Caleb A. Gerber
11/16/2026
tags: history, jurisprudence, philosophy
The “heritage right” desires us to believe that America, as a nation, is founded on—well, not on the principles of the Declaration of Independence, or, for that matter, on any other principles. What we are based on is much less self-evident in their minds, and rather beside the point. But with two hundred and fifty years of shared history behind us as a nation, historians David Bobb and Tony Williams have written a commemorative volume on the influence that these principles have had, and continue to have, in our debates on the future of this ship of state.
In Divided Over the Declaration, as the title would suggest, the main “points” of the narrative are those times when America has faced disagreement over the meaning and the legacy of our principles, embodied in the declarative document which began it all. From the Revolution itself, to the conception of America as a body of states under the Constitution, to the decades-long struggle over slavery, onto the age of Progressivism and the civil rights movement, the paradigm of America’s history is a conflict with this document as its foundation. In showing how the conflicts have split America in the past, Williams and Bobb are trying, it seems, to bring us together in the present, with a renewed focus and respect for the “creedal” nature of our Republic.
The narrative begins with a lengthy but well-argued explanation of the principles themselves. What were they? Where did they come from? How is it that they were in the ascendancy during the 1760s and 1770s? One particularly noteworthy thing is that the authors make no attempt to please their audience with either an entirely secular or a completely religious understanding of the founders. The ideas themselves—self-government, consent of the governed, all men are created equal—have their origins in various places, most notably in John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, but also in the distinctly Judeo-Christian vision, and more particularly, the Protestant understanding of anthropos, which would lead Madison to declare in Federalist No. 51 that “if men were angels, no government would be necessary.”[1] The authors do not seem to believe that there was any inherent conflict or clash of visions between Enlightenment rationalism—of the English variety—and Christian missiology, which significantly relieves the pressure of the argument on whether America was conceived of as an Enlightenment idea or a Christian conception. The answer, per the authors, seems to be: both.
The chronological structure of the narrative is at times confusing. One chapter begins with a letter from Alexander Stephens of Georgia—the future Vice-President of the Confederacy—to President-elect Abraham Lincoln, but then returns to the Constitutional Convention and the New Jersey and Virginia proposals on representation, only to return to Lincoln two chapters later with the Gettysburg Address. It also isn’t entirely clear, beyond the fact that all of the moments of American history discussed herein are arguments over the Declaration, how these moments were chosen, whether arbitrarily or through some deeper meaning. Why the struggle over female suffrage of the 1840s and not the same conflict in the 1920s? Why the Progressive Era but not World War II? Further, it isn’t always clear how a quote or a subplot helps in the development of the greater thesis.
A considerable portion of this book is spent on the pro-slavery versus abolition movements of the first half of the nineteenth century. The authors take a deep dive into the philosophy of William Lloyd Garrison, making the argument, through a point-by-point examination of Garrison’s isms, that his worldview was in opposition to the foundational truths of the Declaration, while simultaneously treating Garrison with great respect for the work which he did in the effort to defeat slavery. The contradictory postulates, which violated not only traditional political consensus but also religious dogma, with Garrison’s belief in the perfectibility of man, complete pacifism, and Gnostic rejection of all things political, are best brought to light when seen through the life of Frederick Douglass, an ally of Garrison who, when he began to question Garrison’s presuppositions, was banished from his movement. Although they do not say so in as many words, it is easy to infer that the authors see Douglass, and not Garrison, as carrying on the true legacy of ’76. The principles of the founding, based as they were on human equality, were to come under fire with far more consistency from pro-slavery forces than from those favoring abolition, with Senator John C. Calhoun denouncing them as obvious untruths [2], a notable pun considering Jefferson declared them to be “Self-evident,” or, in their original form, “sacred & undeniable.”[3] The question here arises whether the book’s central thesis can be maintained, for in these chapters, the debate is not on the Declaration’s meaning, but on its very validity; not on how it applies, but on whether it applies at all.
Similar to this is the chapter which focuses on an issue whose repercussions, far more than slavery, affect us to this very day: the conflict between progressives and conservatives, or those who advocate for an originalist understanding of the Constitution and Declaration, and those who see it as a “living document.” While they are conspicuously apolitical in this chapter, and treat both sides with equal respect and consideration, something which is rare and praiseworthy in modern authors on topics as heavily discussed as these, each reader will be forced to end his reading with a certain verdict. If we are to understand as self-evident some truths, which were equally intelligible to the founders as to us, truths, in other words, which reach across time and space, is it not a reasonable conclusion to draw that truths, and Truth, are constant and unchanging? In this case, it is hard to see how the case could be made for a “living”—that is, a changing—Constitution, much less the Declaration. Either the truths are true, or they aren’t, and if they aren’t, then we would be better off starting from scratch.
The vision of the founders, the authors seem to argue, is most perfectly encapsulated in the political philosophy of Abraham Lincoln, to whom, as referenced above, they return almost constantly. Far from this being a weakness, a reference to Lincoln is just as valid as a reference to Jefferson himself, for the authors show how much the two overlap. Neither Jefferson nor Lincoln was an abolitionist. From facts alone, ignoring all subsequent events, it would seem that Jefferson was more open-minded about this question than Lincoln himself, but eventually prioritized the conservation of the Union over the conflict which would almost necessitate hostilities and could very well destroy the “last best chance.” Both of these men saw as their chief duty the preservation of the Union, believing that the fate of the United States would, to use Hamilton’s words, determine “Whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.”[4] In a paradoxical way, Jefferson saw raising the issue of freedom for the slave as destructive of freedom itself. Lincoln would finally take this paradox head-on, defending both the Union and the rights of the slave. Why? Because of the principles of liberty which had been conceived “four-score and seven years ago.”[5]
Culminating the work is a chapter on the Civil Rights movement. Perhaps the weakest part of the book, the authors trace the lives of Martin Luther King and John Lewis. The first needs no justification as to why he was included; the second does, but it is not included. The significance of the Civil Rights movement can be seen simply from a cursory reading of an elementary textbook, or from a reading of King’s Letter from Birmingham Jail. If the desire with the inclusion of Lewis is to show the division over the Declaration, the authors do manage to prove the division, but it is harder to see the case for why this was over the principles themselves rather than a simple question of strategy. The endless detail on King and Lewis, especially the latter, drags out a chapter which could have been made more concise. The value of it, however, remains, for in exploring King’s allusions to Aquinas, the founders, Lincoln, and other great thinkers of the age, Bobb and Williams once more establish the depth of the riches found in our creedal nature.
In the concluding pages of the work, published just before our 250th anniversary, the authors urge a return to the guiding principles which both bind us together and tear us apart. Through grappling with them, and with each other, through reasoned argument and conversation, with the founders’ intent always in sight, bringing it to bear on our national problems and cultural conversations, we too can be part of this great conversation of the ages. We may be divided, but we are divided, they seem to say, over the right thing, and, as long as we keep it in sight, as long as we are chained to it and do not let it go, our future remains secure. In a way few other books do, this one succeeds not in giving answers to the questions of our nation, but in asserting that the question is the answer, and that the more questions we ask, the closer to the truth we get. A solid achievement, an enjoyable read, a heartfelt discussion, this book should, and likely will be, part of our conversation for quite some time.
Review Written by Caleb A. Gerber
November 17th, 2026
Notes
James Madison, The Federalist No. 51, February 6, 1788.
John C. Calhoun, speech on the Oregon Bill, U.S. Senate, June 27, 1848.
Thomas Jefferson, original draft of the Declaration of Independence, June 1776
Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 1, October 27, 1787.
Abraham Lincoln, “Gettysburg Address,” November 19, 1863.
Caleb A. Gerber
11/16/2026
tags: history, jurisprudence, biography
Historian Walter Stahr has previously devoted his considerable talent to writing about prominent Americans such as Chief Justice John Jay, or to individual narratives on the “Team of Rivals” who proved so instrumental to the presidency of the revered Lincoln. Now, with painstaking detail, he turns his attention to a lesser-known but equally consequential figure: President and Chief Justice William Howard Taft. The author begins the biography of the 27th President, the first single-volume biography in decades, by denying that his subject was a “great” President by any stretch of the imagination. Strictly un-hagiographical, Stahr’s focus is not on what made Taft great, but what made him good.
Doris Kearns Goodwin, in her treatment of Taft and Theodore Roosevelt, asserts that Taft was less president-like than Roosevelt, failing to live up to the image of the President that we have today, and that he was better fitted for the office of Chief Justice, which he would later hold. Stahr, who quotes Goodwin on certain issues, seems to agree in theory. And though his treatment of Roosevelt is far more abbreviated and seen almost entirely through the eyes of Taft, this is perhaps appropriate given the subject of the biography.
The education of Taft was, in the strictest sense, legal. Taft’s father, Alphonso Taft, had a long and successful stint as a judge, serving in the administration of President Ulysses S. Grant as both Attorney General and Secretary of War. His son, bookish and overweight, was not the typical personality associated with a political future. Like his father, the young Taft was fair, took time—sometimes time which he did not have—in order to carefully weigh each issue, and was surprisingly bipartisan despite his lifelong membership in the Republican Party. Stahr succeeds, from the very beginning, at bringing out in Taft the double-edged swords which would both plague him and bless him for the rest of his career of public service. He does this not so much by asserting facts about Taft’s behavior as by providing an extensive treatment of letters from the future President, his college achievements, and the beginnings of his stint as a judge.
Though far more reserved than Goodwin in asserting a connection between Taft’s political turn and the personality of his wife, Stahr does show how the steadying anchor—or, rather, the one who would then and again rock the ship—was Nellie Herron Taft. Convinced that her husband would one day be President, her role is not so much prescriptive as descriptive in this narrative, seen more as a foil to Taft himself than as the “Big Bang” of his political evolution.
Moving on through the critical period as Solicitor General of the United States, through the Spanish-American War, and then into the period of Taft as Governor-General of the Philippines, Stahr begins to demonstrate the considerable administrative and magnetic personality of this bulk of a man. Through his fair and consistent arbitration of disputes, his legal genius in crafting judicial arguments, and his refusal to be swayed, as Roosevelt would be, by flights of passion, Taft nevertheless earned the love and admiration of everyone he came into contact with.
An interesting contrast here arises between Roosevelt and Taft, both of whom managed to attract a group of admirers and both of whom maintained a constant popularity among the populace, even throughout most of their turbulent presidencies. Yet Roosevelt is justly remembered as the man who could fire up the crowds, whose admirers were as fanatical as they were widespread, and whose ethos pervaded every aspect of his administration following the assassination of President William McKinley in 1901. It would be a mistake to assume that Roosevelt was simply more likable, or to assume that Taft had more enemies. In both cases, the contrary is actually true. How, then, can the duality of this phenomenon be explained? A potential explanation, one which Stahr doesn’t address but which he seems to point to, is that, while earning respect in all quarters and love in some, Taft earned devotion in none. Thus, his friends were more likely to be personally close but his allies politically distant. Whereas Taft’s careful handling of the issues gave him significant influence and standing in both chambers of Congress, Roosevelt’s appeal was undoubtedly more democratic and more demagogic. Taft, for all his charm, lacked the unique ability of Roosevelt to convert personal popularity into political capital.
Stahr’s treatment of Taft shows us a reformer, but not a reformist, a conservative by instinct yet a progressive in principle, and these two come awkwardly together in Taft’s leadership during both administrations. As Secretary of War, but, as Stahr notes, de facto vice-president in the truest sense of the word, Taft’s job was to espouse Rooseveltian and, because of this, progressive policies at home and abroad. Though opposed to independence for the Philippines because he did not think them yet capable of self-government, he was equally opposed to the colonialist impulses of the more conservative McKinley-era Republicans, whose desire was simply to keep the Philippines in a perpetual state of political subjugation. Several times, as with Roosevelt’s order to discharge without honor the Black soldiers of the 25th Infantry Regiment in the now-infamous Brownsville Affair, Taft’s convictions would come into conflict with Rooseveltian decisiveness, even if such decisions were poorly based in reality.
