Enemy security measures and/or the antipathy of certain segments of the population often deny selected portions of an operational area to the guerrilla force or the auxiliaries. Since these areas are usually essential to the support of enemy operations, the resistance force attempts to extend its influence into them. The element used to conduct operations in such areas is the underground.
The underground is a cellular organization within the resistance movement or insurgency that has the ability to conduct operations in areas that are inaccessible to guerrillas, such as urban areas under the control of the local security forces. The underground can function in these areas because it operates in a clandestine manner, which prevents it from receiving legal belligerent status under any international conventions. Examples of underground functions include the following:
Intelligence and counterintelligence networks.
Subversive radio stations.
Propaganda networks that control newspaper or leaflet print shops and/or Web pages.
Special material fabrication, such as false identification, explosives, weapons, and munitions.
Control of networks for moving personnel and logistics.
Individuals or groups that conduct acts of sabotage in urban centers.
Clandestine medical facilities.
The underground, then, is that element of the resistance force established to reach targets not vulnerable to other elements of the resistance (the guerrillas or auxiliary). The underground is employed to achieve objectives which would otherwise be unattainable.
In many respects the underground closely resembles the auxiliary force. They conduct operations in a similar manner and perform many of the same functions. The major differences, then, are twofold:
The underground is tailored to conduct operations in areas which are normally denied to the auxiliary force and guerrillas.
The underground is not as dependent upon control or influence over the civilian population for its success. The degree to which the underground achieves this objective is a byproduct of other operations. Control of the population is not the primary underground objective.
The underground organizes into compartmented cells. It forms these cells within various political subdivisions of the sector or area, such as the U.S. equivalents of counties, towns, and neighborhoods. The operation cell is usually composed of a leader and a few cell members operating directly as a unit (Figure 2-3).
The intelligence cell is unique in that the cell leader seldom in direct contact with the members of the cell, and the members are rarely in contact with one another (Figure 2-4).
Cellular organization can also be in parallel and in series.
The underground environment may be urban or rural. The functions of the underground largely enable the resistance movement to affect the urban areas.
A command committee organizes and controls underground activities. The committee members perform duties and responsibilities based on their skills and the degree of risk they are willing to accept.
For security reasons, the size of the underground is kept as small as possible. The underground receives evaders, downed pilots, and other key people. It hides people and moves them as needed or moves them out of the JSOA (Joint Special Operations Area) entirely. The auxiliary also moves and hides people within its sector of operation. However, the underground can move people across the entire area complex. It has a system of “safe houses” that have been carefully selected and prepared to hide these people. It develops procedures so that people can be moved along selected routes at the best times to avoid detection. The underground moves them in false-bottom containers to include laundry carts, fish crates, vehicles, furniture, and caskets. It also moves sensitive documents and equipment in a similar manner.
To support other operations, particularly those involving the smuggling of personnel and materials, the underground commits acts of deception to steal bona fide documents (identification [ID] cards, passes, ration coupons, money, and passports) and use them under false pretenses. If the underground cannot obtain the bona fide documents, it prepares facsimiles.
The underground normally contains more specialists and technicians than either the guerrilla or auxiliary components. Ideally, they are able to conduct combat operations in SR (Special Reconnaisance), DA (Direct Action), and UW (Unconventional Warfare). Also, they should possess the ability, experience, and equipment necessary to prepare all types of counterfeit documents and be able to produce counterfeit money.
To survive and be effective, a member of the underground must exhibit many positive personality traits necessary to endure hardship and he must be highly self-motivated. Among these traits, he must—
Be technically and tactically proficient in combat skills, stealth, and self-discipline.
Maintain and display an inconspicuous, “average citizen” image toward the enemy.
Be very cautious about confiding in others. Secrecy and dedication to the cause come before any personal benefit, allowing for greater longevity.
Underground operations can be clandestine, covert, and overt. These operations have major similarities with those of both the guerrillas and the auxiliary. Some involve overt and violent actions and others are passive.
Underground cells support the operations of the guerrillas and auxiliary (within their sector commands) with acts of deception, sabotage, and movement of personnel and equipment. Underground cells cooperate closely with other underground counterparts in their sectors and throughout the area complex. Cooperation enables successful movement of personnel and equipment in and out of the JSOA.
The guerrillas and auxiliary are more independent. Only in rare, coordinated operations does the underground work with its counterparts in other sectors.
The underground may commit acts of violence or sabotage to interdict enemy operations and movements.
The underground may publish a resistance newsletter or newspaper promoting the resistance cause among the civilian population. In countries with a controlled media system, a private publication of this nature will be of high interest. However, the underground must anticipate enemy reprisals for possession of the paper. Also, the enemy will probably search for the printing press. A defense against this threat is to print the paper outside the JSOA and smuggle it into the country, storing the supply in various locations.
The underground may engage in covert operations to disseminate embarrassing or incriminating information about the enemy or its officials. These revelations may inflame existing problems in sensitive areas and degrade the enemy’s rapport with the civilian population or cause dissension in the enemy’s ranks.