Date: October 3 14:30 -17:30
Location: Doshisha University (Imadegawa Campus) Ryoshinkan, RY316
Speakers/titles:
1. 14:30 - 15:45 Shinpei Noguchi (Hitotsubashi University)
"Incentive to Leave Costly Reviews"
(joint with Shohei Yanagita)
abstract: This paper investigates the conditions under which rational and selfish individuals voluntarily leave costly reviews. Although prior studies have focused on how reviews influence economic behavior, taking review-leaving behavior as given, little attention has been paid to the incentives that lead individuals to write reviews in the first place. We develop a game-theoretic model in which review leaving is endogenous and show that positive externalities from good products sustain voluntary review behavior in equilibrium, even when leaving a review is costly. Bad reviews steer others away from bad products and facilitate search, while good reviews encourage the adoption of good products, allowing reviewers to benefit from externalities.
2. 16:15 - 17:30 Kohei Kawamura (Waseda University )
"Dynamic Screening with Stochastic Evidence"
abstract: Expert knowledge is richer than public communication can convey. When specialists assess parts of a decision, separate compressed messages can lose information needed to compare them. An institution such as a news organization or public agency can instead compare them before compression. Direct access lets audiences cross-check the institutional message and learn how strongly it favours one specialist without learning whether that favouring is justified. A Bayesian audience may shift to fragmented reliance and stop cross-checking before resolving this uncertainty. If institutional visits finance synthesis, individually rational withdrawal can destroy integrating capacity whose option value remains positive and lower ex ante welfare.
Style: In-person meeting
Language: Japanese