Many have argued that our attentional capacities are under threat in the current attention economy, where digital media companies are incentivized to maximize screen time. My current work on attention provides a grounding framework for grasping this threat: in order to understand whether and how the attention economy might impair attention, we need to understand how attention is supposed to function in the first place. I develop a needs-based account of the biological proper function of attention, according to which attention has the function of (i.e. was selected for) organizing online cognitive resources in ways that serve the individuals needs in context. This Needs-Based Account is accompanied by a philosophically rich account of needs, that distinguishes needs from mere desires, goals, and tasks, without reducing needs exclusively to what is biologically required for survival.

The needs-based account provides a useful framework for understanding neurodiversity in attentional styles. In work in progress, I argue that the proper function of attention is a relational proper function (Millikan 1984) that can be successfully fulfilled by multiple attention strategies. For instance, ADHD-style cognition may be fruitfully thought of as a distinctive epistemic style with adaptive benefits in group cognition. However, I argue that contemporary work and educational environments favor sustained attention on monotonous tasks in a way that exacerbates some of the harms associated with ADHD style cognition. This constitutes a form of structural cognitive injustice. 

I also consider how the attention economy might hinder our ability to attend well, by contributing to information-overload, decision fatigue and mental disorganization. 

Wittgenstein's striking and insightful remarks in his final notebooks On Certainty (1969) have inspired recent work in hinge epistemology, guided by Wittgenstein's metaphor that just as the hinges of a door must stay put if it is to turn, so too intellectual inquiry is possible only if some commitments are held fixed. These 'hinge' commitments enable reflective epistemic evaluation of belief, but are themselves held with a maximal degree of certainty, so that they are themselves beyond doubt and justification (Pritchard 2016). 

I am currently working on a manuscript, Belief Beyond All Doubt, which develops a new approach in hinge epistemology and applies this to topics in social epistemology. Contrary to standard approaches, I argue that hinge commitments can vary across epistemic perspectives, yielding a form of epistemic relativism. In addition, because of the particular role hinge commitments play in epistemic evaluation, hinges are themselves not only insulated against certain kinds of doubt, but also against purported counterevidence. 

This approach to the epistemology of certainty contributes to explanations of deep disagreement and political polarization. Deep disagreement emerges when the core commitments of individuals conflict with each other. I argue that cultivating the epistemic virtue of intellectual humility is important for navigating deep disagreement. We can have humility about our core commitments by acknowledging the rational groundlessness of the core certainties of one’s epistemic perspective. 

I also use the concept of a hinge commitment to make sense of certain forms of ignorance and bias. When one's hinges are rooted in exclusionary worldviews, this can result in ignoring or downplaying evidence that could otherwise challenge a bias or social prejudice. In my manuscript, I will explore a form of self-knowledge of one's own hinges that provides a way to take accountability for and to change one's biases. 

I have also published on the epistemology of basic self-knowledge (Johnson 2021; Bar-On and Johnson 2019). Basic self-knowledge, such as my knowledge that I want another cup of coffee, is striking in appearing to enjoy a special epistemic security despite lacking a clearly identifiable epistemic basis. I have argued (in joint work with Bar-On) that basic self-knowledge is directly epistemically grounded in the mental states which that knowledge concerns. This approach describes a structure for basic self-knowledge according to which the competence to make avowals (linguistically expressive vehicles) explains the epistemic immediacy of self-belief. 

Slides from my presentation at the Functions of Attention workshop (Feb. 2024)

A paper on hinges and disagreement

A paper on self-knowledge