency nor the volition, despite mentioning Diotima as the instructor to Socrates, and Love generating in the Beautiful (as in Symposium), and refers to priestess at Delphi and Dodona who benefitted humanity by prophesising the madness of divine kind (as in the Phaedrus).

Abstract title:

 "Equalizing the Producers: Two Problems in Nicomachean Ethics 5.5"

In his analysis of reciprocity in Nicomachean Ethics 5.5, Aristotle emphasizes that a just exchange  must be an equal one. But it is not only the exchanged products that must be equal: the exchangers themselves––whom Aristotle portrays as producers––must be equal as well. As a result of equalizing  the producers and their products, the following proportion obtains: ‘As a builder [is] to a  shoemaker, so many shoes [are] to a house’ (NE 5.5.1133a22–23). But two problems arise in  connection with the equalization of the producers. The first problem is quantitative: must the ratio  of the producers be equal to 1 or not? The second problem is qualitative: in what respect must the  producers be equalized? In terms of labor-time, skill, need, or something else? 

The quantitative problem has received little attention from scholars; the qualitative one has been  debated more extensively, but that debate is unsatisfying. Both problems, then, require a fresh  examination, which is the task of this paper. My approach is as follows. First, I outline Aristotle’s  proportion for a just exchange (‘as a builder [is] to a shoemaker…’) and his route to arriving at it.  This proportion is ‘geometric’ in form, and that fact raises a question. Distributive justice, too,  involves a geometric proportion; but the ratio between the two parties can diverge from 1 in a just  distribution, and so we might wonder whether the same holds true in a just exchange. I therefore take up the question of the ‘Equality Thesis’––the thesis that, in a just exchange, the ratio of the  producers must be equal to 1. After rebutting three objections against the Equality Thesis, I offer a new Aristotelian-philosophical defense of that thesis, based on Aristotle’s treatment of  equalization in friendship; I then point out a neglected piece of textual evidence for that thesis in NE 5.5. But if the producers must be ‘equalized’––so that their ratio equals 1––what does such  equalization consist in? Drawing again on Aristotle’s treatment of friendship and on some clues in  NE 5.5, I argue that the producers must be ‘equalized’ in terms of what they give. Finally, I end with some concluding remarks and some lingering issues for future investigation.

Abstract title:

 "Can Philosophy Aid in Addressing Psychology’s Main Problem? Reviving the Connection between Philosophy and Psychology"

Historically, the exploration of psychological phenomena, encompassing the human mind, mental events, and consciousness, fell within the realm of philosophy. However, as philosophy lost its position as a legitimate source of knowledge following the scientific revolution, psychology sought separation and independence from its parent discipline, philosophy. Psychology established itself as a scientific field by strictly adhering to scientific research methods, similar to those found in the natural sciences. Philosophical methods of speculation, introspection, and rational thought were no longer considered trustworthy approaches for discovering truth regarding psychological phenomena.

On the other hand, some scholars argue that the connection between philosophy and psychology cannot be dissolved solely through the application of scientific methods in research. They advocate for integrating philosophy and its tools into psychological research.

Since its early days as an independent field, many thinkers and scholars have contended that psychology has not yet achieved its greatest triumph, as it lacks a unifying principle that could unify psychology in the same way atomic theory unified chemistry, the theory of evolution unified biology, or the laws of motion unified physics. Despite its dedication to scientific research methods, psychology’s status as a science has consistently been questioned due to its inability to identify a unifying principle.

This presentation aims to address this problem by sharing results from an extended interpretivist study. The presentation proposes a unifying principle that can account for all types of psychological phenomena, thereby unifying all branches of psychology. The suggested unifying principle was recognized in ancient Greek philosophy and has been identified through interpretivist research methods, such as philosophical speculation. Thus, the presentation demonstrates that philosophy and its methods have the ability to tackle issues in psychology. Moreover, it emphasizes the deep and interconnected relationship between psychology and philosophy. In particular, it provides compelling evidence showing the significant impact that philosophical heritage has on psychological research and how ancient philosophical perspectives and methods can play a crucial role in addressing enduring issues within psychology as a field.

Abstract title:

 "Aristotle’s Dual Conception of Nature: Material Substratum and Form in Natural Beings"

This paper examines Aristotle’s dual account of “nature” (phusis) as both material substratum and formal principle, with a focus on the interpretive tensions this distinction raises in Physics  II.1. Aristotle identifies nature, on one hand, as the underlying material from which things are  made—such as wood in a bed or bronze in a statue—and, on the other, as the form or essence  that provides an internal source of motion. These examples, especially the case of a planted bed  sprouting wood, prompt philosophical difficulties: how can artificial objects serve as illustrations  of natural beings (τα φύσει όντα)? W.D. Ross famously found this puzzling, given that beds and  statues lack the internal principle of change Aristotle associates with natural substances. 