The next myth which Stahr seeks to destroy, one to which even a historian such as Doris Kearns Goodwin has fallen prey, is that Taft never sought the Presidency. With direct letters from Taft’s siblings urging him to run, campaign speeches, and simply the fact that Taft broke custom and actively campaigned for the nomination in 1908, fending off challenges from the popular New York Governor Charles Evans Hughes, Stahr demonstrates that, even though he may have been hesitant at first and certainly preferred a Supreme Court appointment, Taft did seek the Presidency, and he achieved it largely through his own personal gravitas as the public front of many Rooseveltian policies. His victory in 1908, though far from assured, was still decisive, and with a mandate to continue the policies of his predecessor, as well as his predecessor’s full confidence and support, Taft set to work.
So, what exactly went wrong?
In a recent book, though in a different context, historian Arthur Herman has identified and contrasted two types of leaders: the founder and the manager. Through this duality, Herman has pointed out, the duties of the founder are, because of their originality, generally more successful. Further, with the inevitable effects of entropy, the manager is, if not fated, then projected to fail, and his success is rare. Taft had a similar task, and it could be argued that fortune was set against his administration from the start. With Roosevelt changing so much, and Taft agreeing in principle with most of those changes, it was Taft’s job not to start something new, but to preserve something older. The principles and policies of his administration, though Progressive in relation to the country at large, were, by definition, conservative in that they tried to maintain a preexisting structure rather than start from zero. Taft, standing on the shoulders of a giant, was perhaps within reach of great success, but a giant such as Roosevelt was not content to remain still for long, and Taft’s safe perch atop the President’s shoulder became less safe as the political environment became more heated.
Stahr’s treatment of Roosevelt in the post-1908 section of the work is one-sided and almost entirely negative. The Roosevelt of 1912, with his apocalyptic energy and declaration of impending Armageddon, receives little serious treatment, and his policies, radical and perhaps even socialistic, are dismissed out of hand. Stahr, who seemingly shares my own and Taft’s conservative outlook, is perhaps too quick to dismiss Roosevelt’s statements of 1912 as his true political dogma, rather than as an attempt to distinguish himself from his successor’s policies. It is a small inconsistency, but one worth noting: he treats Taft’s political change at length, but seems to project negativity in retrospect, calling into question the policies which Taft supported during the first two Roosevelt terms, and fails to point out that Roosevelt would largely return to his Republican convictions during the tenure of Woodrow Wilson and would, through his alliance with Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, cement the Republican legacy for decades to come.
At the heart of the conflict, even leaving aside any reading of it as an inevitability because of the founder/manager distinction, was a fundamentally different view of what the Chief Executive’s role ought to be. Both men could claim some precedence. Roosevelt could point to Lincoln, with his suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, or even more so to Washington and the Federalists, whose crafting of the job of President largely around the personality of Washington himself contributed to a vision of a robust, powerful, and centralized executive. Taft, more in line with Washington’s later tendencies and the conservative precedents he would set, but also comparable to Calvin Coolidge in the 1920s, saw the Chief Executive primarily as a caretaking position. Roosevelt saw everything as allowable for the President unless forbidden by the Constitution; Taft saw everything as forbidden unless allowed. We should not make the mistake of seeing Roosevelt as parallel to, say, Woodrow Wilson on this. Roosevelt was not advocating for a “living Constitution,” and his respect for the document and for its history is evident. Rather, both Republicans, in trying to remain faithful to the mandate of preserving, protecting, and defending it, drew different conclusions about what was and was not allowed in doing so.
Although focusing briefly on the decade of the First World War, with Taft’s life in retirement, his lobbying for the League of Nations, and his desire to work with both President Wilson and the still largely Rooseveltian Republican leadership, while freely criticizing both, Stahr goes into lesser detail here than elsewhere. Indeed, the reader may wish for a broader treatment of this period of the man’s life, as the extraordinary naivete of President Wilson in advocating for the League must be equally Taft’s to bear and would seem contrary to his more conservative principles.
Stahr’s theme throughout the entire narrative is that, in the modern age, Roosevelt’s vision of the executive role has thrived, while Taft’s has not, thus making Taft’s seem more reasonable and better. This is perhaps true, and would fit the mold of the traditional conservative consensus, but whether or not the executive should be strong or dispersed cannot be separated from the focus of the last decade of Taft’s life: the judiciary, specifically, the Supreme Court.
Undoubtedly, the most enduring legacy of the Taft Court is the 1925 Judges Bill, which would allow the Supreme Court the liberty to choose which cases it would and would not take up. Stahr notes this at the outset of the book, naming it not only as the greatest of Taft’s accomplishments during his years on the Supreme Court, but as perhaps the most enduring legacy of all, whether in the judiciary or the executive. Not only this, but Taft also helped start the construction of a new building for the Supreme Court.
Yet one cannot help but infer that even these two great accomplishments, which would leave a long-lasting influence, pale in comparison to the judicial philosophy and uniting force that Taft had in his decade at the head. Able to construct alliances with each justice at one moment, coming to be respected by judicial geniuses as far removed as Oliver Wendell Holmes and George Sutherland, Taft was still bound by none. His fairness meant that the Court’s reputation increased greatly, especially with the solid accumulation of talent on the Court through the numerous appointments of Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge. Indeed, a solution other than simply inferring that Taft was right about the executive and Roosevelt wrong was that Roosevelt’s vision was better generically, and Taft’s better suited for the Court, an argument which Goodwin seems to make in her treatment of the two. This is not to dismiss Stahr’s point about a limited executive looking better in the age of executive power, but simply to suggest that the executive’s role is to—well, execute, and the judge’s role is to judge.
Stahr’s biography is, from start to finish, a masterful achievement. Like few other historians, he makes his subject come alive in a way that he has even failed to replicate in the past with his solid portrayals of Edwin Stanton and William H. Seward. Managing to contain the wealth of sources on Taft’s illustrious career in a single, 700-page volume without skimping and without overburdening the reader with useless detail is perhaps even more impressive than the sustained and consistent argument which the author makes about the lessons of Taft’s life. If you desire to gain another hero for your personal hall of fame, this book will likely disappoint you, but if, on the contrary, you simply wish to learn about a great American life and its legacy, this book will not disappoint.
Review Written by Caleb A. Gerber
November 16th, 2026
Caleb A. Gerber
10/27/2026
It is common in the modern age to read stories, watch movies, or hear of countless examples of men and women who have risked all to help their nation, their people, or their cause by spying on a foreign nation, an enemy, or a threat. Their success stories are perhaps no more inspiring than the stories of their failures, for we can see that, either by winning or losing, they were serving a good cause. And while they may have failed in their mission, their inclusion in the annals of history signifies that they did not fail at the mission. But how does our moral narrative fare when, instead of examples of greatness, we hear stories of debauchery? What happens when, instead of spies protecting their nation, we hear of spies selling information to another nation at the expense of their own?
This is exactly what Antonia Senior’s new, penetrating look at the Cambridge Five does. In Stalin’s Apostles, Senior shows how these five men, young and idealistic in the beginning, were brought into the folds of Soviet intelligence and then proceeded, over the next two decades, to funnel information to their Russian bosses through a World War and the beginning of the decades-long Cold War.
Senior does not give us a typical biography. Although it broadly follows the lives and fortunes of Anthony Blunt, John Cairncross, Donald Maclean, Kim Philby, and Guy Burgess, this is a biography not of a man, or of men, but of a faith. This faith was a faith in communism—in the ability of man, through his own efforts, to bring heaven down to man—and it was this religious zealotry that drove these five to do the unthinkable.
1930s England was a time when two competing perceptions of the world had collided. One of them was in its death spiral; the other was skyrocketing in popularity. It was ironic, but the idealism of war that had led so many young men to their deaths in the First World War—the idealism, as it were, of the real—was giving way to the realism of the ideal. This realism of the ideal, which saw the problems created by nationalism, war, and the economic effects of the Industrial Revolution, was nonetheless no less idealistic than the patriotism of the pre-war era. The only difference was that this new and renewed confidence was not in the nation-state but in the nationless state—utopia.
Gone with the confidence, patriotism, and relative stability of the Victorian age were also the religious convictions and ethical mores of the same. While any age has moral problems with which it must deal—child slavery in the nineteenth century, the deviancy of the aristocracy in the early nineteenth century—a rejection of the foundations of these mores led to a wholesale rejection of the mores themselves, and Senior chronicles, with devastating simplicity, the effects of this abandonment. Two of the Cambridge Five were the sons of devoutly religious fathers—and religious in twentieth-century England meant Christian. Yet none of the five would maintain even a semblance of this faith, instead swallowing the alluring hook of utopian Marxism—hook, line, and sinker. Further, the mores holding society in place were also thrown out with Christian belief: four of the five spies were deviant homosexuals who, besides spying on their governments, engaged in some of the most promiscuous behavior imaginable, from marital abuse to affairs with countless men and women, and with each other, to the sponsoring of male brothels.
Yet we would be in error to suppose that this rejection of traditional faith was a rejection of faith. While it is all too common today to think of people in terms of the “religious” and “secular” labels, and to think of Stalin’s regime, Mao’s China, or Fidel’s Cuba as secular states, this is both an egregious misunderstanding and a dangerously naive view. For the Cambridge Five, their rejection of faith was not a rejection of the Christian eschatology, but a stripping of its theology in its entirety; it was an attempt to preserve, in atheistic form, many of the moral goods that Christianity had once and again asserted.
Senior, as a secular journalist, only just hints at these realities. It would perhaps have been a stronger argument had she made these things explicit, linking the lack of Christian theology with its replacement, but this lack of acknowledgement is understandable. Further, while it is perhaps not the goal of this book to explain the causes of their actions as much as their consequences, it would have been helpful had the author spent considerably longer explaining the ideological appeal of communism, to which she alludes but which she never fully encapsulates.
And yet, unlike true Christianity, this new zealotry of the communist idealists was entirely unquestioning: a blind leap of faith instead of a reasoned acceptance of reality itself. Far more than the miracle of the Virgin Birth or any similar element of Christian theology, communism demanded of its adherents a genuinely irrational faith—one that required them to violate all their commitments in pursuit of its goal. In the late 1930s, the Cambridge Five’s faith was shaken by the show trials in Stalin’s USSR. The heroes they had quoted, modeled their lives after, and looked up to were now the enemies of the State they served. Bukharin, Zinoviev—even the five handlers themselves—were evidence of the fact that revolutions eat their own. And yet the Five helped eat them, or at least stood by passively while they were eaten, their commitment to Stalin’s regime neither marred nor affected. Telling themselves that it was for the defeat of fascism that Stalin had to do this, their loyalty still remained firm even when Stalin himself became Hitler’s principal ally, their arch-nemesis, through the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. The worldview of these men was so zealous, so unthinking, so committed in spite of all else, that by the end of the 1940s, they themselves were actively involved in the betrayal of their own agents into the hands of the NKVD. Rebels in Eastern Europe, from Ukraine to Poland to Albania and Lithuania, working with British intelligence to undermine the Soviet system, were betrayed by the very people they were helping, their fates sealed by the demonic attributes of the oppressive communist dictatorship.
The slippery slope of Stalinism becomes evident through these pages. Like Lenin, who was, for all intents and purposes, deified after his death, Stalin was the god-man during his life. His word was infallible. To question him was to question the Soviet experiment; to question the Soviet experiment was to question the revolution; to question the revolution was to question and deny the principles that motivated it, which made one an enemy not only of the state but of mankind generally. Thus, Dostoevsky’s statement rings true: “Without God, all things are permitted”—if the new God, the state, allows it.
Senior’s key strength is not simply in showing the ideological motivators behind the Cambridge Five, though this goes far further than other historians, some of them Soviet apologists, have done. Instead, her brilliance is captured in the fact that she puts a face on the consequences of their actions. Telling the story of the people inside the Iron Curtain, who had survived Hitler’s Nazi tyranny only to fall into the hands of their would-be liberators, makes the reader sympathize with the plight of European resistance. Not only the reader, but also the leaders of the Western nations, who, perhaps for reasons of realpolitik, or perhaps out of actual concern—we do not know—understood the importance of these movements, are forced to come to terms with how best to help them. The strategy of containment was only part of it; the provision of resources, infiltration by agents, and intelligence support were all means by which these patriotic, pro-Western men and women risked everything and subsequently lost it. Why? Because of the Cambridge Five.
