This paper develops an OLG model of school choice in which parents choose between academic and technical tracks for their children. Children differ in ability, parents differ in socioeconomic background, and teacher recommendations determine what families learn about child ability. Schooling shapes children’s human capital, thereby affecting the distribution of parental status across generations. Information determines whether school assignment pools children in one track or sorts them by parental background or ability. Correct information maximizes net family surplus at a given population composition, yet can yield lower long-run welfare than no information: better informed choices may reduce the long-run share of highly educated parents enough to outweigh the benefits of improved school assignment. Conversely, sorting by parental background can be efficient when observing child ability would not change the preferred track. A forward-looking steady-state planner can improve on fully informed parental choices by accounting for their intergenerational consequences. The welfare value of information depends on the extent to which the intergenerational effects of school assignment are internalized.