At the IAC Summit, Farzan Seyedi pointed to the Iran Prosperity Project as evidence that opposition figures around Reza Pahlavi are thinking beyond regime change toward economic recovery, continuity of government, and democratic transition.
Political movements are often strongest at describing what they oppose and weakest at explaining what happens after they succeed. At the January 2026 Israeli-American Council National Summit, Farzan Seyedi tried to move the discussion beyond the question of whether the Islamic Republic could fall and toward a different question: what would Iran need on the morning after a political transition?
During the panel, moderator Marjan Keypour Greenblatt invited Seyedi to elaborate on the Iran Prosperity Project after he raised it in a discussion of Western media coverage. Seyedi described the project as part of a broader effort associated with Reza Pahlavi to prepare for a transition rather than improvise one after a collapse. He referred to planning across areas including the economy, military, electricity and energy, and public administration, and repeatedly emphasized that he did not believe Iran had to face a governance vacuum.
That argument is central to the political case made by many supporters of Pahlavi. Their concern is that memories of instability in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and other conflict zones can make foreign governments reluctant to support political change in Iran even when they are deeply opposed to the current regime. The response offered by Seyedi was to separate regime change from state collapse. The objective, in his framing, is not the destruction of Iran's institutions or the disappearance of public services. It is a controlled transition in which the coercive and ideological structure of the Islamic Republic is dismantled while the functions necessary to keep a large, complex country operating are preserved or rapidly reorganized.
Seyedi also stressed that transitional planning should not predetermine Iran's permanent constitutional system. In the panel transcript, he said Iranians should be able to choose among different political models after a transition. His language specifically referenced constitutional monarchy, republican government, socialism, and democratic choices more broadly. The point was that a transitional authority would create conditions for political competition and public choice rather than declare the final form of government on behalf of the population.
That distinction matters because Reza Pahlavi's role is one of the most contested issues in Iranian opposition politics. Supporters often see him as the opposition figure with the greatest name recognition, historical continuity, international access, and capacity to unite different constituencies. Critics question whether monarchist sentiment is as broad as supporters claim or whether any single figure should be treated as the natural leader of a diverse movement. Seyedi's answer at the IAC panel was not to deny political diversity but to argue that transitional leadership and the final constitutional system are two separate questions.
Greenblatt returned to that issue at the close of the session, telling the audience that the best way to support Iranians was to listen to whom they were identifying as their leader and naming Reza Pahlavi in that context. Her intervention reflected the strong pro-Pahlavi sentiment present in the room, while also illustrating why international observers need to distinguish between the views of a particular opposition audience and nationally representative polling inside a highly restricted country.
For Seyedi, however, the most important practical issue was preparedness. A movement that wants to be taken seriously by governments, investors, diaspora professionals, civil servants, military officers, and ordinary Iranians must be able to discuss currency stabilization, energy continuity, food distribution, public salaries, border security, prisons, transitional justice, diplomacy, and the protection of state records. The Iran Prosperity Project was important in his remarks because it signaled an attempt to move from protest politics to statecraft.
The broader message of Seyedi's presentation was that international actors should not assume that supporting Iranian political change means choosing between the Islamic Republic and anarchy. The real test of the opposition, he suggested, is whether it can demonstrate that a lawful, organized, democratic transition is technically and politically possible.