Published papers

Klinenberg, D. (2023). Does Deplatforming Work? Journal of Conflict Resolution, https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231188909
- Link to replication files

Empirical Studies of Conflict Working Papers link
Presented at WEAI 2022 - Cryptocurrency and Social Media Group
Feature in The Forward

Danny Klinenberg (2022) Synthetic Control with Time Varying Coefficients: A State Space Approach with Bayesian Shrinkage, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, DOI: 10.1080/07350015.2022.2102025
- UCSB outstanding second- year paper 2020
- Presented at the IAAE machine learning seminar 2020

Danny Klinenberg & Richard Startz (2022) Covid, colleges, and classes, Applied Economics, DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2022.2091110
- Featured on the Brookings Institute Brown Center Chalkboard (link)

Working papers

Selling violent extremism

Abstract:

Domestic violent extremist organizations have become a significant threat to Western democracies, with some groups attracting tens of thousands of members. How did these groups amass such large followings? Surprisingly, some of these organizations behave similarly to firms. I study the effect of three firm tactics – membership discounts, armed events, and advertisements – on the demand for membership in the Oath Keepers, America’s largest paramilitary organization. Using a synthetic control-like strategy, I find that discounts cause new member sign-ups to increase by over 60% and cause-related marketing by 150% respectively; however, sports sponsorships decrease it. Demand for membership is less responsive to price changes in counties with more income inequality, but more so in heavily politically conservative counties.

Accepted at the Journal of Conflict Resolution
Presented at ESOC annual conference, 2022, Cal Poly- San Luis Obispo economics' department seminar series, UCSB Applied Microeconomics Lunch
Nonacademic coverage: Boston Globe, Wikipedia, Marginal Revolution

00_klinenberg_selling.pdf

Deterrence using Reaction Curves: An empirical analysis of the Israeli-Gaza Conflict

with Eli Berman, Prabin Khadka, and Esteban Klor
Link to NBER working paper

Abstract:

We use response curves in a repeated game to formalize key aspects of integrated deterrence: escalation, de-escalation, incomplete deterrence, and deterrence by denial. In our approach, episodes of violence are due to the interaction of response curves, which follow a strategic logic of disincentivizing opponents from attacking, through both deterrence and compellence. To maintain credibility both sides punish attacks, disincentivizing larger attacks and yielding nonviolent lulls. We empirically estimate those curves using detailed incident data from the Israel-Gaza conflict between 2007 and 2018. Our estimates match the dynamics of the raw data: very frequent episodes of low lethality violent exchange. Response curves are stable and exhibit a posture consistent with incomplete deterrence: i.e., episodes de-escalate, but not to complete nonviolence in equilibrium. Major Israeli military operations shift the Gazan reaction curve inwards, yielding a less violent equilibrium.

DRC 29Jan2024 West Point.pdf

Work-in-progress

Timing is Everything: Estimating strategic response in sequential data (with Eli Berman, Prabin Khadka, and Esteban Klor)

Many applied economic studies aim to estimate strategic behavior through reaction curves. Examples include two-sided conflicts, or economic trade wars, and algorithmic pricing between firms. Analysis is usually performed at a pre-specified time interval, such as days, weeks, months, years, etc, using a Vector Autoregression (VAR). Yet sides may respond within a day to one action, but wait a month after another. If data is recorded in arbitrary time intervals, then the researcher may mistake waiting to act for inaction. We analytically show that VAR analyses do not recover true reaction curves if the timing of reaction is not accurately recorded. We discuss alternative approaches to estimate reaction curves and investigate their usefulness in a Monte Carlo simulation.

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