Five Things Science Cannot In Principle Explain (But Theism Can)

1. Science Cannot Explain the Origin of the Universe

 It is now beyond reasonable doubt that the universe—the system of time, space, and matter/ non p ersonal energy—began to exist at some finite time ago (13.8 billion years ago). The kalam cosmological argument—a powerful argument from this fact for God’s existence—was formulated many centuries ago, but it has received renewed interest in the last few decades :

 1. The universe had a beginning.

 2. The beginning of the universe was caused.

 3. The cause of the beginning of the universe was personal.

 Philosophical Evidence That the Universe Had a Beginning

 As we saw in an earlier chapter, one philosophical argument for premise 1 involves the impossibility of crossing an actual infinite (an actual infinite is a collection of things that is infinitely larger than any finite number) number of events. For example, if one started counting 1, 2, 3, . . . , then one could count forever and never reach a time when an actual infinite amount of numbers had been counted. The series counted could increase forever (what’s called a potential infinity), but would always be finite (and thus could never be an actual infinity).

 Trying to count to infinity is like attempting to jump out of a pit with infinitely tall walls—walls that literally go forever without top edges to them. No matter how far one counted, no meaningful progress would be made because there would always be an infinite number of items left to count!

 Now, suppose we represent the events in the history of the universe as follows:

The Present

(Infinity past) <-------------------------------------

-3                      -2                     -1                      0

The present moment is marked zero, and each moment in the past (such as yesterday or 1500 BC) is one point on the line. If the universe never had a beginning, the left side of the line has no end. Rather, it extends infinitely into the past. If the universe had no beginning, the number of events crossed to reach the present moment would be actually infinite. It would be like counting to zero from negative infinity.

 Scientific Evidence That the Universe Had a Beginning

 While there are two scientific arguments that the universe had a beginning, in my view the philosophical argument is stronger than either and establishes a beginning without needing further support. And while science can provide evidence that the universe had a beginning, as we will see, it cannot explain that beginning, that is, it cannot say what caused it.

 One scientific argument for premise 1 derives from the second law of thermodynamics , which in one form states that the amount of useful energy in the universe is irreversibly being used up. If the universe were infinitely old, it would have already used up all its useful energy. Since there are many pockets of useful energy (for example, the sun), the universe must be finite in duration. Therefore, there was a beginning, when the universe’s useful energy was put into it “from the outside.”

 If the universe had already existed throughout an actually infinite past, it would have reached an equilibrium state an infinite number of days ago, but it obviously has not done so. Think of it this way: Suppose you woke up in a room so tightly sealed that there was nothing whatsoever, including matter or energy, that could enter or escape the room. Now, suppose you found in the room a warm cup of coffee and a burning candle. You would know that the room was not beginning -l ess , that it had not been built and sealed an infinite number of years ago. In fact, you would know that the room could not have been built and sealed more than, say, an hour ago. Why? Because, had it been longer, all the warm, burning objects would have run out of energy and the entire room would be a uniform temperature (it would have reached equilibrium).

 The second scientific argument is the classic Big Bang theory, currently the most reasonable and widely respected theory regarding the origin of the universe. It confirms the fact that the space -t ime physical universe had a beginning. Scientists have discovered evidence that the galaxies are accelerating away from each other. You can picture this by imagining a balloon with dots drawn on it. Each dot represents a single galaxy. Now, as the balloon is blown up, its surface expands and stretches and the dots travel away from each other. This is exactly what is going on in our universe. If you were to reverse time and extrapolate backward, you would reach a point at which time, space, and matter spring into existence at an initial creation event.

 But it bears repeating: even though, as shown by these two examples, science can provide evidence that the universe had a beginning, it cannot, even in principle, explain that beginning; that is, it cannot say what caused it.

 Evidence That the Beginning of the Universe Was Caused

 Premise 2—the beginning of the universe was caused—is confirmed by universal experience, with no clear counterexamples. Alleged cases from science where something comes from nothing actually involve one thing coming into existence from something else (e.g., lead from uranium). This premise is also confirmed philosophically by analyzing the nature of nothingness—a total, complete lack of any being whatever; no properties, events, causal powers, etc. No real thing can pop into existence from nothing.

Evidence That the Cause of the Beginning of the Universe Was Personal

 Evidence for premise 3—that the cause of the universe was personal—derives from the fact that the ultimate laws of nature, time, space, and matter did not exist earlier than the beginning of the universe. Causes that are physical or that are subject to scientific law presuppose time, space, and matter to exist. But since we are asking what caused time, space, and matter, the cause itself must be something other than each of these. In other words, it must be timeless in order to cause time; 1 it must be nonspatial in order to cause space; it must be immaterial in order to cause matter; it must therefore be supernatural , capable of existing without the natural world and without being subject to the ultimate laws of nature.

