FinTech versus banks : A war of distance ? (With Frederic Jouneau-Sion (Univ Lyon 2)).

Abstract: The emergence of remote services has reshaped many retail industries over the past two decades. Yet, despite early optimism, many online firms continue to struggle to achieve profitability, and numerous business models have fallen short of expectations. In the banking and financial sector, one possible explanation is that remote service provision still suffers from relatively low perceived reliability and reputation, as suggested by Foncel et al. (2011). This paper empirically assesses the relevance of this mechanism using firm-level data from the French banking sector. We adapt the original theoretical framework to this context and propose a structural econometric approach to quantify the impact of reputation and trust on the performance of fully remote banking services. Our results suggest that these services face persistent structural constraints, implying a long path toward sustainable profitability.

Codifying Trust: Institutional Classification and Structural Hierarchy in Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (With Magali Chaudey (Univ Saint Etienne)).

Working paper — May 2026.

Abstract: Blockchain technology was designed to enable coordination that relies neither on trust nor on trusted third parties. Yet, blockchain-based organizations, known as decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs), actively work to restore trust through organizational mechanisms. This study examines how trust is produced and distributed within DAO governance by analyzing three major decentralized finance DAOs: MakerDAO, Aave, and Uniswap. Drawing on Zucker’s typology of trust production and a social network analysis of governance interactions among 18,375 actors, we find that DAOs institutionalize trust through three complementary mechanisms: on-chain algorithmic enforcement, a formalized off-chain behavioural classification system, and the creation of shared cognitive frameworks. However, formal classifications of trust and structural positions of actors within governance networks only partially coincide. Actors occupying the most central and brokerage positions are not necessarily those granted the highest formal trust status, revealing hidden hierarchies that formal classification does not capture. Rather than eliminating trust, DAOs redistribute it across layers of governance, dividing it into algorithmic, formal, and cognitive dimensions whose alignments or misalignments forge organizational hierarchies and influence deliberations.