Description Work

Link Files

Echeverría, M. (2023). Footnotes on the Foundations of Game Theory F1.  (draft).

First paper in Footnotes on the Foundations of Game Theory. It provides verifiable information of a universal solver g[], for finite pure-strategy Nash Equilibria, without disclosing code. In doing so, theory at work is displayed. In particular, this feat exploits a bridge between static games and Replicator dynamics to show that only predicted symmetric NE are stable fixed points. A theoretical discussion from the perspective of a Machiavellian ruler accompanies this mathematical treatment.

The second part establishes a link between the number of solutions and their character in terms of symmetric (diagonal) solutions and coupled (off-diagonal) in symmetric matrices with heuristics. Data generated with g[] is used to test hypotheses. 

This is improved on with a method for more general tensors. A statistical model predicts the distribution of the number of solutions. The method can be applied to any set of NE of interest for any distribution of incentives etc. Data does not reject the model. All results follow from simple or common-knowledge concepts and definitions. More general solvers will be discussed in future work.

Game Theory, Applied Mathematics, Social Science, Evolution.

Echeverría, M. (2023). Kapitalets väldiga kropp II - Sverige är suveränt (draft).

Studien slår undan premisserna för de senaste decenniernas politiska debatt: ”Vi har inte råd”; ”vi får inte p.g.a. kapitalflykt/inflationstvång”; ”bara mindre avsteg från statsbudgeten är möjliga”.

Den ekonomiska teorin som dominerar den högre förvaltningen och akademin världen över är felaktig från grunden. Hur och varför förklaras med fokus på pengarnas roll i samhällsekonomin. På en A4-sida klargörs:

• Vad pengar är.

• Varför hela statsskulds-debatten är en bluff.

• Hur självständiga stater alltid kan finansiera reformer.

• Varför överskott i statsbudgeten kan skada ekonomin.

• Varför reformer aldrig är skattefinansierade.

Slutsatsen är att Sverige, i betydande utsträckning, är monetärt självständig eller suverän. Finansieringen av stora reformpaket underlättas därmed avservärt. Statsskulden kan strykas, så länge utländsk valuta förblir en obetydlig del av lånen. Bara formalia kan stå i vägen om politisk vilja finns.

Artikeln avrundas med en fristående diskussion om Artificiell intelligens (AI) i en hypotetisk ekonomi. Denna klarar hållbar tillväxt med en verksamhet som bygger på generella moduler. Dessa optimeras över tid för att bli alltmer återvinningsbara och användbara mellan alltfler sektorer. 

Källorna är från tongivande ekonomer, SCB och riksgälden.

SVERIGE ÄR SUVERÄNT är andra delen i Kapitalets mäktiga kropp.

Echeverría, M. (2023). Kapitalets väldiga kropp I (draft).

Studien slår undan premisserna för de senaste decenniernas politiska debatt: ”Vi har inte råd”; ”vi får inte p.g.a. kapitalflykt/inflationstvång”; ”bara mindre avsteg från statsbudgeten är möjliga”.

Hotet mot kapitalintensiv produktion från kapitalflykt vid omfördelning är obefintligt. Bolagen i materialet med den egentliga produktionen är inte beroende av sådana källor i finansieringen. Tvärtom flödar kapitalet framförallt uppåt i koncernhierarkin. Det ekonomiska utrymmet utesluter att betydande delar av elproduktionen är i behov av subventioner, skattesänkningar, prishöjningar, lägre löneutveckling etc. för att möta efterfrågan med framgång. Investeringsvolymerna kunde ha mångdubblats och fortfarande lämna utrymme till vinst. 

Nyckelord: Bolagsstrategi; Elbolag; Deskriptiv statistik; Populärvetenskap

Echeverría, M. (2022). Nato Without Reason – The May 13 Report.