 The universe’s immaterial cause was timeless, spaceless, and had the power spontaneously to bring the world into existence as a first mover, i.e., without changing first to do so (if it had to change before bringing the world into existence, that change, not the act of bringing the world into existence, would be the first event). Such a cause must have genuine free will and, since only persons have free will, it must be a personal creator.

 Three Reasons Science Cannot in Principle Explain the Origin of the Universe

 What I have written thus far is an inadequately brief précis of the kalam argument for God’s existence. 2 However, what is also of interest is that, for at least three reasons, science cannot—even in principle —explain the origin of the universe.

 First, science explains one aspect of the universe by appealing to another aspect of the universe, often by connecting the two by subsuming them under a law of nature. For example, we explain the formation of water by appealing to the chemical properties of hydrogen and oxygen, along with some energy -r eleasing event that caused the two to come together according to these chemical properties. We explain the death of the dinosaurs by appealing to different catastrophic events. In all cases of scientific explanation, one already has to have a universe in existence before scientific explanation, initial conditions, laws of nature, and so forth have something to which they can apply. Scientific explanations presuppose the universe in order for those explanations to be employed in the first place. Thus, a scientific explanation cannot be used to explain the very thing (the universe) that must exist before scientific explanation can get off the ground.

 Second, scientific explanations apply to ongoing temporal states or changes of states (both are events) of various things according to relevant laws. The moving of the continents, the formation of the solar system, the development of life, the decay of uranium into lead are all events or changes of state that are explained by other events and laws that connect the events. The ongoing event of a gas retaining its pressure at constant volume is explained by the gas’s retaining its temperature according to the ideal gas law.

 And so scientific explanation presupposes time (events are temporal episodes, and no sense can be given to the idea of a timeless event) and the reality of events. Two things follow from this. For one thing, science will never be able to explain the first event (the beginning of the universe) because to do so, it would have to appeal to a prior event and a law connecting them. But in this case, the origin of the universe would no longer be the first event; the prior explanatory event would be. But then, to explain this first event, one would need to postulate another prior event, and a vicious regress ensues.

 For another thing, since scientific explanations tie one event to another via a law, such explanations presuppose time for those laws to be applicable. Thus, again, science cannot explain the origin of the very thing (time) that must exist before scientific explanations can be proffered in the first place. Third, coming into existence is not a process but an instantaneous occurrence. Consider the process of walking into a room. One starts completely outside the room, then one is 20% into the room, then 30%, and so on, as one passes through the entrance. Finally, one is 100% in the room. But coming into existence from nothing is not a process. It is not as though the entity in question starts off being 100% nonexistent, then is 90% nonexistent and so on until it is 100% existent. Remember, by “90% nonexistent” I don’t mean that 10% of the entity fully exists and 90% is completely nonexistent. Rather, I mean that the entire entity is 10% real . It’s hard to avoid the conclusion that notions like 90% nonexistent are incoherent.

 Something either does or does not exist. Period. It follows that, apart from the creative activity of God, there can be in principle no reason, no explanation for why one thing—say, the universe—popped into existence as opposed to another thing—a Honda Civic, a bass’s backbone, one half of Mount Everest, or a pair of chicken wings. Science can only be applied to transitions of one thing into another, but coming into existence is not a transition; it is, as it were, a point action or instantaneous event. So science cannot in principle explain the coming -into -existence of the universe from nothing.

2. Science Cannot Explain the Origin of the Fundamental Laws of Nature

 Not all laws of nature are equally fundamental. Some can be derived from others. For example, Newton’s first law of motion (an object at rest stays at rest, and an object in motion stays in motion with the same speed and in the same direction unless acted upon by an unbalanced force) builds on Galileo’s concept of inertia (the tendency of matter to resist change in velocity; objects do not spontaneously change their velocities, which will remain constant unless acted upon by friction).

 However, such derivations cannot continue indefinitely. There must be—and it is widely agreed that there are—fundamental or foundational laws of nature. But the existence and precise nature of these laws cannot be explained by science, since all scientific explanation presupposes them . As far as scientific explanation is concerned, these foundational laws are simply brute givens to be used to explain other things scientifically but which themselves cannot be explained scientifically.

 So, how do we explain the existence and nature of these laws? Where did they come from? There are two major options here: (1) take them as unexplainable, brute entities, or (2) provide a theistic explanation. For many thinkers, myself included, the “ unexplainable -b rute -e ntity ” option is not a good one. Since the actual brute entity might not have existed, we naturally seek an explanation as to why the contingent entity exists instead of not existing. And the fundamental laws of nature are contingent realities—after all, it is easy to conceive of worlds that have different fundamental laws of nature. So why does our world contain certain fundamental laws instead of others?

