Research Assistants

• ERATO Kojima Market Design Project, The University of Tokyo, April 2024 – Present 

Teaching Assistants

• Microeconomics I (Graduate), The University of Tokyo, Spring 2025 

• Microeconomics II (Graduate), The University of Tokyo, Autumn 2026

Working Papers

• No Screening is More Efficient with Multiple Objects (with Shunya Noda) Link
  (Previous title: Money Burning with Multiple Objects: Theory, Computation, and Application to Vaccine Allocation)

• Accelerating Automated Auction Design using Sufficiency of Local Incentive Compatibility Link Code

• Dynamic Pooling and Regional Participation in Organ Allocation Link

Previous Presentations

• August 2024, Summer Workshop on Economic Theory (SWET 2024), Otaru.

• September 2024, 7th International Workshop on Matching Under Preferences (MATCH-UP 2024), University of Oxford.

• October 2024, Economics and Game Theory Seminar, Tokyo University of Science.

• June 2025, Tokyo Conference on Market Design (TCMD 2025), University of Tokyo.

• August 2025, 2025 World Congress of the Econometric Society, Seoul.