Abstract

This paper dismantles the main arguments for Swedish NATO membership from the most illustrious advocates. None of the conclusions in favour of NATO presented by the Government in the May 13 report survive scrutiny. In conclusion, even if the assumptions are taken at face-value, it does not follow that NATO will enhance Swedish security. Official pro-NATO arguments rely on a naïve understanding of international relations, contracts and incentives. Analysis of the incentive structure of so-called binding agreements reveals that the NATO mechanism does not guarantee as much as commonly advertised. NATO is a deficient insurance for Sweden as it increases the risk of worst-case scenarios while current threats, as assessed by the May 13 report, remain minor as non-aligned. Finally, the historical arguments from NATO advocates, only strengthen the case for non-alignment.

Keywords: NATO; Contract theory; Governance; Review

Echeverría, M. (2021c). Palestine in Ruins and in Mass Media – Reality Check.

EVEN POLARISATION IS OBEDIENT

Reality Check wraps up previous work in the series. The paper is available for preview or download (PDF 702KB). Data and results should be considered in view of paper 1 & 2 in Information Production Theory. The following text pinpoints some of the findings:

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

(1) Multivariate non-parametric simulations show that commercial and tax-funded outlets engage in terror-shaming of Palestinian victims in news items. However the likelihood of doing so is influenced by ideological outlook. Centre-left commercial journalism is least likely to engage in such practices; right-wing commercial outlets most; and Swedish Television has a pseudo-neutral position in between.

(2) Analysis of opinion pieces reveals polarisation in support of either side of the conflict, and divergence from state position, within a particular outlet. 

Categorical claims of left-wing bias in media in general, Swedish Public Service in particular, remain as unsound as any unhinged conspiracy theory

IMPLICATIONS

Evidence supports Information Production Theory (Echeverría, 2021). A polarising topic is not a sufficient condition for polarised journalism. Master (top down) demand for ideology regulates supply. In Sweden Master demand in the divisive Assange case was specific and virtually unison, hence homogenous and obedient journalism was supplied (Echeverría 2018; 2020). Master demand was vague and divided, on the divisive Israeli occupation of Palestine, when violence escalated May 2021. Consequently, journalistic supply was allowed to be divergent and polarised.

GENERAL INTEREST

Categorical claims of left-wing bias in media in general, Swedish Public Service in particular, remain as unsound as any unhinged conspiracy theory. Evidence indicates that polarisation conforms to the demands of those in power.  Erratic polarising psychological mechanisms operate in close to perfect harmony when fired along the circuits of a hierarchical social fabric.

Echeverría, M. (2021b). Palestine in Ruins and in Mass media – On Method.

This version (2021-11-21) is virtually the same but with updated databases. However there is one new peculiar finding: Careful comparative analysis with Swedish-Television data reveals that archived items at Retriever Research, differ substantially from the most visible versions at the time collected in the foreign news web page. Many items are completely different – but the number of items coincide, which makes it difficult to spot. This shows journalists to some extent can publish one set of accessible articles as history unfolds, and then archive a different set for future historical record.

ABSTRACT

On Method is the second paper of Palestine in Ruins and in Mass Media. It consists of an empirical and a theoretical part: First section reviews the fixed-point search engine introduced in the first paper of the series (Echeverría, 2021). In conclusion, algorithms employed so far yield suitable signatures of the narrative of a given topic. Comparison with refinements are implemented with a much larger set, of 733 articles on the Israel-Palestine conflict, from the biggest Swedish media outlets. These refinements deal with networks of words. The sample covers May 2021 when violence escalates. In summary, both methods and results from the first paper are robust but the refinements are more reliable.

The second section provides a mathematical formulation of the framework. A general setting is considered where a probability measure, for the robustness of a given ranking, is derived. This scheme deals with configurations of unknown complexity. In summary, naïve, basic or mechanical rules with plenty of flaws can be successfully used to gain relevant information from language, good enough for hypothesis testing. Minimal prior knowledge about grammar or language is required. Moreover, the scheme allows for arbitrary or inconsistent rules. In the end a probability measure reflecting the usefulness of the method is given regardless. The solutions to these problems and the scope of the framework justify a general theoretical discussion on society, and provides probabilistic accounting perspectives.