Of particular interest to modern readers should be the setting at the beginning of the story. Our own conception of spies works something like this: a rival nation sends its intelligence agents to infiltrate a rival intelligence agency of a different nation. Perhaps, with promises of money, a better future, or some other reward, they succeed in turning an agent or two and thus obtain information critical to their own government. We may be forgiven for thinking that this was the case with the Cambridge Five, but it wasn’t. The communist method for gaining power and influence is far deeper and far more insidious, as we have seen in decades prior. All five men were recruited while still in college. None of them was in an influential position, and there was no reason to believe that they ever would be. Later on, after distancing themselves from communism for the purpose of casting off suspicion, the Five would dismiss their college-days socialism as youthful idealism—but if it was youthful idealism, then they were always young, for they never lost it. Indeed, Senior points out that agents who are in it for the money can be turned simply with the offer of more money. Agents who are in it for the excitement or novelty will soon find it boring, old, or simply too dangerous. But by choosing fanatically committed ideologues, the Soviets ensured that, barring a change in convictions, the communists would remain communist.
Using original and previously unearthed archival materials, Senior presents clear and undeniable proof—yes, proof—that the actions of the Five directly led not only to the betrayal of rebel groups but also to the rapid nuclearization of the Soviet Union. She convincingly points out that, were it not for Donald Maclean’s reading of communications between the President of the United States and Prime Minister Churchill, Russia would likely have been delayed by months, perhaps years, in the successful testing of its own nuclear weapon. This success, which gave the Cold War a new and more devastating potentiality, would not have been possible, or at least would not have occurred within its historical timeframe, without their aid.
As all stories do, this story has its end—and it is not a particularly glorious one for any of the Five. All of them passed through death into eternal death, from suffering into unending misery; broken and sick, having experienced the pleasures of the world for a season, their lives evoke the biblical lesson: “Be sure your sin will find you out.” Stunningly, all five managed to evade the justice system; none would face political or legal repercussions for their involvement. But while they were never convicted in a court of law, they stand convicted in the court of public opinion and, more reliably, in the court of the eternal, immutable law.
Perhaps the most celebrated of the Five, Kim Philby, whose statue stands in Prokhorovka, near the site of the Battle of Kursk, where his spying helped the Soviets defeat the Germans, provides the most striking example of this. His flight to Moscow, unexpected and unwanted, helped him escape the hangman’s noose or a judge’s verdict, but it hardly brought him the revered status for which he longed. A drunkard, forgotten by most and condemned by all, he had spent most of his adult life serving Soviet intelligence, yet his last years were not spent in his ideal utopia but in a living hell. Guy Burgess, noted for his witty and outrageous personality, was abandoned in Russia: no longer sought, an exile from the world in which he flourished.
Review Written by Caleb A. Gerber
October 27th, 2026
Caleb A. Gerber
10/4/2026
tags: philosophy, politics
Perhaps no other issue is so discussed inside conservative circles as the role of the Judeo in the Judeo-Christian foundation of our civilization. Israel can be both a uniting force and a dividing one; one that politicians use when appealing to our foundations, and one which radicals use when trying to tear these foundations down.
One of the loudest and most prominent voices in the defense of Israel is Josh Hammer, and in Israel and Civilization, Hammer, a practicing Jew, makes his case for why Judaism should remain at the center of what Western civilization stands for.
At the outset, Hammer makes clear that he is writing a book as a practicing Jew. It cannot be held against him that he brings this distinct view into play in making the case for his argument. The problem, I believe, is that Hammer does not immediately make it clear that he is writing for a Jewish audience, which could and should have been made clear early on in the book, at least not explicitly.
The argument Hammer makes follows this rough thesis: Western culture is in decline; it’s being attacked on three fronts by three different enemies: the Islamists, the wokeists, and the globalist neoliberals. Hammer doesn’t bother giving a definition for any of the three, though the first two are fairly self-evident. In each of these three areas, Judaism is being attacked first, and it, Hammer asserts, is the main bulwark, the main defense, and the main weapon vital to defeating all three.
At times autobiographical, at other times historical, and sometimes simply political, this book is a melee of ideas, assertions, historical narrations, and personal anecdotes, all of which serve, in different ways, to defend the thesis Hammer wishes to make.
Raised in a secular household, Hammer makes clear that his family was what might be called “spiritual but not religious,” a concept he will loudly and vociferously criticize later on in the book. Unlike those who discover their faith and then order their traditions, practices, and beliefs around those, Hammer says that he moved the other way around, from a secular but still traditional Jewish family into a religious and practicing individual. The fact that he has to state this plainly lends some credence to his proposition that this is the way to go, the way to rescue the assimilation of Jews into the cultural mainstream. This is the solution to the problem, he believes, applied to the individual.
Hammer next moves to explain in great detail the consequences of not acting. He does this by reflecting on his visit to a German concentration camp, and then to one of the kibbutzim which was attacked by the hordes of Muslim jihadists on October 7th, 2023. This point must be well-taken; Hammer does not simply give an emotional appeal, does not simply recount the horrors of these two places, though he does that, but he clearly shows how exactly the thought processes, the ideology behind radical anti-Semitism, led to these frightening and horrific places.
Hammer then moves on to explain the ideological background, not only of anti-Semitism, but also, he affirms, of the global neoliberalism which he sees as rotting the Judeo-Christian foundations. Moving from the Enlightenment down to the present day, Hammer uses the arguments of Yoram Hazony and the rhetoric of Patrick Deneen to deliver a stinging critique of the classical liberal order which he sees as going in lockstep with the liberalization of religion, especially with the rise in Judaism of the Reform movement. Hammer is much more knowledgeable than I am about the liberalization of his faith, and whether the timeline matches with the rise of classical liberalism in the political realm, but, at least in Christianity, such a timeline by no means lines up, and the fact that the political liberalism of Locke and the religious liberalism or radical autonomism of the French philosophes, or of Jewish rabbis, were addressing fundamentally different spheres of human life, and also in active opposition to each other, is one which is either overlooked or consciously left out of the narrative. Hammer’s political criticism, based heavily on Hazony’s The Virtue of Nationalism, dismisses Locke, and thereby Jefferson, as anthropologically dishonest. By including as liberal everything from Reform Judaism, to the political formulas of Locke and Strauss, to the epistemological rationalism of the Enlightenment, to the Hegelian idealism of Woodrow Wilson, Hammer, and with him Deneen and Hazony, include almost everything but explain nothing.
Hammer attacks the emphasis on “Reason” of the Enlightenment as dishonest and neglecting what he sees as one of the most necessary of human virtues, what he calls “epistemological humility,” but since when has this been seen as a virtue? Not being sure of reality is certainly the antithesis to Cartesian rationalism, as Hammer believes it to be, but far from being an antidote to the former, it instead falls into the trap of Kantian uncertainty, and gets from somewhere, however mistaken that somewhere may be, to nowhere at all. Epistemological humility is simply a synonym for saying you don’t know and you don’t care to know. Hammer seems at times to treat the recognition of human limitations as though it were itself an argument for the authority of tradition. It is not. One can reject rationalist hubris without abandoning reason as the means by which we distinguish truth from error.
Even further, in making the case not merely against liberalism, but more fundamentally, for a common-good conservative Judaism, Hammer falsely equates the ancient principle of a people, as in the people of Israel, with the modern principle of a nation-state, ignoring the obvious differences between the covenantal nature of Ancient Israel and the mixed societies of the present day, which do not have laws from the Mountain of God, or a direct nation-divine relationship open to them, as the Jews did and do. Hammer takes a descriptive attribute of Ancient Israel and turns it into a prescriptive solution to the modern state.
That said, Hammer’s argument that self-confidence in one’s own abilities is fundamentally at odds with Western civilization is a necessary and vital point, not only in Judaism, but also in Christianity. “Idolatry,” he writes, “is perhaps the single greatest offense committed against God—the Second of the Ten Commandments, and the first hortatory one—because it denies His sovereignty over His own creation. Paganism, the opposite of the Bible’s monotheism, evinces solipsistic self-worship and/or a misplaced trust in false gods.”
Hammer also spends time talking about the Jewish political system, instituted from Sinai, and then codified into the social consciousness of the Jewish people for millennia. Making the postliberal argument in its fullest form, Hammer asserts that Judaism itself exemplifies the only true alternative to the atomization of the individual and the loss of binding mores that he thinks go hand in hand with liberalism. He believes that Judaism is the perfect balance between the individualism that is necessary both to protect the individual from the community’s overreach and to hold an individual accountable for his actions, and the necessity of community, and the ensuring of communal holiness and responsibility that places individualism in check. Of course, his argument is broader than simply encompassing what Christians call the Old Testament, for he cites Jewish authorities and other writings in making his case, but as any philosophical claim, which are by nature unfalsifiable, it is necessary to see how exactly the theory worked out in practice, and if Scripture is any guide, it didn’t. That isn’t a criticism of Judaism per se; it certainly isn’t meant to reflect badly on the Jews themselves, it is simply a reflection on humanity, on human nature in general: the fact remains that throughout the Bible, the Jewish people failed continually: the persecution of the prophets, disbelieving the word of God, failing to live up to the moral standards imposed on Sinai: all of these things point not to a failure in the law or the Lawgiver, not even something fundamentally wrong about the theory itself, but it does reflect on the fact that even the best and most well-intentioned of systems simply fail to deliver on what they promised. And that may be precisely the problem with Hammer's political argument. If Israel's possession of divine law did not prevent Israel from repeatedly violating that law, why should we expect the recovery of Jewish political principles to produce the virtuous political community Hammer seeks? The failure may not be that we have chosen the wrong system. It may be that no system, however wise, can make fallen men virtuous merely by placing them under better laws. Hammer also tries to reassert the importance of Jerusalem on Western Civilization, a good move, but by doing so to the extreme in which he does it, he underappreciates and undervalues the contributions of Greece and of Rome, which played an equally important role in the ideas of the Founders.
So does Hammer give a more modern subpoint to defend his thesis? Indeed he does. Confessing that Abraham Lincoln has long been one of his greatest heroes, Hammer quotes the sixteenth President at length, including showing some fascinating connections between Lincoln and Jewish leaders of the time. Hammer also quotes from the Founding Fathers, such as Hamilton, John Adams, and George Washington, in showing the role of Jewish thought in the formation of the nation, from Washington’s letter to the Jewish congregation of Rhode Island, to Ben Franklin’s desire to include a picture of the Exodus on national emblems, to the role of the Ten Commandments, the Noahide Laws, and other ethical imperatives on the moral foundation of the nation. This succeeds in planting his argument back on firm ground, not in that his previous arguments were unhelpful or wholly devoid of accurate diagnosis, but simply in being able to connect Ancient Israel with modern America. The problem with this, though, is that he accidentally undermines his own point. Lincoln, Hamilton, the Founders whom he so loves, were explicitly liberal in outlook: that is, they embraced natural law republicanism, the form of government by the consent of the governed laid out by Locke in his treatises. Hammer replies to this counterpoint quickly by pointing out that all of this could equally be traced back to Judaism and Christianity, and well they could be, and should be, with Locke as connection between them. Hammer applies a seeming double standard here in saying that the Founders were not formed ex nihilo, and got their ideas from somewhere other than themselves—ostensibly treating Locke as almost simultaneous to them—but then denies Locke and the classical liberals the same courtesy by failing to note that they got their ideas from the same place.
The last critique Hammer makes is perhaps the most politically volatile. Growing up in the shadow of 9/11, he was a Bush interventionist, a neocon, with all the moral rigor implicit in the name and all the certainty and conviction that led to Iraq, Afghanistan, and twenty years of conflict. However, Hammer seems unwittingly to have swallowed the forever wars myth pushed by politicians almost constantly in the past couple of decades. Even more concerning, he equates Bush’s push in Iraq and elsewhere as the same as Wilson’s plan in the concluding years of World War II. Hammer hammers Paul Ryan, the former Speaker of the House, for claiming that he wanted to bring liberty and freedom to every nation, and that he was concerned about dealing with any nation that didn’t embrace the American values, the very Judeo-Christian values which he is somewhat contradictingly defending. In doing so, Hammer accepts the relativism of the radical left, in saying that Ryan is wrong because American values are merely values, and that other nations have other values, and we can’t all expect to live under the same systems. In doing so, Hammer simultaneously degrades Western civilization to merely a set of values” while upgrading every system, from the radical Islam which America fought in Iraq to the communism of China and the authoritarianism of Putin, to a set of values, even though they are likely value-free. Very much like his ploy with epistemological humility, Hammer disguises his ideas under the same guise as the woke neoliberals he seeks to critique: as simply human, simply tolerant, simply realistic, and thereby forfeits the entire premise. He seeks to avoid the temptation to remake the world in America’s image, but ignores the fact that all men are made in God’s image, and are thus equally entitled to the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. His dismissal of the idea of America as a credal nation is his lone attempt at dealing with the fact that Americans aren’t so different from anyone else, and neither, for that matter, are Jews, Poles, Russians, or anyone else. The point I am trying to make is not to argue for universalism, but simply to point out the inconsistency in his desire to argue that Americans shouldn’t wish freedom on all people, as if we are fundamentally different. We are different, but only insofar as we affirm the creed of the Declaration.
