Crampe mentale, flexion et réflexion. Commentaire d'un texte tiré du Cahier bleu de Wittgenstein, Les Etudes philosophiques, à paraître.
La logique, science recherchée, Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 2020/2, N°106, p. 145-164.
Accointance par procuration, Les Etudes philosophiques 2019/3, N° 193, p. 369-384.
Logical Contextuality in Frege, The Review of Symbolic Logic, 11(1), 2018, p. 1-20.
Discussing Frege's "logical universalism," I claim that the universality of logic (the fact that logical truths purport to be about everything) and the radicality of logic (the fact that logic precedes any other theory) ought to be distinguished. Drawing on a suggestion in Frege's "Foundations of geometry," I then argue, contra Wilfrid Hodges and William Demopoulos, that Frege can make sense of the notion of non-logical constant. The general point is that Tarski's semantics is but one implementation of Hilbert's concept of reinterpretation of a formal theory.
The Concept of "Essential" General Validity in Wittgenstein's Tractatus, in Sorin Costreie (ed), Early Analytic Philosophy. New Perspectives on the Tradition, Springer, The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science 80, 2016, p. 283-300.
In the Tractatus (6.1231-6.1232), Wittgenstein describes the general validity of logical truths as being "essential," as opposed to merely "accidental" general truths. He does not say much more, and little have been said about it by commentators. How to make sense of the essential general validity by which Wittgenstein characterizes logic? This paper aims to elucidate this crucial concept.
The Versatility of Universality in Principia Mathematica, History and Philosophy of Logic, Vol. 32, n°3, 2011, p. 241-264.
In the Introduction of the first edition of Principia Mathematica, Russell says that one can account for all propositional functions using predicative variables only, that is, dismissing non-predicative variables. That claim is not self-evident at all, hence a « no loss of generality » problem, that this paper is devoted to solve. Two main points are put forward: Firstly, ramified types should be conceived of as highly fine-grained propositional forms; Secondly, the formal hierarchy of types lends itself to realizations in different epistemic universes.
Generality of Logical Types, Russell : the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, n.s. 31, 2011, p. 85-107.
Two kinds of generality can be attributed to logical types in Principia Mathematica, and ought to be clearly distinguished. The first one, external generality, pertains to the formality of types as introduced in the Introduction to the first edition. The variety of possible epistemic counterparts of each type is what substantiates and explains its formality. The second kind of generality, internal generality, bears on typical ambiguity and is shown to be formalizable within specific systems of modern typed lambda calculus.
Boa constructeur, Critique, n° 666, 2002, p. 896-912.
This is an assessment of Carnap's notion of construction in the Aufbau, on the occasion of the review of S. Laugier (ed), Carnap et la construction logique du monde, Paris, Vrin, 2001.