 This seems like a perfectly permissible question, but some atheists reject the question on the grounds that it assumes The Principle of Sufficient Reason , which either begs the question (the only reason to believe it is if one already believes in God) or is just a brute principle that atheists are free to reject. The principle has different formulations, but one is this: For every contingent existent, there is a sufficient explanation for why it exists as opposed to not existing.

 Theists have responded that the Principle of Sufficient Reason does not, in fact, presuppose the existence of God, and they insist that it is a rational principle that stands behind and justifies the human quest for explanations of why certain things exist and are what they are.

 The atheist seems to be committing the informal taxicab fallacy . This fallacy occurs when someone hops into a principle or system of reason and uses that principle

 principle until he no longer likes the implication of the principle (or system), whereupon he hops out of the principle (or system) and stops using it. Applied to our discussion, we use the principle of sufficient reason all the time (e.g., when your car breaks down, your mechanic assumes there is a reason for why the engine exists in a bad way as opposed to existing in the way it should, so he tries to find that reason), and it has proven itself over and over again. But when we apply the principle of sufficient reason to the existence of the fundamental laws of nature (or, indeed, to the contingency of the universe we live in), the atheist rather arbitrarily stops using the principle because it most naturally yields a theistic explanation. He or she then jumps out of the taxicab.

 The principle of sufficient reason does not apply to necessary beings—beings which, if they do indeed exist, exist in all possible worlds. Necessary beings are beings that could not not -e xist . If God exists (and this argument provides evidence that he does), then he is a necessary being and the reason for his existence lies within his own nature as necessary.

 But if God is a necessary being and is the creator, how do we explain that the universe he brought about contains laws of nature that are contingent (i.e., that could have been otherwise)? The answer lies in God’s free will. Even though he freely brought into existence our universe, he could have refrained from creating at all, or he could have created a different sort of universe with different laws of nature. Thus, the contingency of our laws is explained by the free act of a necessary personal God.

3. Science Cannot Explain the Fine Tuning of the Universe

 What do we mean by fine tuning ? 

Our universe contains various constants (like the gravitational constant G in Newton’s law of gravity:

                m1 m2 

F = G --------    

                   r2 

and certain arbitrary physical quantities (such as the specific low entropy R 2 level in the universe—the amount of disorder or useful energy to do work in the universe) that are not determined by the laws of nature but, as far as science is concerned, are brute facts that are just there.

 Given this information, philosopher William Lane Craig defines “ fine -tuning ” as follows:

 By “ fine -tuning ” one means that small deviations from the actual values of the constants and quantities in question render the universe life -prohibiting or, alternatively, that the range of life -permitting values is extremely narrow in comparison with the range of assumable values. 

 These factors are in principle incapable of being explained by science because they are ultimates—brute givens plugged into scientific laws. However, they can be explained quite persuasively by a theistic explanation. To see this, consider the following.

 William Dembski has analyzed cases in which it is legitimate to infer that some phenomenon is the result of a purposive, intelligent act by an agent. 6 Among other things, Dembski analyzes cases in which insurance employees, police, and forensic scientists must determine whether a death was an accident (no intelligent cause) or was brought about intentionally (caused on purpose by an intelligent agent).

 According to Dembski, whenever three factors are present, investigators are rationally obligated to draw the conclusion that the event was brought about intentionally:

 1. The event was contingent , that is, even though it took place, it did not have to happen. No law of nature required that the event happen (unlike in the case of water, which, given the laws of nature, must freeze at a certain temperature).

 2. The event had a small probability of happening.

3. The event is capable of independent specifiability (capable of being identified as a special occurrence besides the simple fact that it did, in fact, happen).

 These three factors constitute what Dembski and others have called the design filter , which is used in various areas of science (e.g., forensic science).

 To illustrate, consider a card game of bridge in which two people receive a hand of cards. Let’s say one hand is a random set of cards—call it hand A—and the other is a perfect bridge hand dealt to the dealer himself. Now if that happened, we would immediately infer that while A was not dealt intentionally, the perfect bridge hand represents a case of cheating on the part of the dealer. What justifies our suspicion?

 First, both hands are contingent . Neither one had to happen. There are no laws of nature, logic, or mathematics that necessitate that either hand had to come about in the history of the cosmos. In this sense, each hand and, indeed, the very card game itself, is a contingent event that did not have to take place.

 Second, each hand should be equally improbable , since both have the same number of cards. The small probability of an event is necessary but not sufficient reason to raise suspicions that the event came about by the intentional action of an agent.

 Third, the perfect bridge hand can be independently specified , regardless of the fact that it happened to be the hand that came about. But this is not so for hand A. Hand A can be specified as “some random hand or other that someone happened to get.” Now that specification applies to all hands whatsoever and does not mark out as special any particular hand that comes about. So understood, A is no more special than any other random deal. But this is not so for the perfect bridge hand (hand B). This hand can be characterized as “a special sort of combination of cards by the rules of bridge” quite independently of the fact that it is the hand that the dealer received.