The solution for the author is not a doctrinaire Wilsonianism—indeed, he writes, it is not a doctrine at all—but, quoting Walter Russell Meade, a Jacksonian realism; an emotional connection, like love of one’s family. This explains everything but explains nothing: it is contradictory in that in the very next paragraph he argues that: “Only a ruthless, emotionally detached, hardheaded realism that eschews any desire to remake the Middle East in the image of Western liberalism can get the job done.”, but if it’s based on an emotion, how exactly has it be emotionally detached, and as everyone knows by self-evident experience, emotions alone are prone to change at every turn, even love of one’s family, which can turn to hate very quickly given the right circumstances. Lastly, as with liberalism, Hammer seems to include a very broad range of political movements inside this field, which would include people as far removed on the political spectrum as Bill Clinton, Dennis Ross, George W. Bush, and Ronald Reagan. Hammer argues that neoconservatives have been pushing for a two-state solution which ignores the needs of Israel with regard to Palestine, but it seems far-fetched to call either Bill Clinton or Yitzhak Rabin conservative, or even new conservatives. He then claims, unhelpfully, that neoconservatives aren’t even that great of allies to Israel, something that I, as a neoconservative, and many like me, from Lindsey Graham to Ben Shapiro, would strenuously object to. Certainly, neocons are more ready allies to the cause of Israel than the postliberals who have taken over on the Heritage Right and who now regularly disparage Hammer and Jews in general.
Hammer’s call for a united Judeo-Christian front is likely the best part of the book; we do have much more in common than that over which we disagree, and we do have common enemies. Hammer, quoting Pope John Paul II, says that Jews are the elder brothers of Christians. He is addressing a Jewish audience when he says this, but for Christians, Paul’s admonition in Romans should come to mind: we cannot be overconfident in ourselves, for we are the olive branch which has been grafted in by grace.
My final critique of this book is one which is outside of anything that Hammer himself, as a practicing Jew, could have fixed, and that is that while it focuses on those Jewish elements of Jewish religion on which Christians could agree, and which Christians share, this ultimately reduces Christianity to Judaism, while leaving Judaism intact. Decrepit human beings, however virtuous, if they are not religious, and by religious I do not mean what Hammer does, will fail to make the world any better than it has been for the last six thousand years of human history. His appeal to tradition, to a good society ordered around God and his law are all good for any society to consider, but they are ultimately bound to fail outside of the grace and redemption of Jesus Christ, who alone allows slaves to walk free, and the chained sinner to act as a saved citizen, not only of earth, but also of Heaven.
Review Written by Caleb A. Gerber
October 4th, 2026
Caleb A. Gerber
8/252026
tags: Christian, leadership, philosophy, politics
The bogeyman in the modern political sphere is the man or woman who is caught in the open with his beliefs in plain sight, especially if those beliefs happen to be part of conservative Christianity. The words Christian nationalism are tossed about anytime someone appeals to biblical ethics, or addresses their faith in a public way, making demands of others based on it. It is also clear that the founders of America did not want a political realm where Christianity, or any other religion for that matter, was state-enforced. The wall of separation between church and state, overused and misunderstood, was nonetheless true Jeffersonian language, coming from the same man who had confessed “nature and nature’s God” in the Declaration of Independence.
Yet while progressive news agencies and liberal, or illiberal, politicians toss these terms around irresponsibly, there is a legitimate debate happening inside a certain circle of Christianity on whether to embrace the term once and for all and stand for it amid the negative onslaught. In Five Views on Christian Nationalism, five prominent Christian leaders lend their considerable talent and authority to investigating and debating the questions surrounding this debate: what is a nation? Can a nation survive without an ontological basis? Is America a creedal nation? Who are the enemies, and what is the problem that we face? What is the solution to that problem? Can Caesar be entrusted with the keys to the kingdom? Two Baptists, Al Mohler and Paul D. Miller, two Presbyterians, Joe Rigney and Douglas Wilson, and one Catholic, R. R. Reno, take on this issue in what may be the authoritative debate on the merits and demerits of Christian nationalism written this decade.
Instead of allowing the reader to hide behind vague terms, the authors clarify exactly what they mean by Christian nationalism and exactly what they do not mean. The catch? They don’t all agree. For starters, the authors disagree on what a nation even is. Is it a nation-state, as we have seen in the modern political world, especially since the rise of the so-called right to self-determination in the twentieth century? Or is it simply a diverse group, or group of groups of people, united under a common government? Paul Miller is the only one of the five to give an actual definition of Christian nationalism that would survive etymological scrutiny, though all define it throughout the process of writing their essays. “Christian nationalism” is, then, a collection of beliefs about nation and state: it is the belief that one’s nation and culture is definitionally “Christian” in some sense; that it should remain Christian; and that the government has a legitimate role keeping it that way.
But what is a nation? Joe Rigney defines nation as the following: “a people marked out by a combination of 1) shared ancestry, 2) shared history and experience, 3) a common language, literature, culture, customs, and religion, 4) a shared attachment to a particular land and place, and 5) a common law and ruler.” Further, as Rigney notes, the biblical terms used in this argument are the words goy (for nation) and am (for people). Rigney equates the two, as Mohler, Reno, and Wilson would agree, but Paul Miller offers a counterattack to such a view. Noting that Rigney infers their synonymity, rather than proving it, Miller argues that while the words goy and am are used together in the Bible, in Isaiah, for example, they are not collapsible into a singular word, serving rather as cumulative parallelism, that is, their use is to make a point, not to make an equation. That nations are present in a significant way in the biblical account is undisputable. It does not follow automatically, however, that the Bible provides us with a detailed definition of what constitutes a nation in the modern political sense. Scripture may affirm the reality and providential significance of peoples without giving Christians a single, comprehensive political definition of nationhood.
The problem with both Rigney and Miller’s argument is that they both assume more than the evidence gives. Rigney assumes that goy and am are synonyms, which lends credibility to his argument for Christian nationalism, while Miller assumes that they are not synonymous, thus boosting his interpretation against Christian nationalism. Either could be right, and the other wrong, but the evidence cited isn’t conclusive either way.
This leads to the next question. Is America a nation like any other? At the outset, it would seem that the Christian nationalists are committed to America’s exceptionality as a Christian nation, while Miller is arguing against it, but this again is a misconception. On the contrary, those arguing for Christian nationalism seem to base their argument on proving the definition of nation and therefore proving what America must be, dismissing out of hand the idea that America could be anything other than a mere nation. While Miller doesn’t defend American exceptionalism per se, he does defend American creedalism, that is, the idea that the United States gains its identity not in its ethnicity, geography, or culture, but in its propositional nature, something which is not true of most other nations, a fact which must be readily admitted with a simple glance at history. Miller’s argument rests on what he sees as both the basis and the solution for the American experiment, what he terms natural law republicanism. It is these ideas: that all men are created equal, endowed by their Creator, and so on and so forth, which give America its creedal nature and its unique opportunity for religious liberty, freedom, and unprecedented opportunity. Nor is this only Miller’s argument, for America has long been seen as different by a large portion of the world. British thinker and wit G. K. Chesterton wrote that “America is the only nation that is founded on a creed.”
This is where the Christian nationalist critique of creedalism has considerable force. It is one thing to say that America is founded upon propositions; it is another to assume that propositions can sustain themselves indefinitely once the worldview that gave them meaning has been discarded. “All men are created equal” is a proposition. But why are they equal? Why does every human being possess inherent dignity? Why are rights natural rather than merely granted by the state? Why should government be limited? Why should the majority be restrained from violating the rights of the minority? The Declaration provides answers, or at least clues toward answers, but those answers are not philosophically neutral. They rest upon a particular understanding of nature, morality, and God. This is the ontological basis for America, a basis which, argues R. Albert Mohler, is not religiously neutral, but is based on Christianity. Of course, Miller does not deny the Christian basis of the nation: the disagreement comes over whether America should confess its identity publicly or, as Mohler urges, enshrine Christianity, or an admission of its necessity, into the US Constitution. A counterargument to Mohler is that reading the founders as exclusively Christian ignores the effect of the Enlightenment, and of thinkers such as John Locke and Algernon Sidney on the Founding Fathers. Yet even Locke and Sidney were manifestly operating within a Christian worldview, as when Locke urges banning atheists from holding public office, pushing for a Christian understanding of man and his role in society.
Reno, Wilson, and Rigney, all in different ways, attack the idea of America as a creedal nation based on a simple argument. If America is based on a creed, and its creed gives it its identity, then those who attack its creed therefore forfeit their right to be called Americans. This is a logically sound and compelling argument, which, unfortunately, Miller doesn’t take the time to respond to, but it does have one weak spot. The argument would be true if it were just any ideal, or any proposition, yet as Miller notes, it’s a particular proposition, that of the dignity of every individual, that is the basis of the creedal nation theory. To put it succinctly, the right to attack the creed is the creed: freedoms of liberty, of expression, and of religion are a natural outflow of the imago Dei endowed on each man and woman.
Moving on, the main question in this book is what to do about the modern threat to American identity. Whether that identity is primarily Anglo-Protestant, merely Christian, or liberal, the authors disagree, but all agree that the identity must be defended. To a large extent, all five agree on what the threat is: the forces of secularism or of anti-Westernism, Islam, communism, the creed of the sexual revolution, each of which, in its own way, rejects some portion of the moral and philosophical inheritance of the West. The disagreement is less over whether America is facing a serious crisis than over how that crisis should be understood and what Christians ought to do about it.
For Rigney and Wilson, the Presbyterians, who by and large agree, the solution is Christian nationalism. Both are postmillennialists, holding that the task of the Christian is to further the gospel of Christ until every square inch of the world is under his physical dominion, whereupon the earth will be ready to receive its King. Although only a simplistic statement of postmillennial eschatology, this idea figures prominently in their defense of Christian nationalism. It’s based on a simple argument: that if Christ is truly in control of all, then that all must include the governments of the world, which are also subject to his rule. For Rigney and Wilson, the question is not whether Christians should attempt to make Christ Lord over the nations. Christ already is Lord over the nations. The question is whether Christians are obligated to recognize and advance that reality in the political order. Their answer is essentially yes.
This position has obvious internal coherence. If Christ is Lord of all, then there can be no genuinely autonomous sphere of life over which Christ has no claim. The Christian cannot say that Christ is Lord of his marriage but not his politics, Lord of his private morality but not his understanding of justice, Lord of his family but not his government. If the Christian faith makes comprehensive claims about reality, then political life cannot be carved out as a permanently Christian-free zone. This idea notwithstanding, a problem remains, for asserting that Christ is King of all doesn’t exactly tell us how his vassals, the Caesars whom he has left in charge, should rule best, or even if they should acknowledge him. Because Rigney and Wilson are Presbyterians and paedobaptists, however, they approach this question from a conception of the Christian community that differs in important respects from a credobaptist one. In Presbyterian covenant theology, the children of believers are included within the visible covenant community and receive baptism as members of that community. Christianity is therefore not conceived merely as a voluntary association of individuals who have each made an independent profession of faith. This makes it more natural for Presbyterians to speak of a Christian people or society rather than merely of individual Christians living within an otherwise religiously neutral political order. If the political community itself is understood as capable of being Christian, then there is far less conceptual difficulty in saying that Caesar, too, ought to recognize the authority of Christ. Reno, a Catholic, would likely agree in general with such a view.
Christian Nationalism is not, for any of these three men, about coercion. None is in favor of mandating Christianity for citizenship, for this will inevitably cheapen the redeeming message of Christianity, but they are in favor of changing society to reflect a Christian understanding, both of man, Anthropos, and of the goal of man, telos.