KEYWORDS: Applied Mathematics; Theory of Society; Algorithms; Media Analysis; Accounting

Echeverría, M. (2021a). Information Production Theory – Palestine in Ruins and in Mass media.

There are two sets of seemingly irreconcilable results indicating a fundamental problem in the social sciences and humanities. Previous research over the past decades shows that journalism is homogenous or obedient in favour of those in power. In contrast, results in experimental psychology suggest that polarization should be prevalent in settings corresponding to those confronted by journalists. This paper proposes a parsimonious solution.

ABSTRACT

The first part of this paper proposes a theory to explain how information is used to exert power over people, the second sets out to test its implications. The reasoning begins with conflicting results, in psychology and the social sciences, which imply a tension between polarisation and homogeneity or obedience, in information production. The proposed solution in the specific domain of mass media is called Propaganda Cognition Theory (PCT), as it is a synthesis between a Propaganda Model (PM) in the vein of Herman & Chomsky (2002), and psychological mechanisms such as Identity-Protective Cognition Thesis (ICT) tested by Kahan et al. (2017). The PM-tradition generates results about obedience and homogeneity whereas the latter is associated with findings about polarisation and defiance towards authority. PCT shows that both theories are relevant in special cases, and derives testable hypotheses. This is the first in a series, with data mainly about the occupation of Palestine.

Echeverría, M. (2021). The Bullshit Conspiracy: A Theory of Society + Fictitious Jobs + Vicious Critique of Famous Dr Graeber.

– What are people in wealthy countries doing all day?

According to David Graeber (2019), most people still have to waste their time under supervision or in constrained environments with few opportunities to carry out meaningful tasks.

This paper delivers fundamental critique to Graeber’s theory and a completely new one is developed.

ABSTRACT

No-bullshit jobs, as developed in this paper, is a nested process-based definition of fictitious employment. The theory of bullshit jobs ascribed to Graeber (2019) is proven to be irrational, empirically false, contested or inconsistent. Data on two of his major works indicates that although he often is presented as left-wing, anarchist, and activist, his actual statements are nevertheless aligned with right-wing ideology. To underscore these points, his work is conceptualised as a bullshit theory, in the sense that it is redundant, fake, creates unnecessary tasks, and requires duct taping. Furthermore, it is evaluated as a PR-flunky in the arms race to promote essentially an Alt-right world view, where the US Democrats are portrayed as a left-wing party, and academia is depicted as radical. A theory of society is discussed in view of this multifaceted topic.

Echeverría, M. (2020). Footnotes on the Figures of Suppression: Footnote 1 – Propaganda Accounting.

This footnote represents several aspects of my efforts as an independent researcher. It took several weeks to write, and is to some extent a result of private studies in mathematical statistics earlier that year. It is a critique and reevaluation of my earlier work, which culminates in a novel theoretical framework. Journalism and propaganda are perceived in terms of accounting, and given a stochastic articulation. This paper also is an expression of my commitment to the pursuit of truth, especially when it is threatened by power. I show that the central thesis of a propaganda model (e.g. Herman & Chomsky, 2002), can be rigorously tested and accepted, beyond a mere failure to reject it. I also prove that journalism on the Assange case in the Swedish nation-wide press 2011-2016, is propaganda.

Echeverría, M. (2018). WikiLeaks’ Unforgivable Liberalism. Libertarian Books – Sweden. Stockholm/Bergamo

archive.org/details/WikiLeaksUnforgivableLiberalism

This is an online-friendly (2.3mb Baskerville/Caslon) version. The official version was published by Libertarian Books – Sweden / Psychiatry Doctor Marcello Ferrada de Noli (87 mb Minion). For more information, please see tweets by Mr. Assange & WikiLeaks.[1]

This book is an independent part of the project Democracy-Adapted Power which focuses on informal ways of exercising power under democratic restrictions.

