Research

Publications

The State Capacity Ceiling on Tax Rates: Evidence from Randomized Tax Abatements in the DRC

with Augustin Bergeron and Jonathan Weigel [Pre-Analysis Plan] [RCT Registration] [CEPR Working Paper] [NBER Working Paper]Summary: World Bank Development Impact Blog, econimate videoForthcoming, Econometrica.

How Can Lower Income Countries Collect More Taxes? The Role of Technology, Tax Agents, and Politics

with Oyebola Okunogbe [World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 10655] [Reproducibility Repository]Journal of Economic Perspectives, 38(1), 2024.

Hiring Frictions and the Promise of Online Job Portals: Evidence from India [Appendix]

with Nilesh Fernando and Niharika Singh [RCT Registration] [STEG Working Paper]Summary: VoxDev, SGB Evidence Fund, J-PAL Evaluation Summary, IGC BlogAmerican Economic Review: Insights, 5(4), 2023.

Targeting in Tax Behavior: Evidence from Rwandan Firms

Summary: World Bank Development Impact Blog, ICTD BlogJournal of Development Economics, 158, 2022.

Local Elites as State Capacity: How City Chiefs Use Local Information to Increase Tax Compliance in the D.R. Congo

with Pablo Balán, Augustin Bergeron, and Jonathan Weigel [Pre-Analysis Plan] [RCT Registration] [CEPR Working Paper]Summary: VoxDevAmerican Economic Review, 112(3), 2022.

Working Papers

Optimal Assignment of Bureaucrats: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Tax Collectors in the DRC

with Augustin Bergeron, Pedro Bessone, John Kabeya Kabeya and Jonathan Weigel [RCT Registration] [NBER Working Paper] [CEPR Working Paper]Summary: VoxDevRevise and Resubmit, American Economic Review.

Does Collecting Taxes Erode the Accountability of Informal Leaders? Evidence from the D.R.C

with Augustin Bergeron, Elie Kabue Ngindu, and Jonathan Weigel [Pre-Analysis Plan] [RCT Registration]IIPF Peggy and Richard Musgrave Prize 2023

Delegating Tax Collection Does Not Adversely Affect Demand for Accountability: Evidence from an Experiment in the D.R. Congo

with Mats Ahrenshop, Augustin Bergeron, Laura Paler, and Jonathan Weigel [Pre-Analysis Plan] [RCT Registration]

Property Rights and Social Institutions: How Informal Institutions and Chiefs Shape Land Formalization in Urban Africa

with Pablo  Balán, Augustin Bergeron, and Jonathan Weigel [Pre-Analysis Plan] [RCT Registration]Summary: EGAP Stories of Change

Fiscal Contracts? A Six-Country Randomized Experiment on Transaction Costs, Public Services, and Taxation in Developing Countries

with Ana de La O et al. [Pre-Analysis Plan] [RCT Registration]

Using Machine Learning to Create a Property Tax Roll: Evidence from the City of Kananga, D.R. Congo

with Augustin Bergeron, Arnaud Fournier, John Kabeya Kabeya and Jonathan Weigel [ICTD Working Paper]

In Progress

Preferences and Performance Among Bureaucrats: Evidence from Pakistan's Civil Service

with Adnan Khan and Zahra Mansoor [Fieldwork in Progress]
Abstract: An effective bureaucracy is a central component of state capacity. In developing countries, bureaucrats often hold a uniquely consequential position as front-line agents of the state, tasked with administering public services and programs directly to citizens. Among the potential determinants of bureaucrat effectiveness in less developed settings – from selection of quality personnel to monitoring and incentives – this project focuses on the relatively underexamined role of how bureaucrats’ preferences over the nature of work they do shape their intrinsic motivations and performance. We examine this question in the context of Pakistan’s Civil Service, where the allocation mechanism for postings creates exogenous variation in whether civil servants are assigned to their preferred position, as well as to more prestigious postings, or postings with specific characters of tasks. We investigate whether assignment to postings along these dimensions impacts motivation, performance, and career advancement among bureaucrats of the nation’s civil service.

Progressivity, Fairness, and Tax Capacity: Evidence from the D.R. Congo

with Augustin Bergeron, Joana Naritomi, Marina Ngoma, and Jonathan Weigel [In progress]Summary: FID
Abstract: The innovation of progressive taxation in the early 20th century accompanied some of the largest increases in tax revenue in Europe and the US and is a core feature of most tax systems in today’s developed countries. In developing countries, however, states often use simplified tax instruments that are comparatively much more regressive. This project will explore the randomized introduction of progressive property taxation in the D.R. Congo, a low-income country with weak fiscal capacity. In collaboration with the Provincial Government of Kasaï-Central, our evaluation will compare neighborhoods in the city of Kananga assigned to either the existing flat fee schedule (control), a proportional tax rate schedule (treatment 1), or a schedule of progressive property tax rates (treatment 2). We will study effects on total revenue, household compliance, and perceptions of fairness and tax morale to inform the design at scale of a tax schedule that balances revenue and fairness.

Fiscal Externalities: Evidence from Tariff Reforms and Domestic Production Networks in Rwanda

with Pierre Bachas, Anne Brockmeyer, and Anders Jensen [In Preparation]

Policy Writing

How the COVID-19 Pandemic Affected Rwandan Businesses: Findings from Phone Surveys PEDL C-19 Note, July 2021