Going Local: Decentralization, Bureaucratic Capacity and Public Spending Efficiency, with A. Cerqua [Working Paper; SSRN]
Abstract: Decentralization reforms are typically justified on efficiency grounds, yet their distributional consequences remain poorly understood. We show that uniform administrative decentralization can generate aggregate efficiency gains while simultaneously widening territorial disparities, depending on the pre-existing bureaucratic capacity of local governments. Exploiting cross-regional variation in the implementation of an Italian reform through a matched difference-in-differences design and data covering 1998–2007, we document average efficiency gains of 5–14%. However, aggregate gains mask a distributional divide: high-capacity municipalities achieve efficiency improvements through cost optimization, maintaining their pre-reform growth trajectory, while low-capacity municipalities concentrate efforts on visible short-term gains and experience a 1% average income loss. We identify four mechanisms behind this divergence: enhanced fiscal accountability, a strategic shift toward income taxation paired with greater leniency in tax collection among low-capacity municipalities, electoral incentives, and compliance with citizens' preferences for decentralization. This study carries implications for the design of decentralization processes.
Presented at: LSE Geography and Environment Student WIP Seminar, IRVAPP Foundation, Gran Sasso Science Institute, AISRe Annual Conference, RSA Winter Conference, Séminaire en ligne d'Economie Géographique, Banca d'Italia Workshop, EAYE 2025, Lisbon Urban and Public Economics Workshop 2025, UB School of Economics, Madrid European Public Choice Society 2026, SIEP 2026, Bank of Italy EPSI Conference 2026.
Publications
“Dead Man Working”: A Place-based Approach to Workplace Fatalities
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organizaton, 2026, with A. Cerqua, M. Letta and G. Pinto
Media coverage: lavoce, Senato della Repubblica Italiana, IlSole24Ore, Il Fatto Quotidiano
The Causal Effect of Municipal Mergers on Local Institutional Quality
Journal of Regional Science, 2026, with A. Cerqua and F. Zampollo
Femicides, Anti-Violence Centers, and Policy Targeting
European Economic Review, 2026, with A. Cerqua, M. Letta and G. Pinto [replication package]
Media coverage: la Repubblica, IlSole24Ore, Ansa, Domani, IlPost, Senato della Repubblica
Regional Government Institutions and the Capacity for Women to Reconcile Career and Motherhood
Journal of Economic Geography, 2025, with A. Rodríguez-Pose [CEPR DP 19621]
The Municipal Administration Quality Index: the Italian Case
Social Indicators Research, 2025, with A. Cerqua, F. Zampollo, and M. Mazziotta
Working papers
Public salience, collective action, and intimate partner femicides, with A. Cerqua, M. Letta and G. Pinto
Rej&Res. Preliminary version (Oct 2024) available here
Abstract: Does public salience around violence against women mobilize broad societal responses, or does it trigger further harm through imitation? Using newly assembled longitudinal data from Italy, we show that an exceptionally salient intimate partner femicide (IPF) triggered a nationwide rise in help-seeking and reports of violence against women filed with the police. Femicides do not increase and instead point to a decline, particularly in IPFs driven by jealousy or possessiveness motives. This pattern is inconsistent with copycat theories and suggests that heightened public attention can mobilize help-seeking, reporting, and possibly prevention at scale. Reporting effects are concentrated in peak-salience periods, whereas the decline in IPFs emerges gradually, suggesting that sustained public salience can serve as a policy lever against gender-based violence without inducing adverse effects.
Signature spending politics, with A. Cerqua, M. Letta and G. Pinto, submitted [Working Paper]
Abstract: We study how politicians use public money when an exogenous shock expands fiscal discretion. We examine a large recovery program in Italy, where resources were unconventionally allocated through individually sponsored legislative motions. Using Large Language Models to parse thousands of parliamentary documents, we build a project–politician–municipality dataset and match it to electoral and social media data. We show that individually attributable transfers — “signature spending” — generate substantial personal electoral returns for both government and opposition politicians, especially when they publicly claim credit. These candidate-level returns shape political careers, distort territorial allocation, and exceed the more aggregate electoral gains documented in the pork-barrel literature.
Selected works in progress
The Recentralisation Hypothesis in Times of Crisis: the Role of Constitutional Courts, with A. Filippetti and F. Tuzi
Abstract: This article explores the behavior of the constitutional courts when deciding about the distribution of powers between the central and subnational governments during major economic crisis momentum. We propose an empirical assessment of the crisis-driven recentralization hypothesis, where central governments strive to consolidate authority and resources. We also hypothesize that during major crises constitutional courts tend to favor the central governments by taking a more centralistic stance. Using newly collected data about verdicts on intergovernmental conflicts and relying on a non-linear probability model, we test these hypotheses for the Italian context. Our findings show that during significant economic crises, the likelihood of the central government prevailing in disputes and their proclivity towards litigation escalates. This suggests a substantial change in the Constitutional Court’s behavior towards recentralization during crisis periods, irrespective of the prevailing political cycle.
Central Transfers and Local Tax Choices: Evidence from a Discontinuous Reconstruction Windfall [Analysis stage]
Climate change and voting preferences, with G. Valenti [Analysis stage]
Other writings
Femicides, Anti-Violence Centres, and Policy Targeting (2026), voxeu.org, with A. Cerqua, M. Letta and G. Pinto
Fiscal Federalism in Italy Twenty Years after the Constitutional Reform: an Appraisal (2023), with A. Filippetti, S. Rondinella and F. Tuzi, Cuadernos Manuel Giménez Abad, Special Issue 9