Yoo, D. and Slavkovik, M. (2026). Bayesian Game-Theoretic Modelling of Pedestrian-Autonomous Vehicle Interaction. International Workshop on Coordination, Organizations, Institutions, Norms and Ethics for Governance of Multi-Agent Systems (COINE), AAMAS 2026.
Yoo, D. (2026). AI Adoption and Labour Market Adjustment, 3rd Economic Perspective on Artificial Intelligence (EPEAI) Conference, University of Salford, Manchester, United Kingdom, 2026.
Yoo, D. (2026). Ethical AI as the Impartial Spectator, The Legacy of Adam Smith Workshop, Edinburgh, 2026.
Information Asymmetries and Cooperation with Transparent AI
AI Innovation, Energy Efficiency, and the Climate Transition
Structural Digital Inequalities and AI Governance
A Bayesian Game in the Human-AI Society: The interaction between pedestrian and two types of autonomous vehicle
With Marija Slavkovik
It is assumed that an immoral intention of human traffic participants causes an ethical dilemma in an autonomous vehicles (AVs). A new type of reasoner is proposed to introduce two distinct types of AVs (dual-AV systems): one prioritizing passenger safety (insider protection) and the other focusing on pedestrian safety (outsider protection). It minimizes ethical debates regarding the prioritization of lives in unavoidable crashes. It also addresses heterogeneous moral preferences of the traffic participants in the AV ethics. A static Bayesian game model is used to analyze strategic interaction between a pedestrian and two types of AVs, ensuring balanced interactions whether neither AVs nor pedestrians dominate, thereby improving transportation efficiency in mixed traffic environments.
Presented at the 65th Annual Meeting of the Italian Economic Association (October 2024)