"Guilty by Political Association: The Impact of Political Scandals on Connected Firms," with April Knill, Baixiao Liu, and John J. McConnell, Journal of Law and Economics, 67(4) (November 2024), pp. 841-877.

[Abstract]: Using scandals involving US congresspersons over the period of 1992-2018, we investigate the economic impact of scandal-tainted congresspersons on politically-connected firms. Following the first media report of a scandal, firms connected to the scandal-tainted congressperson experience a relative loss in market value. The loss manifests through both a reputational spillover and a reduced connection effectiveness mechanism. Our findings indicate an undocumented cost of corporate political connections - the loss that occurs when a connected politician is caught up in a scandal.

"Institutional Segmentation and Dynamic REIT Demand," with Frank Gyamfi-Yeboah and Philip Seagraves, Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management, 28(1) (July 2022), pp. 13-32.

[Abstract]: Since the REIT form of real estate securitization began, the variety of property types available for investment has grown while institutions have increasingly played a more prominent role in the REIT market. If different types of institutions have no property sector preferences, their investments would be the same across REIT property types and unchanging over time. Understanding investor clientele and investment behavior of institutions is of broad interest to REIT managers and the investment community. In this paper, we explore the institutional investment behavior among the REIT property sectors. We examine the relationship between institutional ownership and REIT property types from 1990 to 2019 using a rolling Tobit regression model with control variables for market risk, liquidity, and prudence factors. The results show that while institutions have consistently favored liquidity and low transaction cost, REIT property sector preferences exist and have been dynamic over time. The factors behind specific institutional sector preferences appear to be driven by a desire to exploit informational advantages.

"Academic Tenure, Income Uncertainty, and Real Estate Risk-taking," with Stuart Fowler, Sean Salter, and Philip Seagraves, Journal of Housing Research, 31(2) (September 2021), pp. 113-134.

[Abstract]: While real estate investment via home ownership is inherently risky for all owners, individual households face varying degrees of risk that may affect the decision to rent versus own. The uncertainty of future cash flows to an enterprise or household is likely to influence investment behavior in large, long-lived capital such as real estate. This study uses a unique data set of university professors to estimate risk preference sensitivity to changes in the degree of uncertainty of labor income. A structural modeling econometric approach indicates that nontenured professors, who have the least secure incomes, are 33% less likely to own a home than their tenured colleagues, despite having similar average incomes. For those with tenure, 38% of their home ownership can be explained by academic tenure. Our calculations indicate that 124,729 tenured professors decided to purchase a home solely because of the job security tenure entails: roughly .2% of the total U.S. national housing stock.