 It is the combination of contingency (this hand did not have to be dealt), small probability (this particular arrangement of cards was quite unlikely to have occurred), and independent specifiability (according to the rules, this is a pretty special hand for the dealer to receive) that justifies us in accusing the dealer of cheating. This act was done intentionally by an intelligent person.

 Similarly, if a wife happens to die at a young age in an unlikely manner even though she is healthy, and if this happens just after the husband takes out a large life insurance policy on his wife a week after proposing to his mistress, then the three factors that justify an intentional act by an intelligent designer are present.

 Fine-Tuning and the Existence of God

 What does all this have to do with the existence of God? In the last several years, scientists have made a discovery so shocking that it played a prominent role in leading to atheist thinker Antony Flew’s conversion to belief in God. In fact, in light of the discovery, Flew began to ask, Did the universe know we were coming? He was compelled by the evidence to answer in the affirmative. 7 Of course, the universe is dead matter and, thus, cannot know anything, so Flew actually affirms that it had to be God who knew we were coming.

 One of my faculty colleagues, David Horner, took his doctorate in philosophy from Oxford University. One day while he was walking past a lecture hall, he heard one of the world’s leading atheists (I won’t mention his name) speaking about this discovery. Horner heard him frankly admit that it provides significant evidence for God’s existence and he really didn’t know how to respond to this new evidence as an atheist.

So, what is the discovery? It is that the universe is precisely fine-tuned so that life could appear. More than a hundred independent, hard facts about the universe have been discovered in the form of basic constants of nature or arbitrary physical magnitudes which are, scientifically speaking, brute facts and for which there is no further scientific explanation (e.g., the force of gravity in the universe, the charge of an electron, the rest mass of a proton, the rate of expansion resulting from the Big Bang). What blows the minds of so many is that, if any single one of these—much less all one hundred!—had been slightly larger or smaller on the order of a billionth of a percentage point or more, then no life could have appeared in the universe. The universe is a razor’s edge of precisely balanced life -permitting conditions:

 If gravity’s force were infinitesimally stronger, all stars would burn too quickly to sustain life; if ever so slightly weaker, all stars would be too cold to support life -bearing planets.

 If the ratio of electron to proton mass were slightly larger or smaller, the sort of chemical bonding required to produce self -replicating molecules could not obtain. The same is true for the electromagnetic force in the universe.

 If the strong nuclear force were slightly stronger, then the nuclei essential for life would be too unstable; if it were slightly weaker, no elements but hydrogen would form.

 If the rate of the universe’s expansion had been smaller by one part in a hundred thousand million million, the universe would have recollapsed and could not form or sustain life.

 Quantum laws are precisely what they need to be to prevent electrons from spiraling into atomic nuclei.

 If the Earth took more than twenty -f our hours to rotate, temperatures on our planet would be too extreme between sunrise and sunset. If the rotation of Earth were slightly shorter, wind would move at a dangerous velocity.

 If the oxygen level on our planet were slightly less, we would suffocate; if it were slightly more, spontaneous fires would erupt.

 I could go on and on and on with additional facts. It should be clear why these discoveries shocked scientists and philosophers. These precisely balanced factors are (1) contingent (it is easy to conceive of them being different, e.g., that the mass of a proton or the expansion of the universe could have been quite different from what they actually are); (2) extraordinarily improbable and balanced to an infinitesimally small degree; and (3) independently specifiable (they are exactly what is needed for there to be life).

 Regarding this last point, for the longest time scientists thought that these numbers could vary significantly with no impact on whether or not life could appear. But no longer. They now know that life -permitting universes have features that are precisely formulated within a range of billionths of a percentage point from what they actually are in the real world. Thus, the actual values fall within razor -thin ranges that are required for life to appear. These values are special (just as are the rules of a card game) quite independently of the fact that the universe’s actual values correspond to them.

 Think of it this way: Philosopher of science Robin Collins imagines a scenario where human space travelers arrive on Mars and find a fully functioning, life -sustaining biosphere. When the astronauts enter the Martian biosphere, they find a panel that controls the environment:

 At the control panel they find that all the dials for its environment are set just right for life. The oxygen ratio is perfect; the temperature is seventy degrees; the humidity is fifty percent; there’s a system for replenishing the air; there are systems for producing food, generating energy, and disposing of wastes. Each dial has a huge range of possible settings, and you can see if you were to adjust one or more of them just a little bit, the environment would go out of whack and life would be impossible. 8

