23/06/2023 BY ALL INSTITUTE

Exploring the Impact of the EU ‘Draft AI Act’ on Democracy: A Timely Discussion with the ‘Draft Compromise Text’ of the European Parliament

I am thrilled to announce the publication of my latest article: 'Exploring the Impact of the EU Draft AI Act on Democracy.' 📚In this thought-provoking piece, I delve into the details of the 'Draft Compromise Text' crafted by the European Parliament, providing valuable insights into the potential implications for democracy in the era of artificial intelligence. 🤖🗳️

If you're curious about the intersection of AI and democracy, I invite you to read the full article on the @All_Institute website. 📰✨ Gain a deeper understanding of the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead as we navigate the complex landscape of AI legislation.

You can also read the article below!

Exploring the Impact of the EU ‘Draft AI Act’ on Democracy: A Timely Discussion with the ‘Draft Compromise Text’ of the European Parliament

The Draft Artificial Intelligence Act (Draft AI Act) for the European Union (EU) represents a significant milestone towards the regulation of technologies employing AI within the EU. Since the zero version of the Draft AI Act was released on 21 April 2021, it has been discussed extensively by academics, policymakers and professionals  who are involved in the decision-making processes within the EU. In May of this year, the European Parliament released a Draft Compromise Text with significant amendments on the Draft AI Act. Therefore, the European Parliament is in a position to launch ‘trialogues’ with the European Commission and the Council of the European Union. Overall, this development represents a formal step towards finalising the regulation for AI systems in the EU.

The main goal of the Draft AI Act is to improve the functioning of the internal market and to advance the creation of a digital single market as indicated in the Digital Single Market Strategy.

AI systems are beginning to be used in various fields and are increasingly integrated with other technologies. For this reason, the Draft AI Act adopts a risk-based approach which categorizes the levels of risk posed by AI systems into three different categories such as ‘low-risk’, ‘high-risk’ and ‘unacceptable risk’. This risk-based approach is also adopted by other countries to regulate various fields of technology such as the National AI Research and Development Strategic Plan 2023 Update. As a result, it would not be wrong to say that there is a race to regulate AI systems. Being an early entrant into the regulatory discussion, the EU has some advantages. In general, the EU wants to be a leader by regulating this area, as it has done so previously with the  (GDPR).

The EU wants to make sure that its values are reflected and implemented within the remit of the AI regulation. For this reason, the EU has evaluated various feedbacks and comments about the alignment between current European Codes and the Draft AI Act. In summary, the Draft AI Act, under development since 2021, puts the EU in an advantageous position to create a robust protection mechanism against potential concerns regarding democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law.

With regard to democracy, Cambridge Analytica, Brexit and the United States elections in 2016 all showed that we should be worried about the use of AI tools in democratic processes. A relatively recent and shocking article from the Guardian also shows that a hacking and disinformation team in Israel meddled in the elections and influenced the outcomes in at least 20 countries.

The Draft Compromise Text gives emphasis to the use of AI systems for the ‘administration of justice and democratic processes’ and it regulates in detail, unlike the previous version of the Draft AI Act. In the previous version, AI systems are considered to be in the high-risk category if they are used for the administration of justice and democratic processes. However, it was not clear what to include in “democratic processes” as a concept; thus, the scope and potential activities of this concept were not determined in the Draft Compromise Text.

The Draft Compromise Text highlights some key points. First, it echoes the previous version of Draft AI Act which states that certain AI systems intended for the administration of justice and democratic processes are classified as high-risk. The reason for the classification of such AI systems as high-risk is due to the evidence that they can have a potential impact on democracy, the rule of law, and upon individual freedoms and rights. In addition, the risk of external interference with the ‘right to vote’ and the subsequent potential effects on ‘democratic processes, democracy and the rule of law’ are also considered therein.

Second, the text focuses on the utility of AI systems to influence “the outcome of an election or referendum” and “the voting behaviour of natural persons”. The Draft AI Act covers the “intentional” use of AI systems to influence the outcome of any election or to influence the voting behaviour of natural persons. In this scenario, it should be explored how AI systems can be used in democratic processes without any intention to influence results or processes. Moreover, if AI systems are used during democratic processes, proving whether it is intentional or not may become a crucial legal problem in the future. On the other hand, the Draft AI Act regulates ‘manipulative AI systems’ within the ‘unacceptable risk’ category. It seems that the Draft AI Act considers the action of “influencing the voting behaviour of natural persons” by AI not as a manipulation, but as AI systems to be evaluated in the ‘high-risk category’. Probably, “the voting behaviour of natural persons” will be another issue that needs to be clarified.

