Program

Session 1A: Matching and cooperative games
(Chair: Michel Grabisch)

Guilherme Carmona, University of Surrey, Stable Matching in Large Markets with Occupational Choice

Konstantinos Serfes, Drexel University, Two-sided productivity heterogeneity, firm boundaries and assortative matching (joint with Kaniska Dam, and Daniel Ripperger-Suhler)

Michel Grabisch, Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, Core stability and other applications of minimal balanced collections (joint with Dylan Laplace Mermoud, and Peter Sudhölter)

Session 1B: Discounting
(Chair: Jean-Pierre Drugeon)

Xuan Bach Dong, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, On multiple discount rates and present bias (joint with Philippe Bich, and Bertrand Wigniolle) REMOTELY

Bertrand Wigniolle, Paris School of Economics, University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Time Inconsistent Preferences with Time Dependent Relative Risk Aversion: a Model with some Macroeconomic Applications REMOTELY

Jean-Pierre Drugeon, CNRS - Paris School of Economics, On Future Allocations of Scarce Ressources without Explicit Rates of Discount (joint with Jean-Marc Bonnisseau, and Alain Chateauneuf)

Session 2A: Public economics
(Chair: Sebastián Cea-Echenique)

Yuliya Veselova, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Does Incomplete Information Reduce Manipulability? REMOTELY

Adrian Miroiu, National University of Political Studies and Public Administration (SNSPA), A modal logic for the majority voting (joint with Mircea Dumitru)

Sebastián Cea-Echenique, Universidad de los Andes, Revisiting uncertainty in public goods economies (joint with Etienne Billette de Villemeur, and Conrado Cuevas)

Session 2B: Learning
(Chair: Marek Kapera)

Michele Muller-Itten, University of Notre Dame, Rational Inattention via Ignorance Equivalence (joint with Roc Armenter, and Zachary R. Stangebye) REMOTELY

Adam Brandenburger, Stern School of Business, Tandon School of Engineering, NYU Shanghai, New York University, Agreement and Disagreement in a Non-Classical World (joint with Patricia Contreras-Tejada, Aleksander Kubicki, Pierfrancesco La Mura, Giannicola Scarpa, and Kai Steverson) REMOTELY

Marek Kapera, Institute of Economics, Polish Academy of Sciences, Learning own preferences through consumption

Session 3A: Networks
(Chair: Arnold Polanski)

Agnieszka Rusinowska, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne University, On the design of public debate in social networks (joint with Michel Grabisch, and Antoine Mandel)

Arnold Polanski, University of East Anglia, Close-knit Neighborhoods: Stability of Cooperation in Networks

Session 3B: Ambiguity
(Chair: Michael Zierhut)

Frank Riedel, Bielefeld University, Efficient Allocations under Ambiguous Model Uncertainty (joint with Chiaki Hara, Sujoy Mukerji, and Jean Marc Tallon) REMOTELY

Michael Zierhut, Humboldt University, Dynamic Inconsistency and Inefficiency of Equilibrium under Knightian Uncertainty (joint with Patrick Beissner)

Session 4A: Persuasion
(Chair: Olivier Bos)

Toygar T. Kerman, Corvinus University of Budapest, Persuading Communicating Voters (joint with Anastas P. Tenev)

Manuel Foerster, Bielefeld University, A theory of media bias and disinformation REMOTELY

Olivier Bos, ENS Paris-Saclay, Auctions with Signaling Bidders: Optimal Design and Information Disclosure (joint with Martin Pollrich)

Session 4B: General equilibrium I
(Chair: Elena L. del Mercato)

Van-Quy Nguyen, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Endowment-regarding preferences

Marta Faias, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, CMA and FCT, Multiple private goods to finance a public good (joint with Mercedes Guevara-Velázquez, and Emma Moreno-García)

Elena L. del Mercato, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics & Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, Sufficient conditions for a "simple'' Second Welfare Theorem with other-regarding preferences (joint with Van-Quy Nguyen)

Session 5A: Communication
(Chair: Maria Kozlovskaya)

Daniel Habermacher, Universidad de los Andes, Policy-advising competition and endogenous lobbies (joint with Manuel Foerster) REMOTELY

Marieke Pahlke, Paris School of Economics, Dynamic Consistency and Ambiguous Communication

Maria Kozlovskaya, Aston University, Expertise Disclosure in Markets for Credence Goods (joint with Alexandros Rigos, and Matteo Foschi)

Session 5B: General equilibrium II
(Chair: Niccolò Urbinati)

Simone Tonin, University of Udine, Cournotian Duopolistic Firms May Be Walrasian: A Case in the Gabszewicz and Vial Model (joint with Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato, and Giorgia Pavan) REMOTELY

Mich Tvede, University of East Anglia, Corporate self-regulation of imperfect competition (joint with Hervé Crès)

Niccolò Urbinati, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, Market equilibrium via classification of commodities (joint with Marco LiCalzi)

