My philosophical research concerns the functions and structure of a set of core mental states of normative significance in ethics and epistemology.
The Epistemology of Certainty. One strand of this work focuses on the ethics and epistemology of certainty, where I examine the limits of rational evaluation, in particular the way that core certainties shape our patterns of interpreting and assessing evidence. This work is situated in the field of hinge epistemology, which seeks to develop a systematic theory drawing inspiration from Wittgenstein's remarks in On Certainty (1969), especially the idea that "the questions we raise and our doubts depend upon the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn" (section 341). Our core certainties, or hinge commitments, are foundational, maximally certain, and visceral commitments that provide the framework in which epistemic evaluation takes place (Pritchard 2016).
In previous work I have argued for the existence of moral hinge commitments, and showed how these can help to address certain problems of moral skepticism (Johnson 2019). I have also applied hinge epistemology to provide an account of deep disagreement, arguing that deep disagreements can be based in divergences in hinge commitments between interlocutors, and when this is so, the disagreement will not be directly rationally resolvable (Johnson 2022; see also my public philosophy piece on deep disagreement at the Institute of Art and Ideas). While hinge commitments are maximally certain, I argue that there is nevertheless an appropriate form of intellectual humility that we can hold with respect to them--an acknowledgement of their rational groundlessness. Cultivating this form of humility is important to navigating deep disagreements in an intellectually responsible manner. I also develop a model for hinge commitments that is useful for application in social epistemology and epistemic injustice (Johnson 2025). This model takes a relativist and non-evidentialist stance to hinges, according to which hinges are relative to individual epistemic perspectives, and are lacking in evidential support and resistant to purported counterevidence. These features explain the possibility of persistent disagreement in the hinges of individuals, and provides a tool to analyze certain forms of ignorance and bias.
I am working on a manuscript, Belief Beyond All Doubt (under contract), that develops this relativist and non-evidentialist model of hinge commitment in more detail, as a form of social hinge epistemology, and applies it to the epistemology of deep disagreement, political polarization, intellectual virtues, and epistemic injustice. In another paper (under review), I apply hinge epistemology together with recent work on the epistemology of attention and salience, to analyze morally problematic forms of neglect, such as taking someone for granted. Our core certainties are likely to have a very low degree of salience (and hence remain unnoticed), as they provide the framing assumptions within which inquiry proceeds. When one's normative commitments such as a commitment to one's partner or to a moral principle play a hinge role, they can come to have a low degree of salience, leading to problematic forms of neglect unless counteracted by deliberate strategies to keep those commitments in mind.
Attention Norms and Neurodiversity. Another strand of my research work investigates norms on attention. Many have argued that our attentional capacities are under threat in the current attention economy, where digital media companies are incentivized to maximize screen time. In order to evaluate whether there is such a threat to our attention, we need to understand how attention is supposed to function in the first place. I am developing a needs-based account of the biological proper function of attention, according to which attention has the function of (i.e. was selected for) organizing online cognitive resources in ways that serve the individuals needs in context. This basic function can be manifested in a variety of cognitive patterns, reflecting a diversity in attentional styles. I argue that identifying the proper function of attention allows us to derive natural norms on attention, which in turn can be used to ground claims about the potential harms of the attention economy. In current and future work, I use this research to assess the status of purported disorders involving attention, such as ADHD, in relation to neurodiversity. I argue that standard work and educational environments are designed at many levels in a way that expresses a value for certain patterns of attention--prioritizing sustained attention to often monotonous tasks despite distraction. The design of workplaces can pose cognitive barriers on neurodivergent people, resulting in structural cognitive injustice.
Two papers on these topics are currently under review; one proposing the needs-based account of attention, and another applying this account to investigate the potential harms of the attention economy. In connection with the GoodAttention project, I organized an international workshop on the functions of attention (16-17 February 2024), that directly investigated these topics. I also co-organized a public interdisciplinary panel discussion on Attention and ADHD, held at Litteraturhuset in Oslo (February 4, 2025).
