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WHAT IS A RABBI?

Mordechai de Molinar

In many areas of halacha – Jewish religious Law, the conclusion of the destination was already chosen by the legal decision maker, and the consclusion was twisted to make the facts fit a pre-conceived reality – a reality many Jews no longer live, or ever accepted.

There has been a drift towards increasing stringency in halachic interpretation – which is severely distorting the message of Judaism. At the same time as this is happening, there is, in some areas, a decline in rabbinic authority. Just as a patient visiting a doctor nowadays looks up his symptoms online, and educates himself in his condition – often becoming more expert in the matter than their general practitioner, or even consultant,so many Jews have found that they have easy access to the closed books of the Law, that once only graced the private libraries of rabbis or the study halls of the great Yeshiboth. There is a great democratisation of Jewish learning taking place. Auto didact Jews are able to study online, enter discussion fora where the matters of halacha are discussed in minute detail, and reach their own conclusions without relying on the authority of a 'rabbi'.

The Torah is quite clear that it is "not beyond the sea". Yet, the current approach to Jewish Law taken by many rabbis is not only placing the shore of Torah observance on the far reaches of the ocean, in many circumstances, one is inclined to think that they have placed it on another planet altogether.

There is always a balance in halachic decision making; the Sephardic route has always been, until the recent influence of the more 'modern' school of thought, to always, in the case of a dispute among the sages regarding a rabbinic enactment, to take the lenient view. Taking a strict line makes Judaism difficult, and drives many Jews away from the religion. If we want to look forward to a day that is 'kulo shabbat' – a day that is always Shabbat, then a different approach will be needed.

There is also an absolute iron clad position that the Sages living in our times are not allowed to create new law. They may interpret the law as received in the Talmud, but may not go beyond it and create new ordinances. Too often, contemporary 'rabbis' have forgotten the very limited nature of their powers; the ignorance of the community allows them to arrogate power that they simply do not have.

Creating new law that is not referenced in the Talmud, may only be done by the National Court, by Sages who have received true authority, and entitled to use the epithet Moharan or Ribbi.

THE GREAT BET DIN

Such a court has not existed in the Jewish world since the final destruction of the final seat of the Sanhedrin, "the Great Bet Din" or simply "The Bet Din in the Hall of Hewn Stone" (Tosef., Hor. i. 3; Tosef., Soṭah, ix. 1; Yer. Sanh. i. 19c). The function of this Court was deliberating on important questions or of issuing regulations referring to religious life, and also admitting scholars to the Rabbinic degree.

Mostimportantly for Judaism, this Great Court decided all doubtful questions relating to the religious law (Sanh. 88b) and rendered the final decision in regard to the sentence of the teacher who promulgated opinions contradicting the traditional interpretation of the Law, the "zaḳen mamreh"; Sanh. xi. 2-4.

This Court continued in existence in the Land of Israel down to the end of the fourth century. It no longer exists, and since that time, there have been no universally accepted ordained ribbis on planet earth.

SAGES AND RIBBIS

The title Ribbi (Ashkenazi: Rabbi) borne by the sages of The Land of Israel, who were ordained there by the Great Beth Din in accordance with the custom handed down by the elders, just described above; someone appointed by the Great Beth Din was given the title 'Ribbi,' and received authority to judge penal cases; while the title 'Rab' is the title of the Babylonian sages, who received their ordination in their colleges in Babylon. The title Ribbi only began to be awarded as a formal title by the Great Beth Din following the destruction of Jerusalem in the year 70 CE, and it continued to be awarded until the fourth century CE.

WHAT IS A RIBBI?

The function of the Ribbi is to teach the members of the community the Scriptures and the oral and traditional laws.

There were three positions open to a properly ordained Ribbi, until the fourth century:

(1) the presidency of the community with the title "Nasi,"

(2) the head of the judiciary ("ab bet din"), and

(3) the ordinary master of civil and ritual laws and exemplar in charitable work and moral conduct.

