ANR DECISION

Un Pinocchio en bois © Jametlene Reskp on Unsplash

Dishonesty is a pervasive phenomenon in our society. It occurs when an individual violates certain moral or legal rules to gain a personal advantage. Dishonest practices have extremely detrimental consequences for society, negatively impacting economic growth, democracy, and overall living conditions. They increase transaction costs, reduce trust, hinder the functioning of the political system, and undermine security.

Identifying the factors that influence the decision to behave dishonestly is fundamentally important for understanding many economic behaviors and for promoting a virtuous society. DECISION conducts a pioneering analysis of the mechanisms—both internal and external to the individual—that are involved in the decision to act dishonestly. To achieve this, it adopts a distinctive three-fold strategy.

First, it examines the individual’s internal psychological, cognitive, and affective states. Next, it considers the broader context of organizations and workplaces, where multiple individuals interact. Finally, it expands its focus to examine how dishonesty varies and spreads across society, where interactions are regulated and shaped by formal and informal institutions.

Publications and pre-prints

Galeotti, F., & Rose, J. (2025) “Costly Confessions”. Working paper available upon request.

Galeotti, F., Krutaj, J. & Villeval, M. C. (2025). "The power of leadership in changing social norms in heterogeneous societies". Working paper available upon request.

Kline, R., Galeotti, F., & Orsini, R. (2025). "Meritocracy or malfeasance: violations of meritocracy erode civic rule following". Frontiers in Behavioral Economics, 4, 1492421.

Galeotti, F., Rilke, R. M. & Verrina, E., (2024) “Beliefs and Group Dishonesty: The Role of Strategic Interaction and Responsibility”. Working paper available at SSRN 4859462.

Bašić, Z., & Verrina, E. (2024). Personal norms — and not only social norms — shape economic behavior. Journal of Public Economics, 239, 105255.

Dimant, E., Galeotti, F., & Villeval, M. C. (2024). Motivated information acquisition and social norm formation. European Economic Review, 167, 104778.

Verrina, E. (2023). Upset but (almost) correct: A conceptual replication of Di Tella, Perez-Truglia, Babino and Sigman (2015). Journal of the Economic Science Association, 9(2), 327–336.

Benistant, J., Galeotti, F., & Villeval, M. C. (2022). Competition, information, and the erosion of morals. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 204, 148–163.

Hillenbrand, A., & Verrina, E. (2022). The asymmetric effect of narratives on prosocial behavior. Games and Economic Behavior, 135, 241–270.

Mittone, L., Ploner, M., & Verrina, E. (2021). When the state does not play dice: Aggressive audit strategies foster tax compliance. Social Choice and Welfare.

Galeotti, F., Maggian, V., & Villeval, M. C. (2021). Fraud deterrence institutions reduce intrinsic honesty. The Economic Journal.

Galeotti, F., Saucet, C., & Villeval, M. (2020). Unethical amnesia responds more to instrumental than to hedonic motives. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 117(41), 25423–25428.

Media

2025 « Dans la tête des fraudeurs : quand la science nous répond » (blog Focus Science CNRS)

2025 « Mentir ou dire la vérité, quand les autres influencent notre perception des normes sociales » (Cortex Mag)