[Document de Travail]

Abstract:

We investigate Political Business Cycles (PBCs) during national elections across European Union countries and their sub-national regions, with a focus on the role of national and supranational fiscal rules. We show robust evidence of political budget cycles in both spending and taxation. Strong fiscal rules  shape the form and timing of PBCs, but their disciplining effect is conditional on political incentives. Pre-election spending expansions are systematically curbed by strong rules, whereas their effect on taxation is asymmetric: they prevent opportunistic tax cuts by right-wing governments but are less binding for left-wing incumbents. Post-election partisan behavior is also evident, as left-wing governments tend to cut spending and raise taxes following leadership changes. Strong fiscal rules moderate these post-electoral adjustments, limiting abrupt fiscal corrections. Overall, fiscal rules do not simply reduce spending, rather, they reshape the composition and timing of fiscal policy.

Keywords:

Elections; Fiscal rules; Political business cycle; National and regional politics; European Union 

JEL Classification:

D72; E62; H30; H71; H72; O52

[Document de Travail]

Abstract:

This research investigates the catalytic effects of loans granted by international organizations and their interplay with geopolitical alignment to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) permanent members. Using a monthly dataset, we first analyze how loan approvals by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) influence financial conditions in UNSC non-permanent members states. Our findings confirm the existence of a catalytic effect in these countries for loans provided by the ADB and the IMF, particularly observable in exchange rate dynamics. Second, we contribute to the literature by demonstrating that a country's geopolitical alignment with UNSC permanent members plays a crucial role in shaping the magnitude and direction of these effects. We measure geopolitical alignment using voting distances between UNSC non-permanent and permanent members in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Notably, we highlight that China-US tensions arise primarily from specific UNGA decisions, while Russia-US tensions reflect broader geopolitical rivalries. This distinction significantly impacts the catalytic effect, regardless of the financial variables under consideration.

Keywords:

International institutions; United Nations; Geopolitical preferences; Catalytic effect; Finance

JEL Classification:

D78; F30; F42

[Document de Travail]

Abstract:

This article provides the first long-run empirical assessment of opportunistic Political Business Cycles (PBCs) in Iceland over the period 1951–2024. We analyse whether electoral timing systematically shapes government spending behaviour by estimating time-series models incorporating electoral indices. Our findings reveal consistent evidence of pre-electoral fiscal expansions, in line with our hypothesis that the clientelistic foundations of Icelandic politics have long anchored practices whereby public spending is strategically mobilised for electoral purposes. These dynamics are especially pronounced within a six-month pre-electoral window, during endogenous elections, and under right-leaning Prime Ministers. PBCs are particularly salient when the Prime Minister belongs to the Progressive Party, when governing coalitions are small (two-party cabinets), and when coalition partners exhibit greater ideological dispersion. Furthermore, we show that left-wing Prime Ministers tend to adopt a more restrictive fiscal stance before elections when their coalition is, on average, more left-leaning—an outcome consistent with the credibility burden faced by such governments.

Keywords:

Iceland; Political Business Cycles; Public Spending; Elections

JEL Classification:

C33; D72; E62; H50

Abstract:

We examine the predictions of political business cycle theories using a large dataset covering detailed information on intergovernmental transfers and tax categories for German municipalities. Our findings provide clear evidence of partisan behavior in local tax policy: municipalities reduce tax burdens during election periods. This pattern suggests an attempt by incumbents to project competence and improve their electoral prospects.

Keywords:

Election cycle; Regional politics; Local investment; Local taxes; Germany

JEL Classification:

Abstract:

This paper studies the Trading Card Games (TCG) market. More specifically, the idea is to highlight the main determinants that drive individuals to buy playing cards by studying 3 main transmission channels. Firstly, cards can be bought for their "sporting" value, with their value fluctuating according to their use by players in a competitive context. Secondly, cards can be bought for their "nostalgic" value, in which case they are collected and their value fluctuates according to their importance in people's memories. Thirdly, cards can be purchased for their "economic" value, in which case they represent an investment comparable to the purchase of any financial asset. To study these different transmission channels, we mobilize a database of Yu-Gi-Oh! TCG cards from the YGOProDeck website (https://ygoprodeck.com/) and card prices from the CardMarket website (https://www.cardmarket.com/en/YuGiOh/), which enable us to analyze fluctuations in card prices over several months/weeks. We are therefore able to test the different transmission channels as follows: (i) the "sporting" value is measured through the use of the cards during the latest big professional tournaments (notably the Championship Series); (ii) the "nostalgic" value via the occurrence of the cards within the various animated series and the Yu-Gi-Oh! manga that accompanies the game and (iii) the "economic" value is measured according to the fluctuation in the prices of the cards, notably the most expensive ones.

Résumé : 

Cette étude vise à examiner si l’occurrence d'événements climatiques extrêmes influence la popularité des partis politiques se revendiquant écologistes. L'impact des catastrophes naturelles sur la vie politique fait déjà l’objet de certaines études concluant notamment qu’elles ont tendance à augmenter la probabilité de réélection du parti au pouvoir (Masiero et Santarossa, 2021) ; qu’elles modifient le comportement des élus (Elliott et al. 2022) ou encore qu’elles ont un effet limité sur les scores électoraux des partis écologistes (Hilbig et Riaz, 2024). Néanmoins, aucune étude n'a étudié directement l’impact des catastrophes naturelles sur la popularité des partis. Dans cette étude, nous testerons l’hypothèse selon laquelle la matérialisation des catastrophes naturelles stimule la popularité des partis "verts". 

Nous supposons que cette augmentation de la popularité des partis écologistes est liée à une prise de conscience accrue des risques climatiques à venir lorsque les électeurs sont exposés à des évènements climatiques extrêmes. À l'inverse, les candidats se revandiquant climato-sceptiques devraient, par le raisonnement inverse, connaître une diminution de leur popularité.