E-mail me for drafts of working papers (jostdo@dps.aau.dk)
Self-Governing Cities and Fiscal Capacity. Under preparation.
Did self-governing cities matter for the development of fiscal capacity? Scholars such as Max Weber, Charles Tilly and Brian Downing have argued that politically autonomous cities help explain the trajectory of European state formation. Yet, the empirical underpinning of these claims have to a large extent not been subject to systematic test. This short article documents that self-governing cities played a major role in the development of the capacity to tax. First, it shows that politically autonomous cities were more likely to introduce sophisticated tax systems than non-autonomous cities. Next, it provides evidence that states with autonomous cities were much more likely to fiscally centralize.
The Coercive Origin of Economic Activity with Jacob Gerner Hariri and Christoffer Cappelen. Under preparation.
This paper studies an early manifestation of the fundamental dilemma between coercion and economic activity – the relationship between castles and cities. In medieval Europe, the castle constituted and signaled coercive power; the city was the center of economic activity. The castle lord offered a source of protection but also constituted a threat to urban activity. We show that castle construction strongly predicts city formation. We further document that castle construction predicts city formation even where the geographical conditions for urban activity are poor, and that cities formed in the shadow of castles fare no worse than other cities in terms of economic activity. There is little to indicate that locally concentrated coercive power, castles, was also a threat to urban activity. However, as European states became sufficiently developed, the relationship between coercion and city formation diminish. The paper contributes to the literature on city development and the literature on state formation.
Authoritarian Succession and Urban Regime Change. SSRN working paper.
In research on autocratic regimes, successions are viewed as pivotal moments during which societal groups can bargain for political concessions. Using new data on urban regime change, lordly ownership, and lordly successions in 293 western European cities between 1000 and 1400, this article shows that the death of rulers enabled medieval European townspeople to introduce self-governing institutions. Next, I examine under what conditions successions are more likely to lead to such political concessions. I find that the impact of successions hinges on the bargaining position of cities. More specifically, I show that city walls strengthened the hand of the townsmen and that multiple heirs weakened rulers whereas state capacity strengthened the hand of rulers.
Papal Correspondence: Gregory VII, Urban Associationalism, and the Papal Revolution with Jørgen Møller. Under review.
This paper analyzes medieval Pope Gregory VII’s role in stimulating urban self-government, a crucial development in the European stateformation process. In the eleventh century, Gregory came to spearhead a reform program that attempted to curb lay control of the Catholic Church. We argue that Gregory’s campaign – called the “papal revolution” by one prominent scholar – fostered urban associationalism and political autonomy as townspeople were incentivized to take political power to implement Gregory’s reform program in the face of resistance from, e.g., unreformed bishops and lay rulers. Enlisting new data on Gregory’s correspondence, we provide evidence that receiving more letters from the pope is associated with a higher likelihood of overthrowing the authority of lay lords and lay-appointed bishops and introducing political self-government.
Projects in early development: "The Survival of European States, 1100-1795"; "The Dominicans and the Printing Press"; "Elite Control of Religious Institutions"; and "Pathways to Democracy".