Publications
Publications
Shocking Gift Exchange (with Arthur Schram)
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (2021)
Abstract: We study how a gift exchange labor market reacts to the occurrence of negative shocks. One-round shocks may hit either workers’ wages or employers’ earnings. In our model, other-regarding preferences suffice to predict gift exchange and wages above the competitive level. The model predicts wage rigidity if we add wage illusion and loss aversion. Using a real-effort laboratory experiment, we find support for the model. When there are no shocks, there is gift exchange. After a wage shock we see strong nominal wage rigidity and no impact on workers’ effort, as predicted. Rigidity is also observed after a productivity shock, but here we do observe increases in effort, especially at low wages. The latter is contrary to the model predictions and suggests that productivity shocks alter gift-exchange patterns. We conclude that the wage rigidity often observed in the field can be explained by boundedly rational workers with social preferences.
Real-time interactions in oTree using Django Channels: Auctions and real effort tasks (with Phillipp Chapkovski)
Journal of Behavioural and Experimental Finance (2019)
Abstract: oTree, a popular platform for conducting behavioral experiments, exchanges data only as a participant exits or enters a web page. In many situations, however, information needs to be gathered and delivered instantaneously. This paper demonstrates a way to add real-time interactions to oTree and presents two ready-made apps: a double auction and a gift exchange with a real effort task. Many auction designs, including the double auction, use time constraints and carry out sales as soon as an ask and a bid are compatible. Instantaneous flow of information is thus a core requirement for programming these auctions in the first place. The real effort task measuring the number of correct answers within a time limit, on the other hand, benefits from the extra flexibility and security that Django Channels provides. Furthermore, real effort tasks are a simple starting point for building real-time interaction apps with oTree.
Choice Architecture and Transparency – Job Market Paper – Link to the paper – Link to a 20 minute presentation (Youtube)
Abstract: I investigate if nudges influence behavior as effectively when people are aware of nudging (nudged transparently) as when they are unaware and if choice architects use nudges differently under transparency. I use a limited attention model that distinguishes between two kinds of nudges. System 1 nudges (e.g., defaults) provide quick decision-making shortcuts, while System 2 nudges encourage reflective thinking, e.g., cost-benefit analysis. Transparency is predicted to reduce the effectiveness of System 1 nudges but not that of System 2 nudges. Moreover, conditional on Choice Architects having image concerns, transparency is predicted to reduce the use of System 1 nudges while increasing the use of System 2 nudges. With an online framed field experiment, I find that transparency does not change how Choice Architects use nudges. The effects of System 1 nudges are somewhat weakened by transparency, but System 2 nudges are unaffected. I show how the framework of slow and fast thinking nudges (System 1 and System 2) can explain some contradicting results reported in the previous literature.
Abstract: I study how workers’ effort responds to different kinds of wage cuts and whether employers anticipate these reactions correctly. Workers and employers engage in a real-effort gift exchange market with negative shocks. Hiring happens by initial offers before potential shocks are announced. The non-binding offers can then be adjusted. Effort is non-contractible and determined after workers learn their final wages. To model responses to wage cuts, I add negative reciprocity to the previous model. Without shocks, employers should never cut wages. Adjustment might be, however, justifiable after a shock if sharing its burden is considered to be fair. With a laboratory experiment, I find that although wage cuts are counterproductive, their effects are insignificant in the absence of shocks. After shocks, wage cuts are punished, regardless of whether the shock hits employers or workers. Surprisingly, it does not matter whether the shock hits predominately the employer or the worker as in both cases the cuts lead to considerably lower effort.
A Comment on "Improving Women's Mental Health During a Pandemic" with A. Brodeur, L. Fiala, J. Fitzgerald, D. Valenta, O. Rogeberg, and G Bensch
Comment on "Food insecurity and mental health of women during COVID-19: Evidence from a developing country" by Rahman et al. with L. Fiala, A. Kjelsrud and A. Brodeur
Robustness Reproducibility of "Improving Workplace Climate in Large Corporations: A Clustered Randomized Intervention" with A. Hallman and M. Johannesson
A Comment on "Jobs and Political Participation: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Ethiopia" by Aalen et al. with M. Jia, O. Kopsacheilis, and A. Popova
Comparing Human-Only, AI-Assisted, and AI-Led Teams on Assessing Research Reproducibility in Quantitative Social Science with A. Brodeur, D. Valenta, A. Marcoci, J. P. Aparicio, D. Mikola, B Barbarioli, R. Alexander, L. Deer, T. Stafford, L. Vilhuber, G. Bensch, et al.
Field Experiments in Credence Goods with R. Kerschbamer, L. Lore, D. Neururer and D. Woods
Entry into Procurement Auctions with A. Hyytinen, M. Kitti and J. Tukiainen
Willingness to Pay for Health and Traffic Safety with H. Kauppi, M. Kitti and O. Lappalainen
What drives (Mis)behaviour in Online Labour Markets? Experiments on Resilience and the Opportunity to Bargain with S. Baulia, V. Mourelatos and P. Zervas