PUBLICATIONS

Articles

  • Restricted environments and incentive compatibility in interdependent values models, with Salvador Barberà and Bernardo Moreno. Games and Economic Behavior 2022, vol. 131, pages 1-28 (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.10.008)

  • Undominated rules with three alternatives in an almos unrestricted domain, with Bernardo Moreno and Antonio Nicolò, Social Choice and Welfare, March 2021 (https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01330-1)

  • Preference Reversal and Group Strategy-Proofness, with Bernardo Moreno. Economics Letters 2020, vol. 196, 109493 (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109493)

  • Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel, with Salvador Barberà and Bernardo Moreno. Social Choice and Welfare, 2020, vol. 54, pages 253-258 (Special Issue in honor of Kenneth Arrow) (https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01196-4)

  • Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness, with Guadalupe Correa and Bernardo Moreno. Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 181, pages 199–202 (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.05.028)

  • Immunity to Credible Deviations from the Truth, with Salvador Barberà and Bernardo Moreno. Mathematical Social Sciences, 2017, vol. 90, pages 129-140 (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.11.002)

  • Group strategy-proofness in private good economies, with Salvador Barberà and Bernardo Moreno. American Economic Review, 2016, vol. 106 (4), pages 1073-1099 (https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aer.20141727)

  • A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model, with Kentaro Hatsumi and Shigehiro Serizawa. International Journal of Game Theory, 2014, vol. 43, pages 153-168 (https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0378-6)

  • Two necessary conditions for strategy-proofness: on what domains are they also sufficient?, with Salvador Barberà and Bernardo Moreno. Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 75 (No. 2), pages 490-509 (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.012)

  • Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences, with Salvador Barberà and Bernardo Moreno. Social Choice and Welfare, 2012, vol. 39 (No. 2), pages 335-352 (https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0624-4)

  • Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results, with Salvador Barberà and Bernardo Moreno. International Journal of Game Theory, 2012, vol. 41 (No. 4), pages 791–808 (https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0305-7)

  • Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?, with Salvador Barberà and Bernardo Moreno. Journal of Economic Theory, 2010, vol. 145, pages 1648-1674 (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.03.006 )

  • Strategic Requirements with Indifference: Single-peaked versus Single-plateaued Preferences, with Bernardo Moreno. Social Choice and Welfare, 2009, vol. 32 (No. 2), pag 275-298 (https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0323-y)

  • On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit, with Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Massó and Alejandro Neme. Economics Bulletin, 2008, vol. 4 (No. 21), pages 1-9

  • An Undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit, with Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Massó and Alejandro Neme. Mathematical Social Science, 2007, vol. 54, pages 152-175 (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.03.004)

  • On Exiting after Voting, with Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Massó and Alejandro Neme. Internacional Journal of Game Theory, 2006, vol. 34, pages 33-54 (https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-005-0005-2)

  • Stability and Voting by Committees with Exit, with Gustavo Bergantiños, Jordi Massó and Alejandro Neme. Social Choice and Welfare, 2004, vol. 23 (2), pages 229-247 (https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0246-6)

  • La economía de la contaminación difusa: aspectos espaciales e información asimétrica, with Renan Goetz and Joan Ribas-Tur. Ekonomiaz, 2002, vol. 49 (1), pages 152-179

  • Single-peakedness and strategy-proofness of generalized median voter schemes. Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, vol. 19 (1), pages 175-192 (https://doi.org/10.1007/s355-002-8331-1)

  • Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good, with Shigehiro Serizawa. Journal of Economic Theory, 2000, vol. 90, pages 39-61 (https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2579)

  • Strategy-proofness and single-plateaued preferences. Mathematical Social Sciences, 1998, vol. 35 (2), pages 105-120 (https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00036-X)


Book chapters / Proceeding / Books


  • Domains admitting ex post incentive compatible and respectful mechanisms: a characterization for the two alternatives case, with Salvador Barberà and Bernardo Moreno. In Social Design - Essays in Memory of Leonid Hurwicz, Ed. Trockel, W., Springer, 2019 (https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7)

  • On the different forms of individual and group strategic behavior, and their impact on efficiency, with Salvador Barberà and Bernardo Moreno. In Domingo-Ferrer J., Sánchez D. (eds) Co-utility. Studies in Systems, Decision and Control, vol 110. Springer, Cham, 2018 (https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60234-9_3)

  • Some new domain restrictions in social choice, and their consequences, with Salvador Barberà and Bernardo Moreno. In the Proceedings of The 10th International Conference on Modelling Decisions for Artificial Intelligence (MDAI), LNAI/LNCS series (Springer-Verlag), 2013 (https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41550-0_2)

  • Nonpoint source pollution in a spatial intertemporal context – a deposit refund approach, with Renan Goetz and Àngels Xabadia, 2006. In Frontiers in Water Resource Economics, Springer, pp: 137-152 (https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-30056-2_7)

  • Frontiers in Water Resource Economics, edited with Renan Goetz. Springer, 2006 (https://doi.org/10.1007/0-387-30056-2)


Teaching articles