This distinction is important because it separates Christian nationalism as understood by Rigney and Wilson from the caricature of a theocratic state in which Christianity is imposed by force. Their argument is not that the state should manufacture Christians, but that Christians should seek to order the political community according to the truth claims of Christianity. In other words, the goal is not the conversion of Caesar by the sword, but the submission of Caesar to a reality that, in their view, is already objectively true: Christ is King. It is, in many ways, Christendom 2.0, as Wilson calls it. Not under a pope or a monarch, though it could certainly work in such a way as well, but with the church in the center, and the kingdom surrounding the church.
Here is where Miller’s arguments come back in force. If Caesar is to become the enforcer of Christianity in making its view of telos the standard for the state as well as the church, how confident can we be that Caesar will not misuse the keys? As a political scientist, demonstrating the historical and political realities of more abstract ideas is where Miller’s attack on Christian nationalism really starts to make some headway. By enshrining Christianity in the current Constitution, would that not give the Supreme Court the authority to decide who Christ was, or what Christianity was about? While all the advocates of this form of nationalism steer clear of the pitfall of allowing for an official state church, Caesar is still given an extraordinary amount of power, in Miller’s view, to define what constitutes blasphemy, which Mohler, Reno, Wilson, and Rigney all wish to criminalize, to determine the boundaries of acceptable religious discussion, and ultimately to decide which version of Christianity is sufficiently accurate to merit the approval and defense of the state. The problem is not that Caesar might become a Christian, the problem is that Caesar might wish to be the pope. By his very nature, argues Miller, Caesar, like Sauron, does not share power. History, too, gives little reason to assure us that even the most well-meaning Caesar could remain helpful to Christianity for long. Christian nationalism assumes and requires, he posits, a Caesar who is both sincerely Christian and willing to submit his own power to the power of a higher being. Such a man is not impossible to find, but he is extremely difficult to keep, especially across generations.
What is Miller’s alternative? The natural law republicanism of the founders. “Republicanism,” he writes, “is nature’s government.” Because the church should be preoccupied with the spiritual state of man, and the government with the outward state, or how he behaves himself, the moral order of general revelation proves sufficient for the ordering of human society. Appealing to Romans 1 and St. Paul’s defense of the law written on the hearts of the Gentiles, Miller’s point is that the founders knew exactly what they were doing in starting the nation: they didn’t make it secular in the modern sense, but they didn’t make it explicitly religious either, and this was not an error; not a bug, but a feature. It is natural law which can give us the basis for our laws, our constitutions, and which gives enough ontological grounding for all of this: it is an acknowledgement of the Creator, which does not specify what Creator, a defense of the imago Dei, without specifying what image and what God it is, but admitting that both are present. Miller gives another authoritative definition when he writes that natural law is “the moral order of creation, applicable across time and culture, for all peoples and all nations, available to the rightly trained human reason without special revelation.”
Wilson comes back swinging, asking how exactly the state, or Caesar, can understand the natural law, but not understand the clearly spelled-out commandments of the Old and New Testaments? If he cannot be relied upon to interpret Christianity well, how much less natural law? Miller responds by not responding: he says simply that the questions about how to ground natural law are exactly the questions that should be asked once we have agreed on the natural law framework. This is perhaps Miller’s weakest answer, but he goes on to say that natural law is not meant as a systematic course on theology. It isn’t an endless investigative process whereby more knowledge can be acquired and a better understanding gained. Rather, it must be the basis for all future conversations themselves. Miller does not seem to be arguing for the superiority of natural law over special revelation; rather, he seems to be taking a more prudential approach: natural law republicanism is superior to Christian nationalism not in that it sounds better, but in that it works.
Reno, the lone Catholic contributor to the book, makes some excellent points concerning nationhood. Ironically, though he argues against a creedal nation, several of his arguments could be used to defend precisely such a doctrine. A nation is, in his opinion, bound together by civic friendship, and he quotes Aristotle in asserting that the friendship is stronger the more friends agree on the highest good. Because of this, argues Reno, a nation bound together by a common religious faith is stronger than one lacking such a faith. He quotes G. W. F. Hegel, who wrote in his Philosophy of History that “Religion is the sphere in which a nation gives itself the definition of that which it regards as the True.” Reno proves helpful in showing the necessity of, as Mohler also points out, an ontological and religious grounding. What he does not say, and what he cannot prove based on the premises, is how such a religious faith should be presented, whether as the official stance of the state, or a bottom-up approach, by the virtue of the people.
Reno then commits the error common in post-liberal philosophy. Like Patrick Deneen, Reno is unsatisfied with liberalism. Like Deneen, Reno attempts to show that the classical liberal experiment of Locke, Sidney, and the founders led to the secularization and progressive radical individualism of the modern day. Of course, this is an interesting philosophical point, but it’s horrendously unhistorical: the fathers of progressivism, be it in education or in politics, denied the very principles of liberalism which Deneen and Reno point to as the basis of their philosophy. John Dewey and Woodrow Wilson, who began the progressive movement, rejected the natural rights liberalism of Locke and Sidney, so to equate the two is to engage in a false historical comparison. Now, admittedly, Reno doesn’t make this exact argument in the book, but his skepticism of the liberal experiment and his position that liberalism itself led to the modern crisis is easy to see and easier still to trace. Mohler, too, seems to be affected by Deneen’s theories, believing that liberalism is not sufficient, even with a Christian basis, as Locke gave it, for the preservation of society. Next, Reno proposes the solution by saying that “It is entirely proper for the magistrate to concern himself with the common good of the people and not only their individual rights.” Except that this gives the magistrate, or Caesar, the power to define what he ought not to define, namely, what is the common good, and who are the people?
While the arguments being aimed at both sides are strong and verge on impolite, none lack in their professionalism. Each side, each contributor, seems to know exactly what he is talking about and exactly what the other is talking about. Unlike many discussions on this topic, the authors don’t talk past each other, but to each other, giving a stronger flavor to an otherwise courteous debate. Mohler and Rigney clearly have their theological and historical strengths, in being able to explain historical Protestantism in the Reformed tradition and explaining the concepts of government of figures ranging from Augustine to Calvin to Kuyper. Miller excels in his political philosophy, connecting it to a particular vision of human anthropology and Noahic duty. Using the arguments of David VanDrunen, among others, Miller is by far the strongest in understanding the practical side of the argument. Wilson and Reno stand in the middle of the pack, which is uncommon for both. Provocative statements aside, Wilson’s arguments are complex and can occasionally become difficult to trace, but his conclusion is, as usual, well-thought out, if not necessarily politically correct. Reno, too, though the obvious weaknesses of post-liberalism are in full view of the reader, is good at understanding and explaining the importance of nationhood to the social imaginary of a people. The armor of all is well-positioned, but so are the arrows of their opponents, which makes for a memorable fight between allies in a common cause.
It would be unfair of those opposed to Christian nationalism to reject Wilson, Rigney, and Mohler’s arguments out of hand. The seriousness and well-rounded theological tradition which they use to back it up makes the argument unavoidable, and the reader will at times feel like the whole world is spinning with the implications of the argument. Likewise, for those of a Christian nationalist persuasion, to ignore the arguments of Paul Miller is to risk political suicide. In the end, the argument may still be unanswered in Christian circles, discussions will likely continue, but no one will be able to say that they don’t know what to think. This book helps make up your mind, one way or another, and it does it FAST!
Review Written by Caleb A. Gerber
August 25th, 2026
Kyle Streitmatter
8/252026
tags: Christian, leadership
The Way of the Shepherd is a short, modern fable that tells the story of fictitious business executive Theodore McBride, the retiring CEO of General Technologies (an obvious take on General Electric). A young reporter is selected to interview McBride, who shares his “seven secrets” for managing and leading people. The opening and concluding chapters feature the reporter’s first-person narration, but the middle sections shift to a young Theodore (Ted) narrating the events—the reader is taken back in time, as if Ted were experiencing the events for the first time. Ted is a young, ambitious MBA student in Texas who has just been hired to manage a team of nine people at General Technologies (the company we already know he will one day lead). His professor, Dr. Neumann, takes Ted under his wing by agreeing to teach him seven lessons about managing people. The lessons unfold in a surprising manner, centered around Dr. Neumann’s flock of sheep in the Texas hill country. As graduation approaches, Dr. Neumann shares a series of seven teachings that allude to (but never explicitly credit) scriptural principles and metaphors, such as Psalm 23 and John 10. The story is not overtly spiritual, but believers will be quick to identify the biblical overtones.
Readers accustomed to drama and climax will likely be disappointed. Much like a parable, the fable intends to impart wisdom rather than entertainment. The story, characters, and dialogue are somewhat predictable and one-dimensional. In many ways, it reads more like a self-help book than a true story. The lessons contained in its pages are not new or groundbreaking; rather, they are timeless and deeply rooted in godly wisdom. The story generally avoids addressing specific situations in the workplace, focusing instead on broadly applicable principles for effective management. Readers will likely not be surprised—but they will be challenged to adopt high standards of character and take on the real challenges of leadership. The text addresses many aspects of leadership, such as engaging, knowing, caring, correcting, guiding, and developing those who work for you. It elevates the role of leader from “decision maker” or “boss” to that of “shepherd”—one whose heart is fully set upon those he leads.
Leman & Pentak’s fable is a must-read for new, seasoned, and veteran managers alike who want to do more than simply “manage,” who desire to cultivate an environment where humans (like sheep) can thrive.
Review Written by Kyle Streitmatter
August 24th, 2026
Caleb A. Gerber
8/102026
tags: history, biography, philosophy
Few philosophers stand at the intellectual crossroads of humanity like Blaise Pascal. Few are so poignant, centuries after their death; few stir the heart as much, and few ask the questions that Pascal asks. Nearly a universally beloved figure, cited by Christian thinkers such as T. S. Eliot and by atheists such as Friedrich Nietzsche, in many ways, Pascal acts as the catalyst for the modern debates raging today and which have raged in the centuries following his brief but influential life. The Enlightenment vs. Romanticism; Christianity vs. rampant atheism; skepticism or rationalism; predestination or free will? In this newest biography of this prominent intellectual, author Graham Tomlin places Pascal within his intellectual and cultural time, yet posits that his ideas are as relevant in our age as they were to his. Mathematician, physicist, apologist, and Christian thinker, Pascal inhabited a world in which the old synthesis of faith, philosophy, and nature was beginning to fracture, even as the new scientific enterprise was taking shape.
Tomlin argues that it was part of the collapse between the scientific world and the metaphysical brought about by Descartes that led to the latter skepticism of figures like David Hume. The problem with this is that Descartes was a rationalist; that is, someone who believed not in the empirical or scientific world, but in the rational world. Whereas Hume certainly collapsed the two into one, Descartes did not. Tomlin actually points this out earlier in the book when he writes that “Descartes’ vision of human life was deeply intellectual, almost as if the body does not really matter.” This suggests that Pascal, in science if not in metaphysics, was far more of an empiricist than a rationalist, which helps to explain both Descartes’ disdain for Pascal and Pascal’s contempt for Descartes. Tomlin’s point on collapsing the empiric world with the metaphysical, or the scientific with the religious, is certainly worth taking into consideration. He argues that had this collapse not occurred and had Pascal’s separation of the two been considered, perhaps this would have prevented the rise of modern atheism.
The problem with Pascal’s division, however, is precisely the one that Thomas Aquinas had to dispute with five centuries earlier in Latin Averroism and which would again manifest itself post-Aquinas in nominalism. This is the division between science or philosophy and theology, which led to the creation of two completely separate worlds which had nothing to say about each other. Although Pascal certainly did not go as far as to say that the two did, or could, contradict each other, separation certainly leaves this possibility open to the point where reason loses all point. Tomlin also argues that when seeking evidence for God from a scientific standpoint, Pascal’s contemporaries could find nothing unambiguous, and so embraced atheism, yet this presupposes that those who searched for unambiguous evidence were coming from the empiricist viewpoint: seeing science, or that which could be proven by the senses, as the only things which could be considered “unambiguous.” This ignores the teleological, ontological, and other classical arguments for the existence of God which are by no means unambiguous, but which would, in turn, only work if one assumes the Thomistic understanding that, though it begins with the senses, reason can lead to metaphysical conclusions.