– INTRODUCTION

https://twitter.com/wikileaks/status/977123824176164864;

https://twitter.com/wikileaks/status/976978056425410562;

https://twitter.com/wikileaks/status/976505390153248768;

Firstly, this contribution is one of the most comprehensive analyses of Swedish media in the Assange case to date. The empirical section departs from Herman & Chomsky’s Propaganda Model. It is my understanding, that few or no serious applications of the model had previously been conducted in a Swedish setting. Results show an astonishing homogeneity in journalistic opinion in support of the official state line. One of the more spectacular findings is the prevalence of fact-resistant behavior among journalist and experts. Associated bias gave rise to a wide range of remarkable empirical regularities. The most intriguing of these are fractal patterns in the data.

This book shows that journalism on the Assange case in the Swedish nation-wide press is propaganda.

– INTRODUCTION

One of the main methodological and theoretical contributions is a game-theoretical treatment of journalistic opinion. I show that it is in principle possible to give a very accurate compressed description of reality, to the extent still-life modelling of reality is feasible (usually not my cup of tea), with a simple graph consisting of a few links and nodes. The reason is that thoughts and opinions are a part of social reality when expressed ‘in print’. It is in principle possible to break down arguments and represent them in a finite list of possible interpretations. Homogeneity further restricts the list of possible readings. Thus what seems to be a ludicrous claim becomes a realistic possibility. One of the most intriguing aspects, is that the assessments and predictions are about the future. Off-sample applications are straight forward and promising.

The second main theoretical contribution is a critique of versions of the Propaganda Model which solely rely on situational explanations. Departing from the tenets of the theory, it stands to reason that it is absurd to exclude intention.

The Assange case is a schoolbook example of the contradictions in Western democracies.

– ARBITRARY DETENTION BY MEANS OF ARBITRARY RULINGS

Theory, analysis, arguments and critique are valid in their own terms, but also consistent with the facts at the time and subsequent disclosures – even supported by scoops in the mainstream press just before publication.

Remark: complex models with unintuitive, and virtually untraceable conclusions can be motivated, e.g. in machine learning settings. Moreover, such results may be telling us something important about theory, underlying reality or both.

[1] Relevant documents of the proceedings are accessible at the Internet Archive: archive.org/details/witnessstatementofgoranrudling; archive.org/details/expertopinionofsvenerikalhem  archive.org/details/witnessstatementofbjornhurtig; archive.org/details/mariannenysstatement040211

Echeverría, M. (2013). On the Limits of Nonprofit Firms. Lund University (Media-Tryck).

Paper 1

What kind of economic output should we expect according to economic theory? How is the production of knowledge and the organisational structure related? This thought experiment gives a game-theoretical treatment of such questions. Its insights carry over to a more general set of institutions under limited liability, and could in principle be employed to discuss media, environmental non-profits, human rights organisations, foreign aid etc. with minor modifications. If the non-profit sector fails altruism or its grass-roots stakeholders when confronted with powerful interests, it stands to reason that other sectors will face similar difficulties or worse. 

Paper 1 gives a game-theoretical treatment of the institutional homogenisation of value-oriented firms. It explains why intrinsically motivated, value-oriented firms like non-profits may become similar to for-profit firms in terms of organisation and norms. The non-profit is able to adapt its organisation by establishing a hierarchy with an intrinsically motivated manager. The donor can in turn react by employing institutions in order to cope with information asymmetries regarding the mission of the organisation and the unverifiable values of the manager. Two main cases are examined, one without competition and a competitive case. The equilibrium in the first case is a flat organisation or alternatively highly altruistic hierarchy. The second competitive case is characterised by a value-neutral hierarchy.

Surveillance, hierarchy and bureaucracy emerge as a consequence of strategic interaction e.g. local competition over one source. Wealthy or ‘small’ organisations can afford idealism and an egalitarian structure. Such organisations are free to choose the management which best suits their needs or even work in a completely flat organisation if they want to. Such solipsism is however not attainable in all environments. 

Please note that in contrast, global competition between systems emerges if additional sources of power/finance are introduced, these may promote different values. Once local equilibrium is established the simplest cases of global competition become obvious – it is just a matter of counting organisations and sources.

