Central Banks and Political Cycles - E. Farvaque et P. Stanek (Eds.), Are Central Banks Still Conservative? Frameworks, Monetary Policy and Inflation after Rogoff, Chapter 1, pp. 11-31.
Central Banks and Political Cycles - E. Farvaque et P. Stanek (Eds.), Are Central Banks Still Conservative? Frameworks, Monetary Policy and Inflation after Rogoff, Chapter 1, pp. 11-31.
This chapter reviews literature on the role of central bank independence in moderating political monetary cycles, specifically the alignment of monetary policy with political agendas. While central bank independence, especially central bank conservatism as outlined by Rogoff (1985), helps reduce these cycles, it does not fully prevent them. First, the chapter examines independence's impact on both opportunist and partisan monetary cycles. Next, it addresses methodological limitations in current research. Finally, it highlights ongoing debates and suggests directions for future study.