Historian Walter Stahr has previously devoted his considerable talent to writing about prominent Americans such as Chief Justice John Jay, or to individual narratives on the “Team of Rivals” who proved so instrumental to the presidency of the revered Lincoln. Now, with painstaking detail, he turns his attention to a lesser-known but equally consequential figure: President and Chief Justice William Howard Taft. The author begins the biography of the 27th President, the first single-volume biography in decades, by denying that his subject was a “great” President by any stretch of the imagination. Strictly un-hagiographical, Stahr’s focus is not on what made Taft great, but what made him good.
Doris Kearns Goodwin, in her treatment of Taft and Theodore Roosevelt, asserts that Taft was less president-like than Roosevelt, failing to live up to the image of the President that we have today, and that he was better fitted for the office of Chief Justice, which he would later hold. Stahr, who quotes Goodwin on certain issues, seems to agree in theory. And though his treatment of Roosevelt is far more abbreviated and seen almost entirely through the eyes of Taft, this is perhaps appropriate given the subject of the biography.
The education of Taft was, in the strictest sense, legal. Taft’s father, Alphonso Taft, had a long and successful stint as a judge, serving in the administration of President Ulysses S. Grant as both Attorney General and Secretary of War. His son, bookish and overweight, was not the typical personality associated with a political future. Like his father, the young Taft was fair, took time—sometimes time which he did not have—in order to carefully weigh each issue, and was surprisingly bipartisan despite his lifelong membership in the Republican Party. Stahr succeeds, from the very beginning, at bringing out in Taft the double-edged swords which would both plague him and bless him for the rest of his career of public service. He does this not so much by asserting facts about Taft’s behavior as by providing an extensive treatment of letters from the future President, his college achievements, and the beginnings of his stint as a judge.
Though far more reserved than Goodwin in asserting a connection between Taft’s political turn and the personality of his wife, