Working paper (completed):
(1) Strategic deliberation under ambiguity (Decisions in Economics and Finance, CNRS 3, HCERES B, revision) (with Matthieu Manant)
Abstract: Our study examines the impact of ambiguity on jury verdicts in the context of communication. We assume that all jurors in criminal trials have an equal prior probability. In contrast to Coughlan (2000)’s model, our model incorporates ambiguity aversion for each juror using the smooth decision-making framework proposed by Klibanoff et al. (2005) (referred to as KMM hereafter). Our findings demonstrate that individual ambiguity renders all revealed signals meaningless when communication is fully informative.
Keywords: Ambiguity aversion; Model uncertainty; Bayesian framework; Fully informative communication
(2) Impact of Blockchain Technology on Supply Chain Litigation (with Bobo ZHANG and Zhou Zhang)
Abstract: This study examines the impact of blockchain technology on supply chain litigation by exploring how blockchain influences the supplier’s decisions regarding the environmental sustainability quality of products in supply chain management. The research highlights the potential benefits of blockchain implementation in legal disputes related to the environmental sustainability of products. Specifically, we demonstrate a non-linear, reverse-U effect of blockchain on the supplier’s decision-making concerning the environmental sustainability quality of products.
Keywords: supply chain; blockchain; trade dispute; sustainability.
(3) R&D cooperation is never anything but looking for a(n) (in)competent partner ( Industrial Journal of Industrial Organization, ABS 3*, CNRS 1, under review) (with Matthieu Manant)
Abstract: Empirical evidence suggests that one of the main motivations for firms to commit in R&D cooperation is to access the other firms’ R&D competences. In this paper we provide a model taking into account differences in R&D competences and we study partner selection for R&D
cooperation within a triopoly. First, we study the incentives for firms to invest in R&D in a general setting in which firms have different R&D competences. Second, we study the stability of the coalitions and the selection of a partner in the case of significant R&D costs. We find that for very low spillovers firms prefer to cooperate with the most competent firm. For high spillovers the two least competent firms prefer to cooperate together. Finally, we estimate numerically the social welfare to evaluate the socially optimal coalition for different values of the spillover parameter
Keywords: R&D cooperation; technological competences; innovation; coalitions.
JEL Classification: L1; O3