It is the last of these that we are interested in. In the Jewish religion the rabbi is no priest, no apostle; he has no hierarchical power. He is a teacher, one who unfolds and explains religion, teaches the young in the school and the old from the pulpit, and both by his writings.

For the first position the rabbi was elected by the leaders of the community; for the second, by the members of the judiciary; while the third position was a matter of duty imposed upon the rabbi by the very Law he was teaching.

All these were honorary positions, without a salary, save the bare living expenses of the rabbi when he gave up his occupation for the public welfare (Shab. 114a). The rabbi as a justice could claim only compensation for loss of time. As a result, all of the ribbis in ancient times also had private occupation, by which they could earn a living.

CLOTHING:

The Rabbis generally dressed in long, flowing white robes, and sometimes wore gold-trimmed official cloaks (Giṭ. 73a). The near universal custom of self identified 'Heimische' or 'Haredi' Jews to wear black hats, dates from the custom instituted in the mediaeval period, by the Hasidei Ashkenaz, as a pious expression of mourning for the destroyed Temple and exile. It has now morphed into a sociological marker of outward conformity to community norms.

Certain communities resisted this haredisation as alien to their tradition, such as the 'Modern Orthodox' and the Spanish and Portuguese Sephardim. Untilrelatively recently, the Sephardic Hahamim dressed in light colours, and many European Sephardic rabbis still resist the sociological pressure of the Hardei Community, and wear light coloured suits.

DO RIBBIS STILL EXIST?

It is an incontrovertible fact that Ribbis, with the authority invested by the Great Beth Din, ceased to be appointed in the fourth century. It was decreed at the time of Judah ha-Nasi that any religio-legal decision, including decisions relating to the ceremonial law, could be handed down only by those properly authorized (Sanh. 5b). Both the candidate for ordination as Ribbi, and the Ribbi ordaining him had to be in the Land of Israel, since the ceremony could take place only in the Holy Land (Sanh. 14a; "Yad," l.c.).

The ordination, performed in the Holy Land, privileged the recipient to exercise his functions as rabbi outside as well as within that country

From that period onward, for many hundreds of years, no Jewish Sage or Scholar took upon himself the title of 'Ribbi'. No Jew any longer has the requisite authorisation. According to Naḥmanides (in his notes to Maimonides, "Sefer ha-Miẓwot," No. 153), the ceremony of ordination was abolished prior to the determination of the Jewish calendar by Hillel II. (361 C.E.). Thus, at the time of writing, there have been no Ribbis on this planet for over 1,600 years.

SO, WHY DO THESE 'JEWISH PRIESTS' CALL THEMSELVES "RABBIS"?

Are they not ordained?

THE SITUATION IN ANCIENT BABYLON:

The Lords of the Exile in Babylon created the system that was later copied by Meir ben Baruch ha-Levi of Vienna; the Jews in Babylon were self governing. The reign of the Exilarchs in Babylon is the longest reign of any single dynasty in the history of planet earth.

THE REIGN OF THE EXILARCHS

The reign of the Exilarchs in Babylon dates back to the Exile. This dynasty was descended from the Davidic line, and was hereditary. The first exilarch was Jehoiachin, the last king but one of the house of David in the Land of Israel. He was captured by Nebuchadnezzar in 600 BCE, and exiled to Babylon.

Thus, while the House of David became extinct after the romans destroye and exiled the Jews from the Land of Israel,the House of David continued to reign in Babylon. Indeed, it is the continued reign of the House of David in exile in Babylon that was a constant source of inspiration for messianists wishig to restore the Crown of Judahin the Land of Israel

THE LAST EXILARCH

In 1040, Hezekiah, who was the last exilarch and also the last Gaon, fell a victim to rumours and gossip. He was cast into prison and tortured; two of his sons fled to Spain, where they found refuge with Joseph, the son and successor of Samuel ha-Nagid. Hezekiah himself, on being liberated from prison, became head of the academy, and is mentioned as such by a contemporary in 1046. The reign of the dynasty of the Exilarchs in Babylon had lasted for over 1,600 years.

WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT TO OUR STORY?