Session 6A: Monotone comparative statics
(Chair: Rabah Amir)

Lukasz Balbus, University of Zielona Gora, Iterative Monotone Comparative Statics (joint with Wojciech Olszewski, Kevin Reffett, and Lukasz Wozny)

Pawel Dziewulski, University of Sussex, Comparative statics with linear objectives (joint with John K.-H. Quah)

Rabah Amir, University of Iowa, On Cournot’s theory of oligopoly with perfect complements (joint with Adriana Gama)

Session 6B: Macro and dynamic programming
(Chair: Yiannis Vailakis)

Hyejin Cho, Durham University, On Equilibrium Determinacy, Savings & Intergenerational Transfers for Three-Period Lifespan Overlapping Generations (joint with Jean-Paul Barinci, and Jean-Pierre Drugeon)

Yiannis Vailakis, University of Glasgow, Pecuniary Externalities in Competitive Economies with Limited Pledgeability (joint with V. Filipe Martins-da-Rocha, and Toan Phan)

Dimitrios Tsomocos, University of Oxford, Bankruptcy in General Equilibrium with Uncertainty (joint with Klaus Ritzberger) REMOTELY

Session 7A: Game Theory(Chair: Michael Greinecker)

Lorenzo Bastianello, University Paris 2 Panthéon-Assas, Conditional strategy equilibrium (joint with Mehmet S. Ismail)

Michael Greinecker, University of Graz, Sequential Equilibria in a Class of Infinite Extensive Form Games (joint with Martin Meier, and Konrad Podczeck)

Session 7B: Distributions
(Chair: Evaist Stoja)

Christian Di Pietro, Università degli studi di Napoli Parthenope, Left and right: A tale of two tails of the wealth distribution (joint with Marcello D’Amato, and Marco M. Sorge) REMOTELY

Evaist Stoja, University of Bristol, The Taxonomy of Tail Risk (joint with Arnold Polanski, and Linh H. Nguyen)

Session 8A: Decision Theory
(Chair: Zbigniew Świtalski)

John K.-H. Quah, Johns Hopkins University, A Theory of Revealed Indirect Preference (joint with Gaoji Hu, Jiangtao Li, and Rui Tang)

Michał Lewandowski, SGH Warsaw School of Economics, Discounted incremental utility (joint with Manel Baucells, and Krzysztof Kontek)

Zbigniew Świtalski, Institute of Mathematics, University of Zielona Góra, Consistency of valued and interval-valued preference relations

Session 8B: Mathematical Economics
(Chair: Miklós Pintér)

Federico Quartieri, University of Florence, Existence of maximals via right traces

Nikolai L. Polyakov, HSE University, What aggregation rules can be classified as logical concepts? REMOTELY

Miklós Pintér, Corvinus University of Budapest, The superiority of posteriors over priors and the locality property of posteriors (joint with Ziv Hellman)

Session 9A: Contracts and Industrial Organization
(Chair: Svetlana Boyarchenko)

Konstantinos G. Papadopoulos, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Advantageous Symmetric Cross-ownership

Marco Serena, Max Planck Institute, Munich, Repeated Contests with Toughness (joint with Stefano Barbieri) REMOTELY

Svetlana Boyarchenko, The University of Texas at Austin, Life cycle of startup financing

Session 9B: Financial economics
(Chair: Bogdan Klishchuk)

Jean-Marc Bonnisseau, Paris School of Economics, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Continuity of marketable payoffs with re-trading (joint with Chéry Achis)

Cuong Tran-Viet, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne & Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, Incomplete markets with a countable number of states: Equilibrium and No-Arbitrage (joint with Cuong Le Van)

Bogdan Klishchuk, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Buy-and-resell Overpricing and Investor Experience

Session 10A: Dynamic Games
(Chair: Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel)

Niko Jaakkola, University of Bologna, Differential games of public investment: Markovian best responses in the general case (joint with Florian Wagener)

Dominika Machowska, University of Lodz, Closed-loop Nash equilibrium for a partial differential game with application to competitive personalized advertising (joint with Andrzej Nowakowski, and Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel)

Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel, University of Warsaw, "The tragedy of the commons": when a scarce renewable resource becomes strategic in short run (joint with Rajani Singh)

Session 10B: Systems and chaos
(Chair: András Simonovits)

Fryderyk Falniowski, Cracow University of Economics, Unpredictable dynamics in congestion games: memory loss can prevent chaos (joint with Jakub Bielawski, Thiparat Chotibut, Michał Misiurewicz, and Georgios Piliouras)

Jakub Bielawski, Cracow University of Economics, Follow-the-Regularized-Leader Routes to Chaos in Routing Game (joint with Thiparat Chotibut, Fryderyk Falniowski, Grzegorz Kosiorowski, Michał Misiurewicz, and Georgios Piliouras)

András Simonovits, KRTK and Budapest University of Technology, Pension policy in autocracy: the case of Hungary