WBS Workshop on Contract Theory and Organizational Economics (a.k.a. CTWE)

Basic Information

  • This workshop is a part of the research project (EN / JP) of the Institute for Business and Finance (EN /JP), Waseda Business School, organized by Hideshi Itoh. It intends to be informal and accessible to anyone who is interested in the topics irrespective of his/her affiliation. Please send me (my first name dot my last name at alumni d0t stanford dot edu) an e-mail if you are interested in contributing to the workshop by presenting your (however incomplete) work or participating actively in discussion. Presentation may be in English contingent on the audience.
  • When: Usually Fridays.
  • Where: Waseda campus.

2019 Workshop Schedule

  • June 14:
    • Location: 11-1109 (11th floor of Building 11)
    • Time: 16:30-18:00
    • Speaker: Jiangtao Li (Singapore Management U)
    • Title: Robustly Optimal Reserve Price
    • Abstract: We study a robust version of the single-unit auction problem. The auctioneer has confidence in her estimate of the marginal distribution of a generic bidder's valuation, but she has non-Bayesian uncertainty about the joint distribution. Within the class of second-price auctions, we solve for the robustly optimal reserve price that generates the highest revenue guarantee, that is, the greatest lower bound of revenue across all joint distributions that are consistent with the marginals. We analyze two versions of this problem. In the first version, the auctioneer is restricted to choosing a deterministic reserve price. In the secondversion, the auctioneer is allowed to randomize over reserve prices.
  • July 16 (Tue, Joint with WINPEC Microeconomics Workshop) :
    • Location: 3-404 (4th floor of Building 3)
    • Time: 16:30-18:00
    • Speaker: Trond E. Olsen (NHH)
    • Title: TBD

Past Workshop (2019)

  • April 26:
    • Location: 11-1109 (11th floor of Building 11)
    • Time: 16:30-18:00
    • Speaker: Yoko Sakamoto (Meiji Gakuin U)
    • Title: Product Life-Cycle and Geography of Innovation
  • April 23 (Tue, Joint with WINPEC Microeconomics Workshop) :
    • Location: 3-404 (4th floor of Building 3)
    • Time: 16:30-18:00
    • Speaker: Shintaro Miura (Kanagawa U, visiting Waseda U)
    • Title: Prudence in Persuasion
  • April 16 (Tue, Joint with WINPEC Microeconomics Workshop) :
    • Location: 3-404 (4th floor of Building 3)
    • Time: 16:30-18:00
    • Speaker: Matthias Fahn (JKU Linz)
    • Title: Informal Incentives and Product Market Competition (with Takeshi Murooka)
  • April 12:
    • Location: 11-1109 (11th floor of Building 11)
    • Time: 16:30-18:00
    • Speaker: Fabian Herweg (U Bayreuth)
    • Title: Regret Theory and Salience Theory: Total Strangers, Distant Relatives or Close Cousins? (with D. Müller) pdf
  • January 25 (joint with Friday Seminar) :
    • Location: Building 11, 9th Floor, Room 903
    • Time: 16:30-18:00
    • Speaker: Shuichi Tsugawa (Kyushu U)
    • Title: Price Competition and Product Differentiation under Green Trade Union
    • Abstract: The number of people who pay attention to eco-friendliness in choosing products is increasing, so firms or product sellers should take care of such demands. In addition, trade unions insist that they should deal with not only increasing their wages, but also environment protection in order to improve their work situation. This paper investigates Bertrand price competition under product differentiation and green trade union. Here, variety of product identifies level of emissions per unit product, and all consumers aligned on Hoteling line have the taste for the variety. It is shown that more eco-friendly firm can set lower product price because of setting lower wages while the other firm sets the higher price.
  • January 11 (joint with Friday Seminar) :
    • Location: Building 11, 9th Floor, Room 902
    • Time: 16:30-18:00
    • Speaker: Hideo Owan (Waseda U)
    • Title: How Good Managers Steer Their Projects: Using Value-Added Measures of Manager Quality (joint with Ruo Shangguan)

Past Workshop (2018)

  • December 28: 6th Annual Communication Theory Workshop
    • Location: Building 11, 9th Floor, Room 903
    • 14:45-16:15
      • Speaker: Hitoshi Sadakane (Kyoto U)
      • Title: Intra-Firm Communication and Organizational Design in a Cournot Competition with Strategic Investments
    • 16:30-18:00
      • Speaker: Kazumi Hori (Ritsumeikan U)
      • Title: Two-sided Strategic Information Transmission when Principal and Agent are Privately Informed (with Saori Chiba)
    • Presentation in Japanese
    • Registration for dinner (closed) .
  • December 21 (joint with Friday Seminar) :
    • Location: Building 11, 9th Floor, Room 903
    • Time: 16:30-18:00
    • Speaker: Desmond Lo (Santa Clara U)
    • Title: Coordination and Organization Design: Theory and Micro-evidence (joint with Wouter Dessein and Chieko Minami)
    • Abstract: We explore the relationship between a firm's organizational structure, the instability of its local environment, and the need for coordination among sub-units. Using micro-level data on a large retailer, we empirically test and provide support for our hypothesis that a more unpredictable local environment results in more decentralization only when coordination needs are small or moderate. In contrast, more unpredictability is associated with more centralization of tasks when coordination needs are high. Our evidence is consistent with an organizational tradeoff between adaptation and coordination and theories that argue that centralized organizations may be better at coping with local shocks when coordinated adaptation is important.
    • Registration for dinner (closed) .
  • November 23
    • Location: Building 11, 9th Floor, Room 909
    • Time: 16:30-18:00
    • Speaker: Yosuke Hashidate (U Tokyo)
    • Title: Image Concerns and Social Influences
    • Presentation in Japanese

Past Workshop (2017)

  • December 22: 5th Annual Communication Theory Workshop, joint with Waseda Seminar on Game Theory and Experimental Economics
    • Location: Waseda campus, Bldg 3, 10F, Conference Room 1 (3号館10階第一会議室)
    • 15:50-16:50
      • Speaker: Shintaro Miura (Kanagawa U)
      • Title: Value of Mass Media
      • Abstract: Are biased media outlets always harmful to voters? To answer this question, we discuss the value of biased media outlets. The distortion aused by biased outlets is modeled by the manipulated news model, where voters do not directly observe policies chosen by candidates, and then they rely on the news from media outlets. We then compare it with the following two counterfactual models in which voters commit not to observe the news from the outlets, but there are alternative sources providing election-relevant information. The first one is the word-of-mouth model, in which voters obtain “rumors” about the proposed policies from the other voters. The second one is the social media model, in which candidates can send direct but imperfect messages to voters. Our conclusion is that the answer depends on whether the alternative sources can send credible information.
    • 17:00-18:00
      • Speaker: Kohei Kawamura (Waseda U)
      • Title: A Simple Theory of Media Reports (with Mark Le Quement)
      • Abstract: We study a model of endogenously repeated cheap talk in a Markovian environment. In each period, the uninformed party (the receiver, i.e. the public/readers) can consult the informed party (the sender, i.e. the media) at a cost. The sender, who is driven by profits, has an incentive to generate uncertainty in order to encourage future consultation. We find that the accuracy of the sender's reports may decline as the cost of consultation becomes lower. Both the sender and receiver can benefit from a higher cost of consultation, which dampens the sender's responsiveness to uncertainty and allows him to commit to similar likelihood of (re)consultation conditional on different messages, thereby reducing the sender's incentive to misreport.
    • Register by December 13 if you want to join the dinner.

Past Workshop at Hitotsubashi