 That’s the universe we live in. As noted, there are more than a hundred independent “dials” (constants of nature; hard facts about the universe)—some estimate many, many more—and each has a wide range of alternate settings (values). Yet each dial is exactly set to precisely the correct setting so that life can appear. It’s no wonder that theoretical physicist Paul Davies acknowledged,

 It is hard to resist the impression that the present structure of the universe, apparently so sensitive to minor alterations in the numbers, has been rather carefully thought out. . . . [T]he seemingly miraculous concurrence of numerical values that nature has assigned to her fundamental constants must remain the most compelling evidence for an element of cosmic design. 9

 The Response by Naturalists

 The main attempt by naturalists to avoid this argument is called the many worlds hypothesis , according to which there is a “world ensemble” containing an infinite number of actual, concrete universes parallel to our own and with which we are incapable of interacting in any way, including scientific means of interaction. Given that each world in the world ensemble would have its own combination of values for its constants and arbitrary physical magnitudes, it is probable that there will be many universes that contain beings capable of observing their own universe. And, thus, it is necessary that our observed universe be one that contains the right combination of constants and magnitudes because if it did not, we would not be here to debate the question!

 In my view, the many worlds hypothesis fails to be plausible. For one thing, since we cannot interact with parallel concrete universes, there is no hard scientific evidence for their existence. Indeed, I can think of no reason to believe in this bizarre assembly of an infinite number of concrete universes other than the fact that it allows one to avoid the theistic alternative.

 Further, the many worlds hypothesis is a prime example of a bloated worldview, the very opposite of scientism’s prized values of simplicity and elegance. Surely, theism is much simpler and more elegant than this hypothesis.

 Moreover, each universe in the ensemble would need a beginning, so the theory does not avoid the kalam cosmological argument described above.

 Finally, the hypothesis proves too much. While its advocates take the hypothesis to allow one to avoid the conclusion that the universe resulted from an intentional creative action by God, I think it also drives one to avoid believing in other intentional actions by us humans. Consider this: In the infinite ensemble of concrete universes, there will be myriads of universes that contain observing beings. Within that range of universes, there will be universes that contain doubles of us; beings that are indistinguishably similar to us but have a different life (say, my duplicate is a lawyer instead of a philosopher).

 Now suppose we have a pot of $500 for the winner of our bridge card game and I am the dealer. On the first deal—surprise—I give myself a perfect winning hand. The others at the table (rightly) accuse me of doing an intentional act (purposely cheating). I respond by noting that, in the Many Worlds Ensemble, there are many, many worlds where we have duplicates, and in many of those, they are playing bridge, and in each world, players get a different hand on the first deal. We just happen to be in that concrete universe where I got a winning hand on the first deal. Surely such an explanation is bogus, but not if I and my card -p laying friends correctly apply the ensemble view to our current situation!

 4. Science Cannot Explain the Origin of Consciousness

 Various features of human persons, consciousness being among them, have provided very serious problems for scientistic naturalism. But consciousness is easily explained, given theism. 10 Consider the following quote from Crispin Wright, one of the world’s leading advocates of scientism and naturalism:

 A central dilemma in contemporary metaphysics is to find a place for certain anthropocentric subject -m atters —for instance, semantic, moral, and psychological—in a world as conceived by modern naturalism: a stance which inflates the concepts and categories deployed by (finished) physical science into a metaphysics of the kind of thing the real world essentially and exhaustively is.

 On one horn, if we embrace this naturalism, it seems we are committed either to reductionism: that is, to a construal of the reference of, for example, semantic, moral and psychological vocabulary as somehow being within the physical domain—or to disputing that the discourses in question involve reference to what is real at all.

 On the other horn, if we reject this naturalism, then we accept that there is more to the world than can be embraced within a physicalist ontology—and so take on a commitment, it can seem, to a kind of eerie supernaturalism. 11

 Wright is right (pun intended). Given naturalism, there is just no place to put consciousness (he calls it the “psychological”), semantic meanings, and so forth. So the naturalist either (1) has to say that these things (e.g., a feeling of pain) just aren’t what they seem to be from first -p erson introspection and, instead, are actually physical things; or else (2) has to deny that they are real in the first place (e.g., consciousness does not exist!). But if we reject naturalism and the strictly physicalist ontology (view of reality) it implies, and accept the commonsense view of these things, we come perilously close to embracing theism.

 Why? Well, in the beginning either there was the Logos or else there were the “particles.” If you start with brute (unconscious) matter, and then understand the history of the universe to be how they come together according to random collisions and the laws of nature to form larger and more complex rearranged groupings of particles, you will end up with—you guessed it—mere groupings of rearranged particles. If consciousness were to arise in this naturalistic creation account, it would be a case of getting something from nothing. But if you start with God (the Logos), your fundamental being is conscious and there is no difficulty in seeing how God could bestow consciousness on various creatures at his choosing. And this is what Crispin Wright correctly understands.

