With Tom Buchot and Elisa Mougin (ENS de Lyon)
Abstract
Performance indicators transform political press coverage, yet their effects on MPs' behavior remain unstudied. Using Nosdeputes.fr, the French website computing such indicators, we address this gap. We compile a comprehensive dataset of press articles, identifying all mentions of MPs' indicators, to disentangle the effects of the website from those of indicator coverage. Performances increase following the website's launch, further amplified by coverage. However, MPs explicitly mentioned do not show additional improvements. While transparency prompts some manipulation--e.g., increased copy-pasting--there is no evidence of strategic inflation in amendments or speeches. Thus, indicators enhance collective but not individual accountability, with limited adverse effects.
Abstract
I provide the first statistical study of political differences between fact-checkers. I collect a comprehensive dataset of articles published by the 6 main French fact-checkers until July 2021 and identify the political affiliation of entities fact-checked. I find that fact-checkers are both less likely to fact-check ideologically close entities and more likely to agree with them. Moreover, fact-checkers with connections with the State fact-check less the party in office. Finally, political differences increase before elections. I replicate the analysis for U.S. fact-checkers to test the external validity and find similar results.
with Giovanni Andreottola
Abstract
This paper develops a theory of political fact-checking aimed at understanding fact-checkers' motivations from their observed behavior. We first document two empirical stylized facts: fact-checkers scrutinize one side of the political spectrum more (Republicans) and uncover a higher share of false facts from that side. We then develop a model in which two politicians report facts — true or false — to persuade voters. The fact-checker selects one politician and reveals whether their fact is true. We examine several fact-checker motivations, characterizing the probabilities of each politician being fact-checked and the share of false facts detected. Our results show that the empirical facts are inconsistent with a neutral fact-checker focused on checking false facts. Instead, these patterns may be explained by a fact-checker with either a strong bias in favor of Democrats or a weak bias in favor of Republicans. We also characterize the fact-checking strategy maximizing voters' welfare and discuss the welfare implications of each motivation.
Abstract
Two principals with heterogenous budgets compete to buy the winner of a competition in which agents are engaged. Principals make offers to agents before and after the competition. In equilibrium, the high-budget principal solely relies on post-competition offers. The low-budget principal makes a pre-competition offer to one agent. For regulation, limiting pre-competition offers favors the high-budget principal, while the opposite is true for post-competition limits. Finally, the high-budget principal benefits from the timing of offers, and her probability of buying the winner increases with the number of agents.
Abstract
We study the problem of a single vote buyer who wants to influence the vote of a committee. Prior to the vote, the vote buyer publicly announces a bribing scheme. When voting, committee members take into account the bribe as well as their impact on the outcome of the vote. We characterize the optimal bribing scheme of the vote buyer under different voting setups. We find that the vote buyer will generically seek the support of a supermajority; such a strategy allows the vote buyer to capture the committee at a smaller cost because committee members expect to be pivotal with a lower probability and accept smaller bribes.
Abstract
We explore a theory of media capture where a principal can either influence journalistic investigation (internal capture) or let the media investigate and pay to suppress news stories at the publication stage (external capture). We predict that the likelihood of internal capture increases with perceived corruption but decreases in competition and protection of journalists. Exploiting new individual survey data from Reporters Without Borders, we use the revelation of the Panama Papers as a shock to perceived corruption. With a differences-in-differences identification strategy based on cross-country variation in exposure to the shock, we show that internal capture increases with perceived corruption.
With Emeric Henry (Sciences Po)
Abstract
Members of groups and organizations often have to decide on rules that regulate their contributions to common tasks. They typically differ in their propensity to contribute and often care about the image they project, in particular want to be perceived by other group members as being high contributors. In such environments we study the interaction between the way members vote on rules and their subsequent contribution decisions. We show that multiple norms can emerge. We characterize the socially optimal level of sanctions to be submitted to a vote by the social planner and discuss optimal voting rules.
Abstract
We investigate the impact of compulsory military service on turnout and political preferences. Exploiting the suspension of mandatory conscription for French men, we find a significant and positive impact of military service on turnout. This effect ranges from 3.6 percentage points for the first round of the presidential election of 2012 to 8.9 percentage points for the second round of the legislative elections. Using a survey conducted in 2017, we investigate the impact of conscription on political preferences. We find that former conscripts are significantly more nationalist and conservative. Especially, we show that they are more likely to support and vote for the Front National, which is the main far-right party in France.
With Florence Nocca (Sciences Po)
Abstract
In this research note, we investigate the recent increase in individualism amongst French elected legislators, which we define as the mobilization, by parliamentarians, of personal political capital and their embracing of dissident stances, even when this runs afoul of the party line. We examine the rise of parliamentary individuation through the use of voting records from the 14th French legislature with a view to assessing party discipline. Moreover, we investigate the ideological positions of legislators by looking at the tweets they published on Twitter during the 2017 political campaign. Contrary to what recent studies have argued, we find that the individuation of legislators remains minimal and that most forms of dissidence can be interpreted as the consequence of shifting party lines. We therefore conclude that despite shifting partisan allegiances, most French legislators continue to espouse the positions of their party.