CCP holds institutional arrangements for power sharing. The Chinese elite achieve vast elite turnover, for example, most of central committee member and alternative member will be reshuffled after each 5-year-term. Current research focuses on the power sharing in 25 politburo members and 307 central committee members, and multiple has pointed out the weakening of several formal and informal institutions, such as presidential term limits, and collective leadership. However, the political elites in CCP happens in the of 5000 members that is governed by central organization department. Extending the to the other listed department may will unpack a more detailed picture of elite politics in Chinese government. Whether and how the CCDI serves the interest of leader, this question may have implication on the dynamics of power consolidating and institution in China.
Previous studies have attempted to uncover the latent mobility structure of labor market and they pertained predominantly to American data , but the mobility structure of the the Chinese labor market still remains unclear. In our research, we aim to explore the mobility structure in China using occupation data from the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS). We link mobility with income by constructing a network based on transition and measuring the latent occupation structure. Additionally, we compare traditional sociological methods with our novel data-driven approach to categorizing occupations. Our analysis indicates that the new method better reflects the occupation structure, and we examine China’s occupation mobility and polarization trends.
I studied the local government's responsiveness towards poeverty reduction during poverty alleviation project in China. The poor county districts in China also have the most severe rural-urban gap, and local government lacks incentive to invest in rural development. Specificlly, I examined the effect of poverty targeting on enhancing official incentives. I found that poverty targeting enhanced the responsiveness, but the effects are not durable.
The paper explores the ways in which digitalization is involved in inclusive development via global panel data using fixed-effect models. The main finding is that the effects of digitalization on inequality reduction have a reverse U-shape. By testing moderation and mediation effects, we further illustrate the dynamics of digitalization on inequality. We find that while digitalization has created inclusive institutions, it may also cause polarized relationships in the long run. We also show that the reverse U-shaped effects are more prominent in countries in the global south, which suggests the diffusion of a relational norm.
DAGs are often used to visualize causal relationship, but scholars ignored its potential for visualizing experiments. I proposed a framework for policy evaluation in policy experiment, integrating the internal and external validity in policy evaluation of policy effect. The new framework is easier to understand and
An R package for text annotation using large language models