Starting with Henri Bergson in the twentieth century, philosophers recently have begun to take up humor as a primary subject of genuine investigation and argument. Presently, most philosophy of humor literature concerns either the nature of humor or the ethics of humor. Most of the ethics of humor literature examines the ethics of joke-telling. My research, however, explores the ethics of finding something funny—the ethics of amusement. It is interesting that we tend to think and feel that we cannot help finding something funny. Nor can we force ourselves to be amused at will. Yet, at the same time, we commonly hold one another morally responsible for what we find funny and fail to find funny. In my dissertation, I show why and under what circumstances these practices are justified.

I begin by arguing that amusement is an emotion. This argument is strongly supported by work from philosopher of humor John Morreall and psychologists Florian Cova, Julien Deonna, and Klaus Scherer. From there, with support from Aristotle, Nancy Sherman, and Julia Annas, I articulate a view of moral responsibility for emotions that emphasizes the forms of control we have over and the complex relationship between immediate emotions and long-term emotional dispositions. This view gives rise to three criteria an individual must meet in order for their immediate emotion or emotional disposition to be fitting. I develop and apply these to amusement specifically and show under what circumstances a person can be praised or blamed for fitting or unfitting amusement respectively. Lastly, I distinguish taking offense from being amused and show why taking offense when we should is praiseworthy and taking offense when we should not is blameworthy. These conclusions may seem surprising, but given our intuitions about humor, they ought not be. 

My contribution to the ethics of humor literature, therefore, is twofold. I demonstrate that it is possible to be praised and blamed for amusement and failure to be amused; and, I clarify the circumstances under which we ought to praise and blame for our amusement and failure to be amused.