Property Rights and Social Institutions: How Informal Institutions and Chiefs Shape Land Formalization in Urban Africa
with Pablo Balán, Augustin Bergeron, and Jonathan Weigel [Pre-Analysis Plan] [RCT Registration]Summary: EGAP Stories of Change, J-PAL Evaluation SummaryAccepted, Comparative Political Studies.Bridging the Gap: Revenue Mobilization in South Asia
with Hagen Kruse, Franziska Ohnsorge, and Zoe Leiyu Xie [World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 11104]Summary: World Bank Blogin Taxing Times. South Asia Development Update, Chapter 2. World Bank, April 2025.The State Capacity Ceiling on Tax Rates: Evidence from Randomized Tax Abatements in the DRC
with Augustin Bergeron and Jonathan Weigel [Pre-Analysis Plan] [RCT Registration] [CEPR Working Paper] [NBER Working Paper]Summary: World Bank Development Impact Blog, econimate videoEconometrica, 92(4), 2024.How Can Lower Income Countries Collect More Taxes? The Role of Technology, Tax Agents, and Politics
with Oyebola Okunogbe [World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 10655] [Reproducibility Repository]Journal of Economic Perspectives, 38(1), 2024.Hiring Frictions and the Promise of Online Job Portals: Evidence from India [Appendix]
with Nilesh Fernando and Niharika Singh [RCT Registration] [STEG Working Paper]Summary: VoxDev, SGB Evidence Fund, J-PAL Evaluation Summary, IGC BlogAmerican Economic Review: Insights, 5(4), 2023.Targeting in Tax Behavior: Evidence from Rwandan Firms
Summary: World Bank Development Impact Blog, ICTD BlogJournal of Development Economics, 158, 2022.Local Elites as State Capacity: How City Chiefs Use Local Information to Increase Tax Compliance in the D.R. Congo
with Pablo Balán, Augustin Bergeron, and Jonathan Weigel [Pre-Analysis Plan] [RCT Registration] [CEPR Working Paper]Summary: VoxDev, J-PALAmerican Economic Review, 112(3), 2022.Supermodular Bureaucrats: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Tax Collectors in the DRC
with Augustin Bergeron, Pedro Bessone, John Kabeya Kabeya and Jonathan Weigel [RCT Registration] [NBER Working Paper] [CEPR Working Paper]Summary: VoxDevConditionally Accepted, American Economic Review.Does Collecting Taxes Erode the Responsiveness of Informal Leaders? Evidence from the D.R.C
with Augustin Bergeron, Elie Kabue Ngindu, and Jonathan Weigel [Pre-Analysis Plan] [RCT Registration]IIPF Peggy and Richard Musgrave Prize 2023Submitted.Fiscal Contracts? A Six-Country Randomized Experiment on Transaction Costs, Public Services, and Taxation in Developing Countries
with Ana de La O et al. [Pre-Analysis Plan] [RCT Registration]Submitted.Fiscal Externalities: Evidence from Tariff Reforms and Domestic Production Networks in Rwanda
with Pierre Bachas, Anne Brockmeyer, Anders Jensen, and Anton ReinickeExtreme Heat and Public Services: Evidence from Vaccinations in Pakistan
with Karrar Hussain, Yasir Khan, and Jiawei LyuDelegating Tax Collection Does Not Adversely Affect Demand for Accountability: Evidence from an Experiment in the D.R. Congo
with Mats Ahrenshop, Augustin Bergeron, Laura Paler, and Jonathan Weigel [Pre-Analysis Plan] [RCT Registration]Using Machine Learning to Create a Property Tax Roll: Evidence from the City of Kananga, D.R. Congo
with Augustin Bergeron, Arnaud Fournier, John Kabeya Kabeya and Jonathan Weigel [ICTD Working Paper]Preferences and Performance Among Bureaucrats: Evidence from Pakistan's Civil Service
with Adnan Khan and Zahra Mansoor [Fieldwork in Progress]Abstract: An effective bureaucracy is a central component of state capacity. In developing countries, bureaucrats often hold a uniquely consequential position as front-line agents of the state, tasked with administering public services and programs directly to citizens. Among the potential determinants of bureaucrat effectiveness in less developed settings – from selection of quality personnel to monitoring and incentives – this project focuses on the relatively underexamined role of how bureaucrats’ preferences over the nature of work they do shape their intrinsic motivations and performance. We examine this question in the context of Pakistan’s Civil Service, where the allocation mechanism for postings creates exogenous variation in whether civil servants are assigned to their preferred position, as well as to more prestigious postings, or postings with specific characters of tasks. We investigate whether assignment to postings along these dimensions impacts motivation, performance, and career advancement among bureaucrats of the nation’s civil service.Progressivity, Fairness, and Tax Capacity: Evidence from the D.R. Congo
with Augustin Bergeron, Joana Naritomi, Marina Ngoma, and Jonathan Weigel [AEA Registry] [In progress]Summary: FIDAbstract: The innovation of progressive taxation in the early 20th century accompanied some of the largest increases in tax revenue in Europe and the US and is a core feature of most tax systems in today’s developed countries. In developing countries, however, states often use simplified tax instruments that are comparatively much more regressive. This project will explore the randomized introduction of progressive property taxation in the D.R. Congo, a low-income country with weak fiscal capacity. In collaboration with the Provincial Government of Kasaï-Central, our evaluation will compare neighborhoods in the city of Kananga assigned to either the existing flat fee schedule (control), a proportional tax rate schedule (treatment 1), or a schedule of progressive property tax rates (treatment 2). We will study effects on total revenue, household compliance, and perceptions of fairness and tax morale to inform the design at scale of a tax schedule that balances revenue and fairness.The Effects of Formalizing Customary Land Rights on Landowners and Land Users: Evidence from Côte d'Ivoire
with Andrea Caflisch, Aletheia Donald, Alexandra Hartman, Michael O'Sullivan, and Oumar Sory [In progress] [Pre-Analysis Plan] [RCT Registration]Abstract: This project studies a land certification program in rural Côte d’Ivoire aimed at formalizing customary rights to land. We leverage experimental variation in exposure to land certification to examine direct impacts on beneficiaries of land certification as well as indirect effects on land users and landowning households excluded from formalization. As governments seek to extend property protections in the interest of alleviating poverty and promoting economic growth, a more complete understanding of formalization’s wider consequences on non-beneficiaries and markets can be valuable for informing complementary policies — to address negative unintended consequences or to capitalize on positive spillovers — to guide how land policy is deployed in the pursuit of broad-based development.How the COVID-19 Pandemic Affected Rwandan Businesses: Findings from Phone Surveys PEDL C-19 Note, July 2021