Third, while it remains broad, ‘democratic processes’ refer to elections or referenda according to the document. However, it is unclear if the phrase includes local elections, presidential elections, regional elections, and European Parliament elections. There is also a specific provision for regulating the utility of very large digital platforms for democratic processes. When those platforms use AI systems for their recommender systems, they are subject to the Draft AI Act and are, thus, required to comply with many requirements such as data governance, traceability, transparency, and human oversight. It should also comply with related provisions in Regulation EU 2022/2065.

However, the only exception has been defined as the ‘possibility that natural persons are not ‘directly’ exposed to certain AI systems that can be used to ‘organize, optimize or structure political campaigns’. It is possible to handle this exception in two different ways. First, if the exception is about organizing, optimizing or structuring how a political campaign is run before the official start of the electoral process, the probability that natural persons will already be directly exposed to this process is not high. Therefore, AI systems seem to be limited only to the management period of a campaign. On the other hand, the qualities and details of the required workforce and financial support for a political campaign may be defined by using AI systems. Namely, the number of voters living in a region, their age range, economic power and related data. Evaluating the results of some regions in previous elections, through AI, is already a common approach used in many projects, or marketing strategies; including political campaigns. Second, there is also the possibility that AI systems known as ‘political bots’ can be used to organise, structure and optimize political campaigns while the election process is underway. In this case, even when bots do not spread any false information, users may still be affected indirectly. Namely, bots cause ‘echo chambers’ or bombard the digital platform with information or by creating hashtags. As a result, natural persons may be out of the scope of the provision for democratic processes in the Draft AI Act. In this case, a question arises about how best to address candidates of elections who will be directly exposed to the organization, optimization and configuration of the political campaign.

In conclusion, the Draft AI Act marks an important step towards the regulation of AI technologies, particularly in relation to democratic processes. While some aspects remain broad and require clarification, the current text of the Draft AI Act does provide transparency and oversight regarding the use of AI in democratic processes.

14/07/2023 BY EDITORIAL BOARD

Analysing Türkiye’s Intense Election Process: Voter Participation, Digital Platforms, and Fairness

📢 Exciting Announcement! 🎉

A new blog piece titled "Understanding Türkiye's Vibrant Election Process: Voters, Digital Platforms, and Fairness." is just released! 🌍🗳️

As a part of the case study of my research project, I analysed the recent elections in Türkiye in this study.

By examining various factors in general such as voter behaviour, the role of digital platforms, and the concept of fairness, I aimed to shed light on the dynamics that shape Türkiye's vibrant democracy.

If you are interested in exploring the recent framework of Türkiye's electoral process, you can find below the blog piece. 

14/07/2023 BY EDITORIAL BOARD

Analysing Türkiye’s Intense Election Process: Voter Participation, Digital Platforms, and Fairness

The recent Turkish elections concluded a few weeks ago, marking one of the highest electoral turnout processes in Turkish history. This blog, which draws on my PhD research, aims to critically analyse the recent intense election process in Türkiye, examining the relationship between voter participation and the role of digital platforms, to ascertain the extent to which we can actually consider these elections “fair” and “free”. According to the Supreme Election Council of Türkiye, 88.92% of voters participated in the first round, and 85.72% in the second round. However, does such high participation serve as an indicator of the elections being conducted in a democratic, free, and fair environment? According to political scientists, high participation in this instance reflects a highly polarized and intense two-round election marathon. Additionally, digital platforms played a crucial role in communication for both parliamentary candidates and the four presidential candidates just before the first and second round.

On 14 May 2023, four candidates ran for the presidency. Turkish citizens living abroad also had the right to vote, and the process for these voters had begun weeks before the electoral day.  However, days before the election, one of the candidates, Muharrem İnce, withdrew, resulting in a shift in the votes of domestic electorates. However, voters living abroad had already cast their votes. This news can be interpreted as an indication that the electoral process, as carried out, was not equal in terms of timely access to information, at least for voters living abroad. In addition, it should be highlighted that there are potential risks if citizens living abroad vote in advance, especially in an election where the results are quite close.