 Reasons Why Science Cannot Explain the Origin of Mental States

 At least four reasons have been offered for why there is no natural scientific explanation for the existence of mental states (or their regular correlation with physical states):

 (1) The uniformity of nature. Prior to the emergence of consciousness, the universe contained nothing but aggregates of particles/waves standing in fields of forces relative to each other. The story of the development of the cosmos is told in terms of the rearrangement of micro -p arts into increasingly more complex structures according to natural law. On a naturalist depiction of matter, it is brute mechanical, physical stuff. The emergence of consciousness seems to be a case of getting something from nothing. In general, physico chemical reactions do not generate consciousness—not consciousness—not even one little bit. These reactions do occur in the brain, but brains seem similar to other parts of organisms’ bodies (e.g., each one is a collection of cells totally describable in physical terms). How can like causes produce radically different effects? The appearance of mind is therefore utterly unpredictable and inexplicable. This radical discontinuity seems like an inhomogeneous rupture in the natural world. Similarly, physical states have spatial extension and location, but mental states seem to lack spatial features. Space and consciousness sit oddly together. How did spatially arranged matter conspire to produce nonspatial mental states? From a naturalist point of view, this seems utterly inexplicable.

 (2) Contingency of the mind/body correlation. The regular correlation between types of mental states and physical states seems radically contingent. Why do pains , instead of itches, thoughts, or feelings of love, get correlated with specific brain states ( C -f iber firings)? We can easily conceive that zombie (a duplicate of us with no consciousness) and inverted -q ualia (“qualia” refers to the what -i t -i s -l ike , the experiential component of sensations, e.g., the hurt of pain, the sensation of seeing red) worlds are possible. In an inverted -q ualia world, there are people who see red things as blue, but point to them and call them “red,” all the while being in the same brain state as people in our world are when they see red; they also see blue things as red. No amount of knowledge of the brain state will help to answer this question. Given the requirement of causal necessitation for naturalistic causal explanations (given the cause, the effect must happen), there is in principle no naturalistic explanation for either the existence of mental states or their regular correlation with physical states. For the naturalist, the regularity of mind/body correlations must be taken as contingent brute facts. But these facts are inexplicable from a naturalistic standpoint, and they are radically unique compared to all other entities in the naturalist ontology. Thus, it begs the question simply to announce that mental states and their regular correlations with certain brain states are natural facts. As naturalist Terence Horgan acknowledges, “in any metaphysical framework that deserves labels like ‘ materialism’, ‘naturalism’, or ‘physicalism’, supervenient facts must be explainable rather than being sui generis .” 12

 Since, on most depictions, the theistic God possesses genuine free will, God is free to act or refrain from acting in various ways. Thus, the fact that the existence of consciousness and its precise correlation with matter is contingent fits well with a theistic personal explanation that takes God’s creative action to have been a contingent one. God may be a necessary being, but God’s choice to create conscious beings and to correlate certain types of mental states with certain types of physical states were contingent choices , and this fits nicely with the phenomena themselves.

 (3) Epiphenomenalism and causal closure. Most naturalists believe that their worldview requires that all entities are either physical or at least depend upon the physical for their existence and behavior. One implication of this belief is commitment to the causal closure of the physical . On this principle, when one is tracing the causal antecedents of any physical event, one will never have to leave the level of the physical in order to trace those antecedents. Physical effects have only physical causes. Rejection of the causal closure principle would imply a rejection of the possibility of a complete and comprehensive physicalist theory of all physical phenomena—something that no naturalist should reject.

 Thus, if mental phenomena are genuinely nonphysical, then they must be epiphenomena —effects caused by the physical that do not themselves have causal powers. So it is not the feeling of thirst that causes you to drink water; rather, it is a certain brain state that causes this. On this understanding, the feeling of thirst, even if it is real, cannot cause anything. But epiphenomenalism is false and therefore should be rejected. It is false for at least two reasons. First, is it self -r efuting . If our mental states, such as the state of being aware of good reasons for a conclusion, are epiphenomenal, then they do not have a role in our drawing of the conclusion. Thus, any argument that gave reasons for believing in epiphenomenalism would play no role in that belief. So, acceptance of epiphenomenalism would not be based on rational considerations, and it would be self -r efuting to give reasons for a view (epiphenomenalism) that, if true, implies that giving reasons for a conclusion is useless! Second, mental causation seems undeniable (e.g., my feeling of thirst causes me to get a drink of water; my beliefs cause me to act in certain ways) and yet, for the naturalist, the mental can be allowed to have causal powers only if it is in some way or another identified with the physical.