Ancient Babylon existed as a centre of Jewry from the time of the exile. For much of this time, the Jews in Babylon were self governing. This created problems in Jewish Law, as the jurisdiction of Jewish Law Courts did not extend beyong the physical boundaries of the Land of Israel. The situation would be roughly analogous to the American Supreme Court relocating to London, and sitting in Judgement in British territory, for Citizens of Britain. There would be a jurisdiction problem.

PROXY POWER

To prevent the financial system breaking down, and to enforce the collection of money out on loan, the Sages of the Babylonian Exile requested, and were given devolved powers by the Great Beth Din in the Land of Israel, to act as their proxy to enforce loans and for other sundry matters. They were forbidden by the Great Beth Din to impose biblically ordained fines, but could demand equal value restitution.

Once the Great Court ceased to exist, this proxy power should have also by rights ceased to exist, but it continued as a legal fiction, "to not slam the door shut on those wishing to loan money". Without loans, there can be no banking system, and no currency. The economy of Jewish Babylon would have collapsed.

This system was put in place because of the great age and authority of the House of the Exilarch. Babylon was seen as an extension of the Land of Israel, ruled by the House of David, even at a time when the House of David in Israel had fallen. The Great Bet Din in the Land of Israel was all too willing to extend these powers.

The letter of appointment issued in Babylon read as follows:

"We have appointed Mr. So and So son of Mr. So and So, a justice in the town of . . . and have invested him with authority to administer the civil laws, and to supervise all matters relating to the Commandments and to things prohibited and permitted and to things connected with the fear of God. And whosoever will not obey the verdict, he (the judge) has authority to deal with him as he thinks proper. The miscreant is likewise liable to [the punishment of] Heaven"

(Geonic responsa "Zikkaron la-Rishonim," § 180; ed. Harkavy, iv. 80, Berlin, 1887).

This letter of authority invested the recipient with full power to act, in his limited jurisdiction under the Greco-Roman or Persian rule, in matters of religion and civil law. The justice could compel a defendant to appear before him for judgment. But, unlike the justice who obtained the Land of Israel turue ordination, or 'semicha', he had no right to impose monetary fines ("ḳenas"), nor to inflict the regulation stripes ("malḳut"), much less capital punishment (Sanh. 31b). He could, however, at his discretion imprison and inflict light bodily punishment for various offenses. This quasi-ordination was kept up in Babylon during the Middle Ages.

The Babylonians, however, were scrupulous not to use the title 'Ribbi', and those who received this letter were called "Rab".

THE SITUATION IN EUROPE

The title 'Rabbi' arose spontaneously as a customary title in the fourteenth century among the Ashkenazim in Europe.

As the Black Death swept across Europe, the old certainties vanished, and the previous informal system of communities appointing their leaders at will was breaking down. There was no organised system such as that operating under the exilarch in Babylon.

How did the "Babylon Option" come about in Europe? Meir ben Baruch ha-Levi lived in Vienna from 1360 to 1390. His authority was acknowledged not only throughout Germany, but even by the Spanish Sages (Isaac b. Sheshet, Responsa, No. 278).

Owing to persecutions, and the plague, the number of competent community leaders and Sages had decreased, and persons unqualified to give rulings in Jewish Law were inducted by their communities to lead themselves. Meir ben Baruch ha-Levi wanted to stop this decay in the system.

To prevent this Meïr issued an order to the effect that no Yeshibah student should officiate as legal decision maker for the community, unless he had been given a letter of permission from himself, and had acquired the title of "Morenu" or "Morenu Ha-Rab"(Isaac b. Sheshet, l.c. Nos. 268-272).

Meir ben Baruch ha-Levi was sensitive to the fact that the title 'Ribbi' only referred to those with the true Semicha or ordination issued by the Great Beth Din in the Land of Israel. This is why the artificial title "morenu" – literally, "our teacher" was chosen. Some time after this, it appears that communities spontaneously began to use the title 'Rabbi'. Remember that in Babylon the same sentitivities had lead to the use of the title Rab, the title Ribbi being reserved for those who had travelled to the Land of Israel to be admitted before the Great Bet Din.