This paper argues that Aristotle’s use of such artificial examples is not an inconsistency, but a deliberate strategy to illuminate the interdependence of material and formal causes in all  substantial being. By using borderline cases, Aristotle sharpens the distinction between  accidental arrangement and intrinsic nature, and demonstrates how form alone cannot account  for nature without matter, and vice versa. In clarifying this interplay, the paper not only addresses  longstanding interpretive issues but also connects Aristotle’s conception of nature to broader  metaphysical concerns regarding the status of artifacts, essentialism, and the nature–techne  distinction.

Abstract title:

 "Mathematics as the Code of Reality"

The paper proposes a symmetry-based epistemological approach, grounded in Hermann  Weyl’s work on group theory and based on two core claims: (i) an External Physical Reality  (EPR) exists independently of observers, and (ii) a Cognitive Apparatus (CA), present in  sufficiently developed forms of life, constrains this reality by preserving substantial  invariants. “Reality,” as it becomes accessible, is thus understood as the coupling between  EPR and CA, governed by a symmetry group G (the set of patterns, drawn from group theory,  that remain unchanged under lawful transformations) Mathematics, with its axiom-based  formalism and rule-governed regularities, is considered as effective practice for identifying  and tracking these invariants. At the same time, the paper cautions against reducing  philosophical inquiry to logic alone, as it provides only the content-neutral setting underlying  the richer, model-dependent body of mathematics. To test the proposed framework, the author  applies it to the philosophical problem of defining notions of explanation and understanding,  in both natural and mathematical language. Although natural language remains central to  philosophical discourse, mathematical language is shown to exhibit a unique effectiveness in  resolving essential questions.

Abstract title:

 "The Importance of Unconscious Cognitive Processes in Predictive Processing Theory"

This paper analyses Predictive Processing Theory (PPT), or the theory of the anticipatory brain. It examines its metaphysical strategy, which fits into the contemporary philosophical project of naturalization and its strong dependence on the natural sciences. The paper shows the theory’s explanatory power on how the mind operates and the need to consider it in the field of Philosophy of Mind and other related fields. The focus falls on unconscious cognitive processes and their consequences for the understanding of mind.

PPT is a modern, viable, and promising concept in neuroscience for studying mind and for developing generative computer models. It seeks to explain cognition, perception, and action by postulating that the brain operates as a predictive machine, with the environment and body as key factors. PPT states that the brain, based on statistical analysis (Bayesian inference), continuously generates and updates a ""mental model"" of the environment to predict future sensory inputs, which are then compared for error with the actual sensory inputs. The brain constantly makes unconscious predictions or hypotheses about the causes of sensory input data, checking them from the top down, layer by layer against the incoming stream of signals, and on this basis shapes the perceptual content and directs actions and learning. The exact mechanism is some approximation to Bayesian inference or error prediction minimization. In other words, the fundamental idea of PPT is that the brain is not a passive recipient of sensory information, but rather an active predictor of what is likely to happen in the environment in which the organism is immersed. Thus Anil Seth considers PPT to be a revolutionary approach, or even a Copernican turn, although the philosophical and scientific intuitions underlying the concept can be traced back centuries, perhaps millennia with the most direct connection found in the work of Hermann von Helmholtz, who in 1867 coined the term “unconscious inference” (unbewusster Schluss) to describe an involuntary, pre-rational, and reflex-like mechanism as part of the formation of visual impressions. Through this mechanism, the brain interprets incoming sensory signals automatically and unconsciously based on prior knowledge and experience. Some authors, such as Link Swanson, find parallels between PPT and Kant's concepts. He also traces the historical connection between Kant and PPT through the work of Helmholtz, who, according to him, sought to provide a scientific justification for Kant's ideas. 

In the current study, the cross points of PPT and language studies are also being explored. It examines the contributions of key theorists in the field such as Carl Friston, Jacob Hohwy, Andy Clark and Anil Seth. The text researches the connections between PPT and other theories that include the body and the environment in structuring our concepts of reality, such as the theory of embodied, embedded, enactive and extended mind – 4E cognition, as well as Cognitive Linguistics with its prominent view of conceptual metaphor.