Please note technical jargon is used which may not correspond to the everyday sense of the words. E.g. verifiability and altruism are terms which concern what is contractible or relate to what is defined in the literature. Bonuses and reimbursements are expressions of solutions to the underlying tensions – these may be thought of as intangibles as well. My report of how such details relate to previous literature should primarily be seen as means to convey information of how effects may remain invariant even when the structure of the arguments is altered, not specific applications.

It is easy to tinker with parameters to model specific situations, especially regarding different modes of reimbursement, wasteful behavior or perks. Because such considerations are theoretically trivial/mainstream (e.g. w.r.t. delegation problem), they are abstracted from in order to emphasise the emergence of bureaucracy or inefficiency (depending on the point of view) as the result of interaction. Similarly, assumptions should not be taken literally. For example: Just because I argue that organisations/workers behave as if they do not move, it does not follow that we should believe they cannot. However, if theory or the facts of the matter indicate it is as if they do not, then this arguably is a very interesting result. Nevertheless, there are quite obvious intuitions to be invoked in this case: For instance, researchers may be thought to compete for the same hierarchy of journals, which radically diminishes the importance of geographical distance. (See the Cambridge Conspiracy)

Please forgive the occasional use of US conventions, and typos involving old notation. If you see them, you probably understand anyway. 

Paper 2

Economists have been puzzled over the fact that most schools are public. For instance, in his ‘fixture of graduate programs in economics’, Macroeconomic Analysis, the famous economist Varian (1992) insists that education is a schoolbook example of an ‘inherently private good’. According to him, it is treated as a public one for political reasons. (Varian, p.414)

However, I argue that if one departs from basic facts of what constitutes an education, it becomes immediately obvious that externalities and thus market failure is at the heart of the really-existing education systems.  Profit oriented ones especially. The bare-bones framework of this paper essentially relies on a few natural assumptions: Knowledge accumulates, i.e. it is based on previous insights; the relationship between a tutor and a student is relativistic in terms of their (costly) contributions to the accumulation of knowledge; and decisions today may be based on future prospects.

In Economics, the remedy to externalities in an environment of private firms, and in the grey areas of public-private partnerships, comes from the Nobel laureate Oliver Hart. From a list of stylized facts, the most crucial were selected and reconciled with his work on contract theory to improve on the details. The resulting framework is then shown to be qualitatively consistent with the whole set of observations, and thus an acceptable minimalist theory of the education system from a contract-economics perspective. It is moreover consistent with pedagogical perspectives and intuition unknown to me at the outset. However, the main result is that these uncontroversial facts are not simultaneously consistent with a contract which can meaningfully optimize production. Socioeconomic reality and opportunistic behavior overwhelms such attempts.

Thus, the literature drawing upon Hart’s work up to that point is confronted with formidable challenges in education settings as well. In view of this, the neoclassical stance seems out of touch with even modest attempts to describe reality. The mainstream link between effort and personal characteristics, such as ability, exists only as a special case in a decision embedded in a richer set of socioeconomic relations. The finesse of this thought experiment is to be found in what a still-life modeler would see as a weakness – namely its simplicity, and adherence to standard assumptions regarding functional form. 

Human-capital formation is treated as a game of strategic interaction between a citizen and the educational system consisting of two separate stages which correspond to elementary and higher education. The product of the interaction is human capital and the equilibrium outcome at the first stage affects the student’s productivity at the second stage of higher education. This research shows how the intertemporal nature of learning opens up for opportunism between elementary and higher education and limits the scope of using non-profits against cost-savings in the presence of for-profit firms. The character of relevant school reform will in general depend on the impact of changes at the structural level relative to the impact of reform aimed at the interpersonal level within the classroom domain. The analysis suggests that pedagogical orientation and the pupil’s aim or predisposition to be forward looking, are important determinants of learning outcomes. We show that what happens between the classroom walls is decisive for how the human capital stock is affected in different contractual settings.

Please forgive the typos involving old notation. If you see them, you probably understand anyway.