RABBIS and RIBBIS

In this text, I will use the spelling Ribbi for those who had the true ordination from the Great Beth Din in the Land of Israel. The title 'Rabbi' I will reserve for those who have the pseudo-ordination invented by Meir ben Baruch ha-Levi.

The certificate of ordination issued by Meir ben Baruch ha-Levi was a conditional one. In that sense, it closely resembles the certificate issued to a barrister in the United Kingdom. A barrister can pass all his or her professional exams, but still need to find acceptance in the 'community of barristers' through a pupillage. Without that, the academic qualification is useless.

Before the institution of Meir ben Baruch ha-Levi any community could appoint any scholar to be their leader, to decide religious questions for them. The appointment was a communal one, and took place by the community calling the appointeee up to the Torah, and giving them a title such as 'Haham' or 'Marbitz Torah'.

At first the order provoked the opposition of many Sages, who accused Meïr of a desire to rule; but they afterward accepted it. Later Meïr assumed authority over the French rabbis, and sent Isaiah b. Abba Mari to France with authority to appoint rabbis there.

This is the origin of the modern 'rabbi'. These rabbis have no more authority than you or I to create new laws that are not found in the rabbinc writings up until the time of 'sealing of the gates of the Talmud'.

Meir ben Baruch ha-Levi 's degree was not the ancient ordination, but something novel in Europe, called 'hattarat hora'ah' – literally, 'Permission to Teach'. It was not the authority to ordain used by the Schools of Babylon, who had been granted authority to issue their letters of approbabtion by the Great Beth Din in the Land of Israe. Rabbi Meir's innovation was something totally new, without any authority,and was not universally accepted.

The hattarat hora'ah, or quasi-ordination, unlike the Christian ordination, confered no sacred power, (as many 'rabbis' nowadays seem to think, and certainly tend to behave, as though it does, influenced no doubt by their Christian colleages).

This letter of fitness is not a license; it is not even a ''practicing certificate' - it is simply a testimonial of the ability of the holder to act as rabbi if elected. I myself hold such a written testimonial, but have never occupied a position as leader of a community, or been called to the law with the title of 'ribbi'. To reiterate, the hattarat hora'ah or quasi-ordination could not give personal power to the rabbi without the consent of the community; and such power was limited to the community that elected him and to his sphere of influence.

Who could give the hattarat hora'ah? Any recipient of a certificate of hattarat hora'ah could issue one to someone else. This is called a 'private ordination', and is still very common.

A community had, however, a perfect right to, and often did, elect a rabbi who had no diploma. The diploma was regarded as a merely formal document acquainting the people that the person named in it was fit to teach and to render decisions.

THE DWECK CONTROVERSY

As the hattarat hora'ah or quasi-ordination does not give personal power to a rabbi without the consent of his community. Such power was limited to the community that elected him and to his sphere of influence. This is beause of the provisional nature of the 'letter of appointment' system instituted by Meir ben Baruch ha-Levi. It is very weak in its authority.

Isaac b. Sheshet rendered a decision (1380) on this point in the case of the French community of Provence, which would not permit the interference of Meïr ha-Levi, chief rabbi in Germany, in its affairs (Responsa, Nos. 268-273; comp. Graetz, "Hist." vi. 152).

Samuel of Modena says: "No matter how superior a rabbi may be, he has no right to interfere in the district of another rabbi" (Responsa, iv. 14, Salonica, 1582; comp. "Bet Yosef" to Ṭur Ḥoshen Mishpaṭ, § 11).

The ordinance enacted at Ferrara by the rabbis of Italy (June 21, 1554), clause 4 provides that "outside rabbis shall not interdict or establish ordinances or in any way meddle in litigations occurring in the town of another rabbi, unless such rabbi voluntarily withdraws from the action. And in a place where the community has elected the rabbi, no other resident rabbi shall interfere with him without the consent of the community" ("Paḥad Yiẓḥaḳ," s.v. "Taw," p. 158a, Berlin, 1887). This "taḳḳanah" was applied by Samuel Archevolti in his decision quoted in "Palge Mayim," p. 15a (Salonica, 1608).

