Date: June 27 15:00 -18:00 (Japanese Standard Time)
Location: Waseda University (Waseda Campus) Bldg 3, 9F, 3-909
Speakers/titles:
1. 15:00 - 16:00 Shintaro Miura (Kanagawa University)
"Toward a Unified Framework for Strategic Communication"
Discussion Section
2. 16:30 - 18:00 Takakazu Honryo (Doshisha University )
"Dynamic Screening with Stochastic Evidence"
abstract: This paper studies a dynamic screening game where a decision maker (DM) evaluates a privately informed agent, with information revealed through stochastic evidence and endogenous dropout. In equilibrium, type separation begins immediately via low-type exit and continues gradually thereafter. The DM’s belief deteriorates monotonically over time even as low types continue to exit. This process continues until the DM’s belief hits her indifference threshold, at which point the DM disapproves. Imposing a deadline without commitment strictly lowers the DM’s payoff. We show, however, that even a simple deterministic deadline rule of the kind commonly observed in practice, committing to disapprove at a fixed date unless evidence arrives, can outperform the equilibrium when the signal arrival rate is sufficiently high.
Style: In-person meeting
Language: Japanese