Working paper (completed):
(1) R&D cooperation is never anything but looking for a(n) (in)competent partner ( Journal of Economics & Management Stretegy, ABS 3*, CNRS 1, Revise and Resubmit (R&R) ) (with Matthieu Manant)
Abstract:
Empirical evidence suggests that one of the main motivations for firms to commit in R&D cooperation is to access the other firms' R&Dcompetences. In this paper we provide a model taking into account differences in R&D competences and we study partner selection for R&D cooperation within a triopoly. First, we study the incentives for firms to invest in R&D in a general setting in which firms have different R&D competences. Second, we study the stability of the coalitions and the selection of a partner in the case of significant R&D costs. We find that for very low spillovers firms prefer to cooperate with the most competent firm. For high spillovers the two least competent firms prefer to cooperate together. Finally, we estimate numerically the social welfare to evaluate the socially optimal coalition for different values of the spillover parameter
Keywords: R&D cooperation; technological competences; innovation; coalitions.
JEL Classification: L1; O3
(2) Post-truth (with Ugo Bolletta)
Abstract: Post-truth pertains to the interaction between subjective beliefs and factual information. We study this interaction through a behavioral application of Bayesian technology. Agents do not learn but wish to validate their subjective beliefs around a topic of interest. When exposed to data that conflicts with their subjective prior beliefs, agents experience cognitive dissonance that can be reduced by providing (intrinsically biased) information which validates their subjective beliefs. In a multi-agent strategic setting we show that there exists a positive mass of players with moderate ideology who will never acquire information, and that there is an increasing benefit in acquiring information the more a player has an extreme ideology. Hence, the ex-post distribution of information exhibits over-representation of extreme views. Said phenomenon is particularly pronounced when the cost of information acquisition is low, which arguably mimics debating in online social media. Notably, our results are built around individual non-cooperative incentives, suggesting that the current patterns of observed polarization are not merely a consequence of the online platform architectures and social influence.
Keywords: Post-truth, Debating, Subjectivism, Polarization, Bayesian updating, Social media.
JEL Classification: D83
(3) Strategic deliberation under ambiguity (Decisions in Economics and Finance, CNRS 3, HCERES B, Revise and Resubmit (R&R)) (with Matthieu Manant)
Abstract: Our study examines the impact of ambiguity on jury verdicts in the context of communication. We assume that all jurors in criminal trials have an equal prior probability. In contrast to Coughlan (2000)’s model, our model incorporates ambiguity aversion for each juror using the smooth decision-making framework proposed by Klibanoff et al. (2005) (referred to as KMM hereafter). Our findings demonstrate that individual ambiguity renders all revealed signals meaningless when communication is fully informative.
Keywords: Ambiguity aversion; Model uncertainty; Bayesian framework; Fully informative communication
(4) Impact of Blockchain Technology on Supply Chain Litigation (with Bobo ZHANG and Zhou Zhang)
Abstract: This study examines the impact of blockchain technology on supply chain litigation by exploring how blockchain influences the supplier’s decisions regarding the environmental sustainability quality of products in supply chain management. The research highlights the potential benefits of blockchain implementation in legal disputes related to the environmental sustainability of products. Specifically, we demonstrate a non-linear, reverse-U effect of blockchain on the supplier’s decision-making concerning the environmental sustainability quality of products.
Keywords: Supply chain; Blockchain; Trade dispute; Sustainability.
(5) Bayesian weighted minority voting: Uncertainty and strategic beliefs (with Mostapha Diss)
Abstract: We extend the Weighted Minority Voting (WMV) framework to a stochastic committee environment where majority members face strategic uncertainty about the behavior of their peers. Departing from deterministic equilibrium models, we introduce a symmetric Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium in which each majority member defects with probability p*. This mixed strategy is driven by the Material Option Premium (Ω)—the strategic value of retaining full voting weight by voting against one’s preferred project. We show that Ω is strictly positive for any weight discount factor α ∈ [0, 1), that pure-strategy equilibria do not exist, and that the unique mixed equilibrium p* is strictly decreasing in α, strictly decreasing in the value of the current project z, and strictly increasing in the size of the majority block N . These findings carry direct implications for the design of dynamic voting institutions.
Keywords: Weighted Minority Voting (WMV), Strategic uncertainty, Bayesian Nash Equilibrium