Research

Abstract: What is the impact of television during periods of political crisis? This paper examines the nullification of the 2017 presidential election in Kenya, followed by the organization of a repeat ballot, which sparked widespread protests and heightened uncertainty. Leveraging exogenous variations in television signal expansion since 2013, I assess the influence of television reception on voter turnout in both the initial and repeat ballots, as well as on electoral protests. The findings reveal that television did not significantly impact turnout in the first election; however, its effects varied across political camps in the repeat election. Turnout decreased by 3pp in pro-opposition areas but was a 7pp larger in pro-government strongholds. I contend that television played an informative role during a period characterized by high levels of uncertainty. Employing text analysis methods, I document the convergence of news content before the recall election, with a particular emphasis on the ongoing protests. Furthermore, the distinctive tone of coverage by the state-owned TV station may have bolstered the call for participation in the second poll.

Abstract: Do campaign finance regulations influence politicians? We study the effects of a French ban on corporate donations passed in 1995. We use a difference-in-differences approach and a novel dataset combining the campaign manifestos issued by every candidate running for a seat in the French parliament with detailed data on their campaign contributions. We show that banning corporate donations discourages candidates from advertising their local presence during the campaign, as well as economic issues. The ban also leads candidates from non-mainstream parties to use more polarized language. These findings suggest that private donors shape politicians' topics of interest, and that campaign finance reforms may affect the information made available to voters through their impact on candidates' rhetoric.

Abstract: We explore a theory of media capture where a principal can either influence journalistic investigation (internal capture) or let the media investigate and pay to suppress news stories at the publication stage (external capture). We predict that the likelihood of internal capture increases with perceived corruption. Conversely, external capture decreases with perceived corruption if the media market is not sufficiently developed. We study a sample of 169 countries between 2012 and 2018, using new survey data collected by Reporters Without Borders and a set of corruption indicators. We use the revelation of the Panama Papers as a shock to perceived corruption. With a difference-in-differences identification strategy based on cross-country variation in exposure to the shock, we find support for our two theoretical predictions. 

Abstract: We study how data-driven press coverage affects politicians’ behavior. Since 2009, the websites Nosdeputes.fr and Nossenateurs.fr publish performance indicators for French legislators. Compiling a comprehensive dataset of press articles, we track how these metrics are used by the press and estimate their effects on parliamentary activity. We find a positive impact on legislative performance, primarily driven by general press coverage, suggesting that monitoring tools must be visible to be effective. The effects are not driven by legislators who are explicitly mentioned, implying that indicators reinforce collective rather than individual accountability. Coverage of indicators also shape the nature of parliamentary work, though we find no evidence of strategic manipulation. Finally, using measures of media congruence and competition, we show that variation in media pressure is the main transmission channel.