 I think that the reliance of some naturalists on the idea of epiphenomenal nonphysical mental entities should be taken as a refutation of naturalism. As naturalist D. M. Armstrong admits, “I suppose that if the principles involved [in analyzing the single, all -e mbracing spatio -t emporal system which is reality] were completely different from the current principles of physics, in particular if they involved appeal to mental entities, such as purposes, we might then count the analysis as a falsification of Naturalism.” 13

 (4) The inadequacy of evolutionary explanations. Naturalists are committed to the view that, in principle, evolutionary explanations can be proffered for the appearance of all organisms and their parts. It is not hard to see how an evolutionary account could be given for new and increasingly complex physical structures that constitute different organisms. Perhaps more than anyone, Colin McGinn has defended this idea along with what he takes it to entail, viz., the inability of naturalism to explain genuinely unique emergent properties:

 Can we gain any deeper insight into what makes the problem of consciousness run against the grain of our thinking? Are our modes of theorizing about the world of the wrong shape to extend to the nature of mind? I think we can discern a characteristic structure possessed by successful scientific theories, a structure that is unsuitable for explaining consciousness. . . . Is there a “grammar” to science that fits the physical world but becomes shaky when applied to the mental world? Perhaps the most basic aspect of thought is the operation of combination . This is the way in which we think of complex entities as resulting from the arrangement of simpler parts. There are three aspects to this basic idea: the atoms we start with, the laws we use to combine them, and the resulting complexes. . . . I think it is clear that this mode of understanding is central to what we think of as scientific theory; our scientific faculty involves representing the world in this combinatorial style. 14

 This combinatorial style may be suited for explaining how complex structural arrangements of neurons could arise, but it is completely inadequate to explain how the property of being a pain—a simple quality that is not a structural arrangement of parts—could take place in a purely physical world.

 Some reply that consciousness is simply an emergent property that appears when matter reaches a suitable level of complexity. But “emergence” is just a name for the problem: how we get simple properties of a totally new thing (consciousness) by simply spatially rearranging physical parts. It is not a solution. Moreover, the emergent -p roperty view suffers from what is called a sorites problem. 15 Consider the idea of the appropriate complexity of matter that must be present if the emergent property (e.g., properties of consciousness) is to arise. This complex structure is composed of literally billions and billions of atoms and molecules. Now, suppose we removed just one single atom from the proper complex structure. Would consciousness emerge under this condition? Surely it would, because removing one single atom among billions would amount to nothing. What about removing another single atom? The same response must be given. Now, no one thinks this process of removal could continue forever. If you got to the point that, instead of a brain, you had only four atoms left, there would be an insufficient structure for consciousness.

 If all this is right, then a disastrous conclusion follows. Somewhere between the removal of the first atom and the place where only four atoms are left, we have a situation such that, at that specific place in the process, if one were to remove a single additional atom, no consciousness could be present. But how could such a small cause (the presence or absence of a single atom) have such a huge metaphysical effect (the presence or absence of consciousness)? It could not, and since the emergent -p roperty view seems to imply that it could, we should reject the emergent -p roperty view. As Crispin Wright and D. M. Armstrong noted, the existence of irreducible consciousness falsifies naturalism and provides strong evidence for theism. 16

 5. Science Cannot Explain the Existence of Moral, Rational, and Aesthetic Objective Laws and Intrinsically Valuable Properties

 Most people acknowledge the existence of objectively true laws in morality, rationality, and aesthetics. Examples in morality are “It is wrong to torture babies for fun” and “One ought to pursue love and kindness and avoid racist bigotry.” If you violate one of these laws, you have done something immoral. Examples in rationality are the laws of logic, principles of evidence evaluation in jury trials, and statements like “If a belief coheres well with other reasonable beliefs you hold, that increases its chances of being true.” If you violate one of these laws, you have done something irrational. In aesthetics , there are principles of objective beauty; e.g., if you want the painting to be beautiful, pay attention to symmetry and color combinations. If you violate one of these laws, you have done something ugly.

 The problem for scientism is that science is descriptive, not prescriptive; science attempts to describe what is the case, but it cannot prescribe what ought to be the case. Thus, science must remain silent when it comes to normative laws and principles. As one of the leading philosophers of evolutionary biology, atheist Michael Ruse, puts it,

 Morality is a biological adaptation no less than are hands and feet and teeth. Considered as a rationally justifiable set of claims about an objective something, ethics is illusory. I appreciate that when somebody says “Love thy neighbor as thyself,” they think they are referring above and beyond themselves. Nevertheless, such reference is truly without foundation. Morality is just an aid to survival and reproduction . . . and any deeper meaning is illusory. 17

 Ruse’s point applies with equal force to rationality and aesthetics. However, if there is a virtuous, good God, then the moral, rational, and aesthetic duties he imposes on us will be objectively true (that is, true independent of what humans think or believe), conducive to prescriptively good human flourishing, and real whether one believes in them or not.