In accordance with constitutional provisions and the decision of the Supreme Election Council of Türkiye, a second round of presidential elections took place as the winner could not be determined in the first round. One of the candidates was Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who has been serving as President since 2014 and had previously held the position of Prime Minister for 11 years. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu was the candidate of the opposition. His candidacy was criticised and caused significant political crises and debates, particularly with the dominant nationalist party, Good Party (İyi Parti), in the opposition wing. Despite close election results in the second round, Kılıçdaroğlu and the opposition block lost the presidential election. According to the Supreme Election Council (YSK), Erdoğan was re-elected as the President on  28 May 2023.

In light of the highly polarized public opinion between these two candidates, this blogs aims to reflect on how fair and equal this electoral process was and the extent to which freedom of speech and information was protected and guaranteed. Perhaps it is appropriate to begin with the closure of “ekşi sözlük”, a long-standing online forum platform website in Türkiye, following a devastating earthquake in February 2023, triggering discussions about the government’s management of the disaster and the subsequent postponement of the general elections. Access to the ekşi sözlük website, which provided alternative information without requiring registration, was blocked without even the notification of the forum management. (As of June 2, 2023, the access block still appears to be in effect.) The closure of “ekşi sözlük” holds significant importance as people sought different sources of information rather than relying on government-controlled or pro-government media outlets. In a similar story from 2014, Twitter access was blocked all over the country before the local elections, which was addressed as a violation of the fundamental rights in the constitution by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Türkiye. This time, Twitter was warned by the government before the elections to restrict some contents ahead of the elections. Despite the efforts to protect society from disinformation, a balance needs to be struck between freedom of information, freedom of expression and state intervention in this digital public sphere.

In February 2023, the Directorate of Communications, which is generally known for controlling or censoring issues shared in the media and discussed in the public, reported that the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, spent approximately 188.8 million Turkish liras (equivalent to approximately 1 million euros) in the month of February alone. Following this news, the opposition block alleged that this budget was used for propaganda purposes in favour of Erdoğan, whose candidacy was viewed as highly likely. Kılıçdaroğlu, was reaching out to voters by sharing videos on Twitter before the electoral process started. He often recorded these videos in his home kitchen, which were intended as a message to potential voters about his understanding of the situation in the economic crisis.

However, these kitchen videos and other campaign footage of Kılıçdaroğlu were manipulated during the electoral process. Footage was combined with videos attributed to various terrorist groups, using deep fake techniques, and was spread on digital platforms, particularly ones such as TikTok, which are widely used by Turks. Furthermore, these visuals were shown at a public demonstration by the current President, Erdoğan, that was held just seven days before the first round of elections. The public demonstration and deepfake videos were broadcast live on television channels. Subsequently, this video was further spread through other interviews, even though it was stated that the footage was manipulated. This created significant confusion among nationalist-conservative voters who were not particularly inclined to vote for a secular or Alevi candidate. Especially after the spreading of this video, Kılıçdaroğlu shared a tweet in both Russian and Turkish, which implied that Russia was behind this defamation campaign and implicitly demanded an end to these activities. Kılıçdaroğlu also warned the Presidency’s Communication Office not to engage in efforts similar to Cambridge Analytica, and he emphasised that meetings with dubious actors in the dark web would not remain a secret.

During the election period, there were also numerous criticisms alleging that the candidates’ television appearances were unfair. Particularly, as Erdoğan was shown the most on the state channel TRT. According to electoral legislation, the state television broadcaster TRT is legally obligated to provide candidates with the opportunity to address the public. However, during his appearance on TRT, Kılıçdaroğlu chose not to discuss his promises but instead reminded TRT of its duties and responsibilities and highlighted the lack of equal and fair speaking rights for all candidates.

One day before the first round of elections, Twitter announced that they had implemented access restrictions to certain content in Türkiye based on court orders related to ‘access blocking’ with the aim of keeping Twitter generally accessible in Türkiye. This raised concerns about the possibility of access restrictions to Twitter or various other news sources on the election day. The reason was that alternative media sources are often widely preferred over mainstream media in Türkiye, with YouTube broadcasts frequently being watched.

Just two days before the second round of elections, Kılıçdaroğlu tried to reach out to voters by sending a message like “your credit card debts will be taken over by our government from the banks.” Then, the Information and Communication Technologies Authority immediately warned GSM operators that their authorization would be revoked if they allowed such SMS or other forms of communication. However, sending SMS to reach voters had been a widely used tool by also the ruling party until Kilicdaroglu’s SMS.

Overall, for the past 22 years, during Erdoğan ‘s political career in power, inequalities and unfair practices in information dissemination have occurred, seriously endangering the fairness of the electoral process.