Research in Economics
During my early career, I developed theoretical models to analyze of contests and tournaments, often with a focus on risk-taking induced by contest schemes. Examples abound, including such bonuses for fund managers based on relative rank or mutual funds who aim to outperform competitors to attract costumers.
In recent years, I broadened my agenda both in terms of topics and methods, often involving some sort of boundedly rational decision making. For example, consider consumers who enter a supermarket and do not take all products into account when making their purchasing decision or chess players struggling to find optimal moves when playing from home.
Academic CV available upon request
Publications
Kuenn, S., Seel, C. and D. Zegners (2022), Cognitive Performance in Remote Work - Evidence from Professional Chess, Economic Journal, 132, 1218-1232, featured among others in FAZ, Forbes, IZA World of Labor, Telegraph, de Volkskrant , and Weekendavisen
Demuynck, T., Seel, C. and G. Tran (2022), An Index of Competitiveness and Cooperativeness for Normal-Form Games, American Economic Journal, Microeconomics, 14, 215-239
Herings, J.-J., Saulle, R. and C. Seel (2021), The Last will be First, and the First Last: Segregation in Societies with Relative Payoff Concerns, Economic Journal, 131, 2119–2143
Mendel, M., Pieroth, F. and C. Seel (2021) Your Failure is My Opportunity - Effects of Elimination in Contests, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 95, 102495
Demuynck, T., Herings, J.-J., Saulle, R. and C. Seel (2019), The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments, Econometrica, 87, 111-138
Demuynck, T., Herings, J.-J., Saulle, R. and C. Seel (2019), Bertrand with Asymmetric Costs: A Solution in Pure Strategies, Theory and Decision, 87, 147-154
Demuynck, T. and C. Seel (2018): Revealed Preference with Limited Consideration, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 10, 102-131
Seel, C (2018): Contests with Endogenous Deadlines, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 27, 119-133
Seel, C. and E. Tsakas (2017): Rationalizability and Nash Equilibria in Guessing Games, Games and Economic Behavior, 106, 75-88
Seel, C. and P. Strack (2016): Continuous Time Contests with Private Information, Mathematics of Operations Research, 41, 1093-1107
Seel, C. (2015): Gambling in Contests with Heterogeneous Loss Constraints, Economics Letters, 136, 154-157
Seel, C. and C. Wasser (2014): On Optimal Head Starts in All-Pay Auctions, Economics Letters, 124, 211-214
Seel, C. (2014): The Value of Information in Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions, Games and Economic Behavior, 86, 330-338
Lang, M., Seel, C., and P. Strack (2014): Deadlines in Stochastic Contests, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 52, 134-142
Seel, C. and P. Strack (2013): Gambling in Contests, Journal of Economic Theory, 148, 2033-2048
Seel, C. and P. Wichardt (2012): How Burning Money Requires a Lot of Rationality To Be Effective, Economics Letters, 115, 111-113
Working Paper
Hotelling Revisited - The Price-then-Location Model (joint with Markus Reisinger and Frauke Stehr)
Potentials in Social Environments (joint with Thomas Demuynck and Jean-Jacques Herings)
Gambling in Risk-Taking Contest: Experimental Evidence (joint with Matthew Embrey and Philipp Reiss), conditionally accepted in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization