Manuscript

Abstract 

We study the problem of a single vote buyer who wants to influence the vote of a committee. Prior to the vote, the vote buyer publicly announces a bribing scheme. When voting, committee members take into account the bribe as well as their impact on the outcome of the vote. We characterize the optimal bribing scheme of the vote buyer under different voting setups. We find that the vote buyer will generically seek the support of a supermajority; such a strategy allows the vote buyer to capture the committee at a smaller cost because committee members expect to be pivotal with a lower probability and accept smaller bribes.

Published version

Supplementary Online Appendix

Abstract 

We explore a theory of media capture where a principal can either influence journalistic investigation (internal capture) or let the media investigate and pay to suppress news stories at the publication stage (external capture). We predict that the likelihood of internal capture increases with perceived corruption but decreases in competition and protection of journalists. Exploiting new individual survey data from Reporters Without Borders, we use the revelation of the Panama Papers as a shock to perceived corruption. With a differences-in-differences identification strategy based on cross-country variation in exposure to the shock, we show that internal capture increases with perceived corruption.

Original unedited manuscript

Abstract 

Members of groups and organizations often have to decide on rules that regulate their contributions to common tasks. They typically differ in their propensity to contribute and often care about the image they project, in particular want to be perceived by other group members as being high contributors. In such environments we study the interaction between the way members vote on rules and their subsequent contribution decisions. We show that multiple norms can emerge. We characterize the socially optimal level of sanctions to be submitted to a vote by the social planner and discuss optimal voting rules. 

Original unedited manuscript

Abstract 

We investigate the impact of compulsory military service on turnout and political preferences. Exploiting the suspension of mandatory conscription for French men, we find a significant and positive impact of military service on turnout. This effect ranges from 3.6 percentage points for the first round of the presidential election of 2012 to 8.9 percentage points for the second round of the legislative elections. Using a survey conducted in 2017, we investigate the impact of conscription on political preferences. We find that former conscripts are significantly more nationalist and conservative. Especially, we show that they are more likely to support and vote for the Front National, which is the main far-right party in France. 

Published version

Abstract

In this research note, we investigate the recent increase in individualism amongst French elected legislators, which we define as the mobilization, by parliamentarians, of personal political capital and their embracing of dissident stances, even when this runs afoul of the party line. We examine the rise of parliamentary individuation through the use of voting records from the 14th French legislature with a view to assessing party discipline. Moreover, we investigate the ideological positions of legislators by looking at the tweets they published on Twitter during the 2017 political campaign. Contrary to what recent studies have argued, we find that the individuation of legislators remains minimal and that most forms of dissidence can be interpreted as the consequence of shifting party lines. We therefore conclude that despite shifting partisan allegiances, most French legislators continue to espouse the positions of their party.