RABBIS IN THE SAME CITY

Even in the same city where there are various congregations, the rabbi elected in one can not interfere with another. David Messer de Leon, who received the highest degree of the quasi-semikah from Judah Müntz of Padua, and was elected by the Castilian Jews in Avlona in 1512, could not enforce a Sabbath prohibition among the Portuguese Jews in the same place; and in endeavoring to preach against them he was insulted by their parnas, Abraham de Collier. The rabbi used his prerogative to excommunicate the parnas. The matter was submitted to David ha-Kohen of Corfu, who decided in favor of De Leon in the main issue as a matter of law, and required of the offender to ask De Leon's pardon (Responsa, No. 22; ed. Salonica, 1803, pp. 80a-84a). And yet De Leon is blamed for forcing his views on the Sephardic community, and even though the apology was required, the responsum makes it quite clear that de leon was acting beyond the remit of his authority.

Thus, we see in the Dweck controvery the illegal interference in the elected head of one community by the leader of another.

This we see that the intereference with the teachings of Rabbi Dweck was beyond the authority of the other rabbis. Rabbi Dweck had been duly elected as rabbi of the community in an open election of the yehidim. If the community that elected him had a problem of confidence in the leader they had appointed, then it is that community that should have dealt with the matter.

THE POWERS OF RIBBIS AND RABBIS THE LIMITS OF THEIR AUTHORITY

As rabbis are not ribbis, great care is needed when looking at the powers given to ribbis in the Mishnah and Talmud.

The power of the Ribbis was a threefold one:

(1) to amplify the Law either by prohibitory statutes for the prevention of transgressions ("gezerot") or by mandatory statutes for the improvement of the moral or religious life of the people ("taḳḳanot"), and by the introduction of new rites and customs ("minhagim");

(2) to expound the Law according to certain rules of hermeneutics, and thereby evolve new statutes as implied in the letter of the Law; and, finally,

(3) to impart additional instruction based upon tradition. But the Rabbis were also empowered on critical occasions to abrogate or modify the Law. In many instances where greater transgressions were to be prevented, or for the sake of the glory of God, or the honor of man, certain Mosaic laws were abrogated or temporarily dispensed with by the Rabbis (Mishnah Ber. ix. 5, 54a, 63a; Yoma 69a; compare also Yeb. 90b).

The over-reaching principle: to not be too strict.

"No rabbinical court [bet din] composed of ribbis can impose laws or institute forms of practise which the majority of people can not without great hardship accept and observe" ('Ab. Zarah 36a, B. B. 60b).

"No rabbinical court can abrogate laws and institutions made by any other court, unless it is superior in both wisdom and number" ('Eduyyot i. 5).

If, however, such a prohibitory law has been accepted by the entire Jewish people, no rabbinical court, even though superior to the one that introduced it, has the power of abrogating it ('Ab. Zarah 36b; Maimonides, "Yad," Mamrim, ii. 4).

The case of electricity on Shabbat is an interesting case in point. The rabbis have tried to impose restriction forbidding its use, as a custom (as they have not convincingly been able to find an ratio decidendi to outlaw it using talmudic priciples) - but the vast majority of Jews who attend synagogue still use it, in definace of the rabbis. In each orthodox congregation outside the black coated haredi cmmunity, there are only a tiny handful of individuals who accept that they cannot use electricity on Shabbat. This matter will be discussed in greater depth later on, when I will deal with the question of what the consequences are of the rabbis over-extending their reach, and forbidding things that are not forbidden, for ‘ideological’ reasons, in so doing making honest Jews believe that they are transgressing a biblical prohibition, regarding themselves as Shabbat transgressors, worthy in Biblical law of the death penalty, when this is not the case. The end result is a tragedy, as Jews feel Sabbath observance is simply impossible, and give up the effort entirely. This is particularly true of the younger generation, who think of their electricity using, Sabbath synagogue attending parents and grandparents as unauthentic Sabbath -breaking hypocrites,when they are no such thing at all.

In case two ribbis, or two courts composed of ribbis differ in their opinions, the rule is that in questions concerning Torah level laws the more rigid decision should prevail; in questions concerning ribbinical laws the more lenient decision should be followed ('Ab. Zarah 7a).

"After one of ribbinical authority has declared a thing to be unclean, no one else has the power to declare it clean; after one ribbinical authority has forbidden a thing, no other can permit it" (Baraita in Nid. 20b; Ber. 63b).

If a teacher dissents from the decision of the highest court of ribbis, he may state his dissent and teach accordingly; but he is not allowed to oppose the authority of the court in practise, in which case he falls under the category of a "zaḳen mamre" (a rebellious elder) (Deut. xvii. 12; 'Eduyyot v. 6; B. M. 59b; Yer. 'Ab. Zarah ii. 42d; Ber. 63a). This only applies to a court composed of ribbis whose authority is from the Great Bet Din in the Land of Israel – and we have had no such court, and no ribbis with such authority since the 4^th Century, a period of over 1,600 years.

After this time period, there was one sole arbiter of the authority of a scholar – whether he had received a letter of appointment or not – and how intelligent and learned he was. For example, Israel Meir Kagan, the author of the most comonly used contemporary code of Jewish Law, the Mishneh Berurah, did not bother to receive a letter of approbabtion until after he had published this text – and then only did so, as he needed it for his passport application.

A great many community ‘rabbis’ who do have a letter of approbation, know far less jewish law and tradition than ‘lay congregants’ who have no such letter of approbabtion.

As a result, in the ultra-orthodox community, there is increasingly a reversion to the ‘status quo ante’ - and any Talmid Haham (Torah Scholar) who gives public lectures, is awarded the title ‘rabbi’, as are teachers of Jewish studies in the Jewish schools, even though they have no formal letter of appobabtion issued by anyone. Many congregation in the ultra-orthodox community are lead by Torah Scholars who have no formal letter of approbabtion. This is how the situation was in Europe before Meir ben Baruch ha-Levi’s innovation.

The situation in the ultra-orthodox world reflects the actual realisty in jurisprudence – there is no special status or power given by having the title ‘rabbi’. If the community calls you rabbi, then rabbi you are, but that does not confer any special status on you – you are assessed by your learning and your knowledge of Talmud and Jewish Law and legal interpretation. No special respect is awarded the title ‘rabbi’, as can be clearly seen in the case of the Dweck controvery, where even the senior elected rabbi of an ancient community is awarded none of the respect due to him by custom and precedent.

LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE

The logical consequence of this, is that if the Great Bet Din, and the smaller city Courts in ancient times could only have someone who was a ribbi sitting as a member, as there are now no longer any ribbis, a court can be composed of any Jew?

If we look into the laws of Jewish Courts, we see that a ‘rabbinical court’ so-called in actual halchic reality does not require anyone to sit on it who has a letter of approbabtion – what is required is that at least one member of the court should be a Torah Scholar.

Dayyan Yechiel Michael Epstein (1829-1908) writes as follows in his Legal Code, the Aruch ha-Shulchan, The Laws of Conversion, paragraph 3.

“A Court of Law of three [legal] experts is required. And if you say, that nowadays there is no true ordination (i.e. we have no ribbis), in reality we are acting as the proxies of the Great Beth Din, as is the case concerning all financial matters. (Here Dayyan Epstein is referring to the legal fiction described above viz. Babylon).

The truth of the matter is laid bare in the minimal post facto valid conversion – in Paragraph 10, Dayyan Epstein writes “ if he immerse before a [court composed of] three ordinary Jews..(as Torah scholars are not mizraqqin in this matter) the conversion is a valid conversion.”

The reason that this is the case, is that ribbis no longer exist, and there is no legal basis in Jewish Law to differentiate between a rabbi and an uneducated lay Jew. Indeed, Dayyan Epstein is very careful in his language when discussing the composition of a court, and says that ideally it should be composed of three Torah Scholars (Talmidei Chachamim). He does not say three rabbis.