 Besides rules and principles, there are also intrinsically good, valuable states of affairs and things in the world. A human person has deep, intrinsic value, and all human persons have equal, intrinsic value and rights precisely as human persons. Certain states of the mind are intrinsically rational and are states one should seek if he or she desires to be a normatively rational thinker. For example, if one’s mind contains the complex thought “If consciousness is irreducible and real, then physicalism is false; consciousness is irreducible and real; therefore, physicalism is false,” this is a rational state of affairs for a mind to be in. Again, if one had the true belief that “the physical, circumstantial, and eyewitness evidence against the defendant is overwhelming, so I find him guilty,” that person is in an intrinsically rational state of mind. Likewise, certain things are intrinsically beautiful, e.g., sunset over Maui, or snow -c overed mountains.

 Now if the universe began with a being who was himself the bearer of intrinsic goodness, rationality, and beauty, then there is no problem with how these things could exist or from where they came. However, if scientism is true, the entire history of the universe is a story of how strictly physical things (strings, waves, particles, etc.) with strictly physical properties (mass, charge, size, location, and so forth) combined according to the laws of nature to form other strictly physical things with strictly physical properties. There is no need or room for intrinsic, normative value properties—whether moral, rational, or aesthetic—to come to be. As the late atheist philosopher J. L. Mackie admitted, the emergence of moral properties would constitute a refutation of naturalism and evidence for theism: “Moral properties constitute so odd a cluster of properties and relations that they are most unlikely to have arisen in the ordinary course of events without an all -p owerful god to create them.” 18 Yea, verily, and amen!

 Conclusion

 So here we have five distinct phenomena that science simply cannot explain, even in principle. They do, however, fit quite nicely with theism. I conclude that these features support theism and provide strong evidence against scientism.

(Excerpt from Scientism and Secularism: Learning to Respond to a Dangerous Ideology  By J. P. Moreland)

 1 . Without time, there was no “earlier than” the universe for them to exist in; without the universe, God exists timelessly.

 2 . For fuller developments of this argument, see J. P. Moreland, Scaling the Secular City (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1986), chapter 1; Douglas Groothuis, Christian Apologetics (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2011), 214–234; William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics , 3rd ed. (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2008), 111–156.

 3 . I am indebted to William Lane Craig’s excellent discussion of this topic in Reasonable Faith , 158–159.

 4 . For a list and nice explanation of these constants and physical quantities, see Hugh Ross, The Creator and the Cosmos , 3rd rev. and expanded ed. (Colorado Springs: NavPress, 2001), 145–167.

 5 . Craig, Reasonable Faith , 158.

 6 . William Dembski, Intelligent Design (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1999).

 7 . Antony Flew, There Is a God: How the World’s Most Notorious Atheist Changed His Mind (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), chapter 6.

 8 . Robin Collins, “The Evidence of Physics: The Cosmos on a Razor’s Edge,” interview in Lee Strobel, The Case for a Creator: A Journalist Investigates Scientific Evidence That Points to God (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2004), 130.

 9 . Paul Davies, God and the New Physics (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 189.

 10 . See J. P. Moreland, The Recalcitrant Imago Dei (London: SCM Press, 2009).

 11 . Crispin Wright, “The Conceivability of Naturalism,” in Conceivability and Possibility , ed. Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne (Oxford: Clarendon, 2002), 401. The paragraph breaks are mine.

 12 . Terence Horgan, “ Nonreductive Materialism and the Explanatory Autonomy of Psychology,” in Naturalism , ed. Steven J. Wagner and Richard Warner (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 313–314.

 13 . D. M. Armstrong, “Naturalism: Materialism and First Philosophy,” Philosophia 8 (1978): 262.

 14 . Colin McGinn, The Mysterious Flame (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 55–56, cf. 54–62, 90, 95.

 15 . As first proposed by the ancient Greeks, a sorites problem occurs when you have something with a lot of parts, say, a full head of hair made up of a large number of individual hairs, and you remove one part and ask if a big change has occurred—e.g., is the person’s head now bald? The answer will be no. Then you repeat this process over and over again, such that it seems you never have the big change occur (the head never gets bald). This is because it surely seems that the removal of just one single hair at each stage of removal will not be significant enough to bring about the big change of going from not being bald to being bald. But, eventually, that change does occur and the head is bald. Something is wrong here, and this is what the sorites problem is. What do we make of cases like this?

 16 . For a technical presentation of the argument for God’s existence from the fact of conscience, see J. P. Moreland, Consciousness and the Existence of God (New York: Routledge, 2008).

 17 . Michael Ruse, “Evolutionary Theory and Christian Ethics,” in The Darwinian Paradigm (London: Routledge, 1989), 262–269.

 18 . J. L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982), 115. Cf. J. P. Moreland and Kai Nielsen, Does God Exist? (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1993), chapters