An important distinction which Tomlin makes is that Pascal did believe that there was room for reason and argumentation. “Similarly, he thinks there is a role for reason and evidence in confirming the truth of the Christian religion – he just doesn’t think it can get you there in the first place.” Pascal believed that Christianity was the religion which best fit the facts, though there is still a question about whether Pascal believes the facts fit Christianity. Pascal also argued that there were things that had to be accepted in what Kant would call a priori, that is, to reason at all, or to conduct experimentation, they must be assumed for anything else to be concluded. This is true. Aquinas would call these first principles or the principles of practical reasoning. Tomlin concludes that “The scientific enterprise is not wholly lacking in faith either.” If by faith he means that which cannot be proven, then he is, of course, correct, yet classically, faith has been seen as more than that. Writes Paul in Hebrews 11, “Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.” Christ also commands us to have faith in him, yet also grants that not everyone does, which grants faith a certain level of freedom, one which would simply not apply to the first principles, which are not a matter of choice: you cannot reject them, for by rejecting them you at the same time affirm them.
On the other side of the dilemma, Tomlin writes that “Pascal stands as one of the key figures at the start of the modern project of experimental science, who sees no incompatibility at all between faith in the God of Jesus Christ and a total commitment to the scientific enterprise and wherever it takes you.” It is an interesting and helpful conclusion, yet one struggles to see how Pascal’s assertion that reason can confirm but never establish Christianity avoids reducing faith to a fundamentally non-rational attribute; if reason cannot furnish any positive grounds for belief prior to belief itself, there is little reason for supposing that any positive grounds will be submitted post-belief. One may argue that faith enables one to see in a new light that which was not seen before; it would hardly seem to fit the Pauline description of faith as “substance” and “evidence.”
The author also wades into the debate over Jansenism which preoccupied Pascal and many others of his time. This theological movement could be loosely associated with Calvinism in that it stressed the sovereignty of God over human fate, yet, as the Reverend makes clear, it was entirely distinct from Calvinism in its commitment to remaining within the confines of the Roman Catholic Church. The Catholic Church, on the other hand, was committed with equal rigor to distancing itself from the Jansenists. The Court of Louis was hostile to them; Catholic scholars committed still to the Jesuits would attack them in the news brutally, showing no mercy and no nuance to the valid points made by many of the Jansenist theologians. Without wading into the centuries-long debate over free will and predestination, Tomlin clearly and convincingly shows us how Jansenism saw the world and what they were ready to do about it, while also showing how Pascal played a vital role in the defense of this group, a group with which he would eventually break.
The book discusses also Pascal’s conception of a hidden God. This idea helps explain why he did not believe that reason, or human reason, could lead to a true knowledge of God. It doesn’t, for the record, prove that Pascal is right, but it shows a surprising internal consistency in that if God is hidden, then reason loses all effect in leading the repentant sinner to grace. His argument is that God hides himself from those who do not wish to accept him, thus making it impossible for them to find him, and making reason useless in the process. Reason, for Pascal, is helpful for the believer, yet ineffectual for the unbeliever for precisely this reason. For reasons outlined above and below, it seems that this answer is a bit too simplistic, yet his broader point stands. Indeed, it seems to affirm some sort of human freedom, despite his Calvin-like belief in the sovereignty of God over human fate, for he believes that for those who do not seek Him, they shall not be sought by Him.
Where Tomlin succeeds marvelously is in placing Pascal within his time. If we look at his ideas, or the ideas of any other philosopher for that matter, as simple ideas, and leave out the context, that makes the ideas no less true or false, but it certainly decreases our ability to properly understand why these ideas were held. Tomlin helps us understand, not only by explaining Pascal’s life - the fact that he was unhealthy for much of his life contributed significantly to his rejection of Descartes’ mind-body dualism - but also those of his contemporaries. One of the most fascinating of these is Michel de Montaigne. Perhaps Tomlin would dispute this, but Pascal and Montaigne seem similar in one significant way: like Pascal, Montaigne seems to be very focused not on the abstracts of Aristotelianism or Platonism, but on the experiential, particularly when it comes to the self. Like Pascal, he is less concerned with the objective reality and more concerned with how we relate to that reality. Indeed, at first glance, the two philosophers seem to be on the same path; certainly, they have started at the same point. These three men are the key to understanding the French philosophical world of the seventeenth century. Descartes believes that belief can be achieved: belief rooted not in itself, but in reason; this belief, posits Descartes, corresponds to reality. Pascal is far less certain. In a way which the author does not state but which could be easily concluded from reading the book, Pascal is the intermediary between the two extremes of Descartes and Montaigne. He too believes that certainty can be attained, but he seems far less preoccupied with the importance of certainty and more preoccupied with why the certainty is necessary in the first place. On the other hand, Montaigne does not believe that certainty is possible, and if it was, he doesn’t really care. It is more of a utilitarian, pragmatist approach, one which Pascal seems to echo in The Wager, in his own way. Writes Montaigne, “Our intellectual faculties and our senses have no foundation to stand on but only fly about in the wind.” Further, Montaigne claims that Christianity itself “did not come to us through reasoned arguments or from our own intelligence; it came to us from outside authority, by commandments.” This is indeed one of the many reasons why the Protestant Reformation was carried out. While Luther would likely have agreed far more with Pascal than with Aquinas on reason and faith - he famously called reason “Aristotle’s whore” - other Reformers would have been different. Calvin was friendly to reason; Melanchthon friendlier still. The Reformers understood that the lack of reasoned argumentation came from a lack of reading of Scripture itself. This is why there was such an emphasis on the printing of the Bible in the lingua franca: because argumentation ultimately could lead to the demonstration of truth claims, and because, as Paul himself instructs, we are to “test all spirits.” The author distinguishes Montaigne and Pascal in a significant area, and that is their treatment of life and the afterlife. Montaigne argued for methods of contemplation which would lead one to finally lose all angst and enable one to enjoy life to the fullest.
Pascal rejects this solution, in a way that more Christians today likely should as we face a Montaigne-like hedonism: for Pascal, angst comes not only from the temporal and should be relieved not because of the temporal, but because of the eternal. It is not a matter of living better in this life, for Pascal, but of being certain about the other. In this, both Thomistic Christians and Pascaline Christians can agree. We may differ on where such a certainty comes from, yet we must agree that the achievement of such certainty is of vital importance. The enduring debate between Descartes, Pascal, Aquinas, Montaigne - and to this we should likely add Augustine and Luther as well - will likely never be fully solved, but with Pascal, we can discover that it is impossible to be fully indifferent to the question of certainty.
Review Written by Caleb A. Gerber
August 10th, 2026
Caleb A. Gerber
6/29/2026
The Father of America is not a new topic to write or to read about. In two hundred and fifty years, biography after biography has been written, from Parson Weems' largely fictitious rendering of the General to Ron Chernow's monumental biography of Washington at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Now Pulitzer Prize finalist author and historian H. W. Brands brings his considerable talents to bear on the enigmatic yet consequential first President of the United States. The question most readers will confront as they read through the book is this: does Brands do anything new? Is his new biography not, rather, the oldest topic in the book of American history, apart from Lincoln?
The two hundred and fiftieth birthday of America is approaching. That is the occasion for which Brands has published his new 600-page biography of George Washington. Our age is torn apart by political battles that Washington tried to avoid throughout his presidency. The geopolitical landscape has changed drastically in two and a half centuries: regional alliances have shifted, and new men have come and gone from the echelons of power. Washington's legacy has been revisited. It would indeed be incredible if, after all this time, a new aspect were to come to light. Not surprisingly, it has not.
That is not to say that Brands' new book is bad. Certainly, the author has gone to considerable lengths in his research from primary sources to produce a lucid, engaging, and authoritative narrative. The prose is not dense, yet neither is it superficial. The man who is painted in this book is the Washington we know, not one we do not know.
The test of a modern Washington biography is therefore not whether it overturns established scholarship, but whether it presents the familiar story with fresh insight, sound judgment, and compelling prose. On that score, Brands largely succeeds.
The key strength of this book is one that may appear odd. Many biographies have been praised for their broad scope and all-encompassing nature. A biography of Lincoln has become notable because it portrays Lincoln in contrast to his advisers. Churchill's many biographies have succeeded largely insofar as they have presented those around him. Brands certainly does not ignore everyone else; yet, in his biography of Washington, he does not also provide biographies of Jefferson, Hamilton, Adams, or any of the other Founders. Washington is the topic, and the topic is the sole focus of this book. In other words, while Brands' cast of characters is broad, it is not long; the people in this book are mentioned only insofar as they help the reader better understand the man Washington was, and the man he was not.
Brands recognizes that there is little left to discover about Washington. Rather than chasing novelty through speculative interpretation or by making the biography about the Founding generation as a whole, he succeeds by keeping Washington himself at the center of every chapter. Discussions about the beginning of the Revolutionary War are largely avoided. While the Boston Tea Party, the Intolerable Acts, and the First Continental Congress are all mentioned, they are viewed through Washington's eyes and the eyes of the Virginian gentry to which he belonged.
Brands refuses to show us Washington in an iconoclastic way: as merely a military genius or a man of temperance and virtue, though he was, in varying degrees, all these things. He was a military genius at times, but also one who made numerous strategic blunders; trusting Benedict Arnold ranks as the most egregious, in Brands' reading. He was a man of temperance and virtue, yet one who, according to witnesses, was not entirely immune from bursts of passion, fits of anger, and a loose mouth. On the other hand, Brands does not reinterpret Washington; he is not a revisionist. He holds Washington's motives to be pure: slaveholder though he was, he was deeply opposed to the institution itself on moral grounds and freed all his slaves upon his death. Likewise, although not devout in the conventional sense, the Washington portrayed here frequently recognized the "dispensations of Providence," both in his personal life and in military and political affairs.
The parts of this book that will most genuinely interest the reader have mostly to do with Washington's early life. Although scant attention is paid to his childhood, Brands does not gloss over his prewar military experience, his complex relationship with the French and with the Native Americans, his military formation as a product of British war policy, and his role in the beginning of the French and Indian War. Specifically, Brands shows how Washington was not only a shrewd tactician but also a shrewd negotiator, skilled in matters of peace as well as those of war. Further, while almost no attention is given to matters affecting Washington only externally, such as the Paris negotiations between Adams and the court of Louis XVI, Brands has uncovered an aspect of the war not generally discussed in contemporary histories: the British perception of the war.
Brands is not pro-British by any measure of the word. Indeed, he is far too skeptical of the Hamiltonian faction of the Federalist Party during Washington's presidency; his allegiance lies squarely in the Jeffersonian camp. Yet his skepticism of the British and his patriotism do not extend so far as to ignore the British altogether. Diary entries from British officers, letters from Admiral Sir Richard Howe, and the story of John André show not Washington's perception of others, but others' perception of him.
This book, however, is not all roses and petals. By paying special attention to Washington's early career, Brands must leave out much of his later career lest the book become longer than would conceivably hold the attention of the average reader. Numerous chapters are spent on Fort Duquesne, his life as a farmer, colonial relations with the Indians, and the battles against the French. The Revolutionary War chapters contain as much detail as could be wished for, providing enough, but not so much, information as to inundate the pages with unnecessary detail. On the other hand, the postwar section consists of a single chapter, albeit an extraordinarily long one, discussing his entire two-term presidency. Events such as the Jay Treaty and the Whiskey Rebellion are mentioned, yet treated more as secondary incidents. The Farewell Address is hardly analyzed at all. The goal of the book is undoubtedly to make the reader acquainted with Washington the man, yet it must be said that very little is said about Washington the politician beyond the fact that he despised political factions.
Despite these apparent weaknesses, Brands succeeds in doing what he set out to do: make the reader more knowledgeable about Washington, if not about his times. It is both a conventional biography and an unconventional narrative, one that has few detours and arrives directly at its destination. Brands' conclusion is admirable in its simplicity and lack of grandiosity. Washington, he claims, was a man of his time. What his time was like, however, we gain only a limited understanding of from reading the book, though Brands likely expects the average reader to be familiar with the story of the Revolution. The General would not fit into today's world, he argues. He would be horrified by it. His strength lay not in predicting the future, but in laying the guardrails and the foundations upon which future generations could build.
Review Written by Caleb A. Gerber
June 29th, 2026
Caleb A. Gerber
6/12/2026
Someone once wisely said that no individual is created in isolation. Each of our lives is intertwined with that of countless others. The same applies to the lives of the all-time greats, or those who have left a mark on history. Because of this, in studying one man, we must inevitably study more than one man; we must study the men and women around him, some great, some not so great; some forgotten, some as well remembered as the principal.
Much as William C. Davis's masterpiece Three Roads to the Alamo, Tim McGrath's new release, Three Roads to Gettysburg, is not a story of the battle, though of course the latter does figure prominently, but the story of the battle-makers. One of them is universally admired, and for good reason: Abraham Lincoln's moral clarity, both before the presidency and during it, is one of the great strengths of our American republic. The Gettysburg Address is perhaps the most memorized, most repeated, and most memorable speech ever given on American soil. How many students have been required to memorize the speech in its two-minute entirety simply by virtue of the fact that it possesses some of the qualities we most admire, both in oratorical skill and in the embodiment of the moral citizen?
Robert E. Lee, on the other hand, is a more complex figure. Certainly, he has become, by some measure, the embodiment of the Lost Cause myth, which views the grievances of the South as legitimate and the encroachment of the North as a morally viable casus belli. On the other hand, Lee is despised by many revisionist historians who seek to demonize him as a racist who tried to keep human beings enslaved simply because of their skin color. Yet others see Lee as somewhere in between; as a man of personal conviction and upright character who was, sadly, by circumstance and familial allegiance, forced to take part in a war against the country which his father had helped to found.
The general who actually led the Union to victory at Gettysburg occupies a different place in American history altogether. George Gordon Meade is, unlike Lincoln, rarely, if ever, remembered as a hero of the Union cause. Ulysses S. Grant is remembered largely because it was under him that the war was ended. George McClellan is remembered mainly due to his young and dashing but ultimately unsatisfactory performance as commander of the Army of the Potomac. Also, unlike Lee, few outside military historians would place Meade in the midst of endless controversy. Yet, argues McGrath, this lack of attention makes him no less compelling.
Unlike many historians, McGrath is content to leave Lincoln atop his monument in D.C. He is content to leave Lee in the muck and mire of history, sinking in the swamp of infamy until a new biographical boat comes along to lift him out of it once more and into the sunshine of public acclamation. The one figure whose legacy he does contest is that of Meade. McGrath avoids any type of moral situating. He does not try to argue that Meade was the savior of the Union cause, nor that he was an entirely loyal Northerner who supported emancipation. Instead, he simply places Meade back in the historical imagination. In this he succeeds.
Beginning with the story of Meade's father, the influential though eventually bankrupt Richard Meade, and then describing Meade's, as well as Lee's, involvement in the Mexican-American War, one of the most interesting things that McGrath does is to show how these two men, who would eventually fight each other in a real war, were learning from two men who, though on the same side of a real war, were on different sides of a diplomatic one. George Meade served under General Zachary Taylor, the unflappable father-in-law of Jefferson Davis, who would also briefly serve as president. The calm Taylor at times resembles the calm Lee, respectful of authority, cool under fire, in short, "Old Rough and Ready." Yet Lee admired not Taylor but Scott. Meade, on the other hand, admired Taylor, yet in personality much resembles General Winfield Scott, with a flammable temper, colorful language, yet also brilliance on the field of battle.
It would be tempting to see Lee and Meade as simple protégés or continuations of these two generals, yet that is far from the truth. The story McGrath tells is not of how the younger generals became the next Scott or the next Taylor, but how they learned from them, and how the lessons they drew would serve them well, or let them down, at Gettysburg.
Indeed, a theme of this book is the fact that influence does not of necessity imply imitation. Lee inherited neither Scott's temperament nor Taylor's command style in full, and Meade certainly was not a full reflection of either man. The roads to Gettysburg, McGrath reminds us, were never straight.
The author also shows us how Gettysburg's lines of battle were drawn not only along the dimensions of North and South, but also between generals, soldiers, commanders, and others. No man can truly cease to be a man when he becomes a soldier, and that is true both in his humanity and in his human nature. Although many have noted how soldiers also feel repulsed at the sight of death, fewer have noted how commanders are repulsed by the sight of each other. From the battles between McClellan and Lincoln to those between Meade and Hooker and Meade and Dan Sickles, the legacy of battle, the story that will be told, may be influenced far less by what objectively happens on the field and more by who has the ear of the media, the ear of the politicians, the eye of the public and of the president, and finally, who lives longer and tells their side of the story to more people.
This does not mean that lessons cannot be drawn, that conclusions, moral ones even, cannot be reached. Indeed, to deny that history can teach moral lessons is to deny one of the chief reasons for studying it in the first place. Yet any conclusions must be reached only when events are first understood through the lens of the men and women who made them. To understand Lee properly is to understand, first of all, why he fought for the South. It is not to excuse him for doing it, explanation is not exoneration, but explanation will lead to either exoneration or condemnation. Neither of the latter can, of themselves, lead back to the explanation.
McGrath succeeds ultimately not in telling history better than other historians, or in explaining factors which would cast a new light on or enable us to reach a new verdict about this battle, nor yet in doing something new at all, but in doing something as old as the universe itself: saying that one did such and such a thing for a reason and then asking the reader, by judging the reason, to judge the man.
Review Written by Caleb A. Gerber
June 12th, 2026
Caleb A. Gerber
6/3/2026
tags: history, philosophy, jurisprudence, Christian
How did our national consciousness evolve? How did our perception of ourselves as Americans form, and from whence did it come? Argues historian Matthew Spalding, it came from the Declaration of Independence.
Before 1776, Americans did not think of themselves as Americans. They were British subjects who were members of their own colony: Virginians, New Yorkers, Pennsylvanians; each colony had its own leadership, its own predominant social class, be it the farmer of Massachusetts, the printer from Pennsylvania, or the Virginia aristocrat. They were brethren, yes, but they were not yet a people. When the immortal words “We hold these truths” were written from the Continental Congress, that all began to change: a new nation would form. By 1863, when President Abraham Lincoln delivered the Gettysburg Address, declaring that "four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent, a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal," the transformation was complete. For Lincoln, as for the founders, America was a nation, but not only a nation, not a mere nation; it was a nation founded upon an idea.
Spalding begins his work by discussing a term we have all heard mentioned: patriotism. Spalding writes that a true understanding of this term, which can mean so many things to so many people, “has always been the civic antidote to what C. S. Lewis called ‘the poison of subjectivism.’” Borrowing from Alexis de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French philosopher who toured America in its first couple of decades, Spalding posits that there are two types of patriotism: the first can breed the nationalism of Otto von Bismarck or the self-serving, self-interested geocentrism that has today gained a foothold in some of our governmental institutions. This is not a patriotism based on anything longstanding or permanent; it is mere loyalty, a sheer blind love based only on a sense of community and on nothing more. The second type of patriotism is the American brand: the type that allows soldiers to fight the Nazis on the beaches of Normandy and to plant the American flag on Iwo Jima. It is not because we hate what is in front of us, as Chesterton wrote, nor yet because we like what is behind us, or feel some sort of emotional attachment; it is because we understand that the principles for which we fight are longstanding, permanent, and true. It is because they are all these things that we can give our last full measure of devotion, as did the Union soldiers during the Civil War.
The clarification of terms, such as patriotism, that Spalding does in the early pages of this work makes it easy to follow, yet not easy to skim. It makes you think, as great books do, yet does not cloud your judgment through vague terminology.
Quoting Augustine, Spalding makes clear from the start what the purpose of this book is. Nothing, according to the great theologian of the early church, can be truly loved unless the object of love is known. For us today, that means that for true patriotism, selfless in its purpose, determined in its cause to exist, we must understand exactly why the Declaration of Independence was written, how it was written, and what that changed.
The story of the Continental Congress is not new. Many books have been written on this critical period. The chapters that Spalding spends discussing the history of the Congress, the roles of its players, the international response, and its broader geopolitical place are clear in purpose but vague in accomplishment. For those well versed in American history, nothing illuminating will be gained from these chapters. Similarly, Spalding focuses a large part of his time on the particulars: what the complaints laid out in the Declaration were. This is, of course, important for a political historian, much less so for a philosophical one or for the average reader. Certainly, the validity of the claims made by Jefferson and others played a central role in their day, yet it becomes difficult to see how they could make any difference to ours.
The real strength of this book is its philosophy. Why is it that there are certain “unalienable rights”? What makes these “self-evident”? Who determines that among these are “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness”? The answer takes us back into intellectual history. From the Greeks' understanding of reason (logos), which was then transmitted down to the Christian church, for proof, simply read John 1:1, came the realization that as human beings endowed with the imago Dei, we have the capacity, through our reason, to reach truths about our life, about the human condition, about our telos. From a Christian perspective, which the author shares, it is this knowledge that enables us to know the moral law in the first place, and then realize that we have transgressed against it, which in turn forces us to recognize our depravity and need for redemption. In the political arena, this means that the law can be known without being spelled out. Critically, before the Bill of Rights, there was already a bill of rights written in the universe. Before the Constitution, there was a constitution written on the mind. For this reason, the founders did not appeal to English common law, as some would have wished them to do. Jefferson understood that even without English common law, even without the Magna Carta or the Glorious Revolution, their cause would still be just; the universe would still have the same moral structure and natural law because it would have the same architect and the same lawgiver.
This understanding carries profound implications for modern political thought, especially in jurisprudence. We have come to see law as simply that which guarantees the greatest good for the greatest number; this utilitarianism would have been alien to the founders. We have also come to see government as the institution that preserves our rights. This is, of course, exactly what the founders intended, yet today, some carry it a step further; they reason, wrongly, that if government preserved the rights, then government gave the rights in the first place. Yet if government gave, government could take away. However, if they originate in nature and nature’s God, then government is subject to a higher tribunal, and the Supreme Court is not really the Supreme Court.
Jefferson’s ideas did not simply come from looking up at the sky and racking his own brain, using his own reason to determine that certain rights existed and were being usurped by Parliament and the King. He had come from a rich philosophical and theological tradition that dated back from Augustine and Aquinas, down through Algernon Sidney and John Locke. This was the more political side of philosophy. With natural law come natural rights. Unlike contemporary monarchical systems, which saw the monarch as the divinely appointed leader, the founders saw such a concept as flawed. They saw government as a servant of the people, and the people as servants of God. “But where, says some, is the King of America?” wrote Thomas Paine. “I’ll tell you, Friend, he reigns above, and doth not make havoc of mankind like the Royal Brute of Britain.”
The author dives into the theological background of the Declaration. The fact that the first entity mentioned in the Declaration is not the King of Britain, but the King of Heaven, at least signifies that these were writers who believed in a divine Providence. “As in its opening, the Declaration here appeals to a standard above and beyond human events to vindicate its cause. And the appeal, as before, is not to some overarching sense of history or to ‘the opinions of mankind.’ But it is also not to ‘the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God,’ which man knows through reason. This appeal of the Declaration is to an omniscient God who not only knows all men but also knows the intentions of each man’s heart. While they declared their cause to the opinions of mankind, in the end the Continental Congress seeks a ruling from a higher court.” Spalding goes further, arguing that they had a specifically Christian understanding both of the role of government and of the role of man in relation to government. Writes Spalding: “Only a truly benevolent King, one who is divine and not subject to the passions of man, could be an absolute sovereign. And since governments are instituted among men and not angels, and no individual on this earth has the divine wisdom and authority to rule absolutely, the powers of government must be limited, divided, and checked to ensure the rule of law rather than the arbitrary reign of worldly men.” The Declaration’s signers were not all orthodox Christians; certainly the author, Jefferson, had some unorthodox beliefs, but they were all, down to the last man, versed in the basic presuppositions of Christianity that were predominant in the late eighteenth century, and it was these presuppositions that were basic in the writing, drafting, and approval of this document.
Inextricably linked to a Christian understanding of God is a Christian understanding of man, which the signers also had. These were Protestants, with the exception of Charles Carroll, but they were Protestants familiar and comfortable with the natural law beliefs and writings of Richard Hooker. Man was a rational animal, capable of understanding right and wrong, if not of actually choosing right and eschewing wrong. “It is by his reason, not by allowing the passions to rule or blindly following conventional mores, that man distinguishes between reality and myth, good and evil, the just and the unjust. Nature, as a structure of reality that is unchanging and permanent, and that can be accessed by reason, is the standard of right in making these distinctions. And as man seeks relationships with others to fulfill that nature, man is a political animal, as Aristotle famously observes, men come to live in communities based on agreed purposes and a common understanding of justice.” The author then makes an even more stunning, but likely accurate, claim: “This argument is the basis of Western thought about man and politics.”
Of course, reason is not the only reason. There is a place for faith; in fact, faith is necessary in a Christian society, though not necessarily in the way modern secular critics often imagine. Spalding’s discussion of human nature is especially enlightening in this regard; society today seems to oscillate between two extremes: the utopianism of Marx, Rousseau, and the Romantics, which assumes that human beings are fundamentally good and that social problems can be solved through proper institutions, and, on the other hand, sheer cynicism, such as that found in Thomas Hobbes, which sees humans as utterly depraved, needing a government to compel them to some form of social stability. Instead, Spalding writes, the founders had a diametrically opposed conception of man: “This is not Thomas Hobbes’s brutish world of man against man, violently seeking to avoid death, or of petty man constantly dominated by narrow self-interests and lowly desires. This is a sacred conception of man, altogether human yet willing to sacrifice and suffer for the highest of ends.”
Spalding demonstrates that the Founders understood liberty not as the freedom to do whatever one wishes, but as the freedom to do what one ought. Rights existed alongside duties; freedom existed alongside virtue. The American experiment depended not merely upon constitutional structures, but upon the character of the citizenry itself. People incapable of self-government could not remain free for long. A people who do not know what they love will not love it for long. Failing to understand where we came from will result in a failure to go where we ought.
Review Written by Caleb A. Gerber
June 3rd, 2026
Caleb A. Gerber
5/31/2026
Mystic guide or heretic? Unsung hero, or the villain who changed the history of the twentieth century? Many descriptions, conflicting ones at that, but all are focused on a single man.
Talented military historian Antony Beevor turns his attention to one of the most overlooked and mysterious players in Russian history and focuses not only on Grigory Rasputin, but on the world into which he was born, in which he lived, and in which he was killed: the world of Orthodox Russia before the Bolshevik coup and the abdication of Nicholas II, which marked the end of the Romanov dynasty. Rasputin was born into humble origins, but he would eventually rise to the top and be introduced into the most powerful and elite circle in czarist Russia. His supposed mystical powers would win him a reputation which, when it came to the ears of the Tsarina Alexandra, would mark the beginning of his rise to the top and the beginning of the Romanovs' fall to the bottom.
For a military historian, Beevor is certainly an interesting writer. Many historians specializing in the history of warfare tend to get bogged down in the details while missing the overall picture. Not so with Beevor, who, with a wealth of sources, manages to encapsulate both the particulars and the universals: both Rasputin the man and the men and women around that man.
Interestingly, this is one of Beevor's shorter works, coming in at around 350 pages of substantive writing, plus footnotes and bibliography. The fact that Rasputin, like all men, lived a full life, and further, the fact that his life was by no means dull, will of course mean that many details which may interest the reader will inevitably be left out. Certainly, this is one of the impressions that will be received when reading the book. Beevor's biography of Rasputin is not a typical biography. Only a couple of pages are given to the first decades of Rasputin's life, while a full three chapters are focused on his assassination. While many biographies will only briefly mention the players who figure prominently in the life of their protagonist, Beevor goes deeper. Not only does he introduce the characters in their relationship with the mystic, but he also presents them as dynamic characters themselves, showing the reader their world as well as Rasputin's, even when the two do not necessarily intersect. At times this makes the overall thrust of the work feel vague, but on the flip side, it adds much depth, both cultural and political, that is not normally found in a simple biography.
While this style may, to some, seem distracting, this unconventional structure ultimately works to the book's advantage. Instead of focusing on Rasputin's birth, early decades, and formation, which would in most cases be desirable, the author's emphasis on the world of late imperial Russia helps underscore the fact that although Rasputin may have been the catalyst for the downfall of the Romanovs, he was not the only, or even the principal, figure. Beevor does not make this explicit, though I wish he did, but this underlines an interesting historical point: everyone should ultimately bear responsibility for his or her own actions. Blame for the fate of a nation may hinge on a particular person, but that hinge should not be mistaken for the door. The author demonstrates that the collapse of the dynasty cannot and should not be attributed to Rasputin alone, despite the enduring popular myth that he single-handedly brought down the entire empire.
Although not in depth, several philosophical and theological questions are tossed around by the author through the people in this story. Rasputin's perverted behavior can be seen, in part, as the consequence of his belief that, to be forgiven much, it is necessary to sin much. Obviously, this is dangerously unorthodox, not in the denominational sense, teaching, as it places a strong emphasis on sinning instead of any attempt to avoid illicit behaviors and acts. The consequences of this mistaken belief may become obvious at once to those more versed in biblical theology and will add a layer of depth to this book which could very easily be missed by those who are not as well versed. Indeed, the opportunity to engage not only with the political philosophy of Nicholas and Alexandra, as well as that of the moderates and those on the right and left of the political spectrum, but also with the theological and philosophical questions which played such a role in the Russia of the early twentieth century, is one of the most enjoyable and commendable parts of this work.
Two areas of weakness in this book are of note. Firstly, with a subject as complex as Rasputin, and with contrasts so stark between the "man of God" that the Czar and the Czarina saw him to be and the "man of the world," the carnal Rasputin accused and likely guilty of rape, the facts alone cannot suffice. Most readers, upon concluding the read, will be left confused as to Rasputin's legacy. Certainly, history is full of shades of gray, but the shades of gray do not negate the black and the white which, when summed, the grays produce. Beevor's attempt at objectivity, while commendable and understandable, is unsatisfactory because it leaves the reader with little sense of historical judgment. Was he good or bad? Perhaps the author intends to leave this question unanswered; perhaps he believes the question is unanswerable; or perhaps he wishes to leave it up to the reader to decide, to weigh the evidence in the balance of history and make the decision for himself. Yet the brevity of the work, coupled with the conflicting facts, makes such a task nearly impossible. Beevor is a master at narrating facts; he is less successful at drawing conclusions from them. Consequently, the central question of who Rasputin truly was remains frustratingly unresolved.
The second area of criticism is less universal and will likely not be shared by all readers. Once more it centers on the author's attempt at objectivity. The way in which he deals with Rasputin, who was after all a primarily religious figure, is almost entirely secular. He narrates what those around him, in a highly superstitious culture fed by Eastern Orthodox mysticism, thought about Rasputin's actions and whether they came from a divine origin, but notably, Beevor never attempts either to debunk any claims of spiritualism or to confirm them. The conflict within the Russian Church is also of note here; not everyone inside the church hierarchy agreed on Rasputin and how the church should deal with him. Beevor also shows that the Tsar's attempts to interfere with ecclesial authority were not welcome, yet no contrast is shown between the orthodoxy of the Orthodox and the orthodoxy of Rasputin. To those readers unfamiliar with the teachings, practices, and liturgy of Orthodoxy, this may be a problem.
Despite these criticisms, Rasputin is a highly worthwhile work and a welcome contribution to the study of late imperial Russia. Readers will emerge with their interest in this period not satisfied, but decidedly piqued. It is a good starting point, a good beginning to a road that will lead deeper into the struggles of history and the struggles of the soul.
Review Written by Caleb A. Gerber
May 31st, 2026
Caleb A. Gerber
5/12/2026
tags: history
It was the worst of times; it was the worst of times. It was the ascent of progress; it was the ascent of depravity. It was an age of love; it was an age of love. In short, it was, as the present age, an age when the good encountered evil… and who would prevail was a question of who had the will to do so and, to a degree, who had Providence on their side.
Much has been told, and many pages filled, with the rise of isolationism at home. Few pages have been devoted to the consequences of isolationism abroad; certainly, few books have been written which have focused on the immediate consequences of isolationism in the garden of the beasts, or, even more so, in the mouth of the dragon. This book is intriguing, therefore, for the reason that it covers not an unknown period of time, but an unknown place in that period. That is not to say that there have been few works on the rise of Hitler; there haven’t. But there has been remarkably little scholarly inquiry into what the American experience was in Hitler’s Berlin.
Erik Larson, with his typical dramatic flair for the good, the bad, and the ugly, traces the lives of two main people: the American ambassador to Germany, William Dodd, and his vivacious and promiscuous daughter, only in her second decade of life, yet already divorced, the flamboyant Martha. From love affair to love affair and diplomatic meetings to diplomatic meetings, Larson shows us, in an intimate way, I mean intimate quite literally, what life was like with Hitler’s rise, and what life was becoming.
The Germans we see in this picture are not the warlike and evil geniuses of World War II, though they were fast becoming that. Rather, Hitler and his government were at a desperate point, their government hanging by a lifeline. Largely, their survival was held in the balance by international perception, and since international perception was largely dictated by the letters of the American ambassador, William Dodd was bombarded with propaganda from the moment he landed on German soil. Instead of showing Hitler, Goring, and Goebbels as idiotic madmen intent on destroying the Jewish race, Larson gives a far more accurate, and far more disturbing, portrayal of the original Nazis. Despotic men, perhaps, but they were still men, and, like all men, had a distinctly personal side. Before they were masters of war, they were masters of diplomacy, yet never, and Larson makes this very clear, did Hitler or his inner circle ever consider stopping what they considered to be in the common good, the attaining of Lebensraum, the decimation of the Jewish population, or the persecution of Bolshevik sympathizers, for the sake of scoring foreign victories. Instead of compromising for the sake of gain, they gained exactly what they wanted without giving an inch, by lying. Larson shows us one lie after another put forth by Hitler, the head of the Gestapo, or Hermann Goring. In some cases, the lies were believed by the teller, but this did not make them any truer.
Secondly, this book shows the progressive distrust inside Hitler’s own coalition. This distrust would ultimately lead to a split, with courageous yet unsuccessful men such as Franz Papen taking a stand against Hitler, and other bloodthirsty opponents of Hitler, such as the head of the sexually perverse SA, Ernst Rohm, suffering the ultimate penalty for their ambition, with the culmination of the break coming on the Night of the Long Knives.
Larson’s chief strength is his ability to show not only the political or the military, but the personal. Certainly, I wish he would have spent less time discussing the ins and outs of Martha Dodd’s love life and more time focusing on the inner turmoil of the senior Dodd’s conscience as he came to realize that he was being used, but either way, this is historical narrative at its best. Perhaps it would not be the equivalent of an academic essay or a biography of William E. Dodd; it certainly does not compare to William Shirer’s Diary from Berlin during this period, but it doesn’t have to. The point is not to show what has already been shown, but to show something new and, with it, to give a new perspective.
Perhaps the most striking and fascinating part of this book is the fact that William Dodd left the United States as an avowed Wilsonian isolationist. He desired intensely to cooperate with Germany. Martha Dodd, too, initially mocked anti-Nazi protestors. Both were skeptical of Jewish persecution, with the ambassador urging President Roosevelt repeatedly to do nothing or to calm the outrage of prominent Jewish intellectuals in America over the rise of Hitler’s antisemitic efforts. Yet by the time of Dodd’s departure, a departure which occurred precisely because the ambassador no longer believed that permanent peace with Germany was possible, Dodd had come to realize the evil of the looming threat, and its intensity. He started the journey a skeptic; he returned a convert. This was not ideological fervor that pushed him to intense criticism of Hitler and Germany; if anything, Dodd was too hesitant to realize the threat. It is through the eyes of Dodd’s family that we can realize the incompleteness and dishonesty of revisionist histories which suggest that the war was by no means a foregone conclusion, that a negotiated peace could have been settled, and that antisemitism was perhaps a fluke and not a foundation. Such a narrative has no grounds in the truth, and Larson shows it masterfully.
In the end, Dodd realized what all men must at some point realize: that, as Bonhoeffer said, “Silence in the face of evil is evil itself,” or, better yet, Burke, who stated that “the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.” Though this book is history, it is a history of a movement, a movement which could well replicate itself in our day and age, for there truly is nothing new under the sun. Perhaps Larson never intended it this way, but this book is, above all, a call to action.
Review Written by C. A. Gerber
May 12th, 2026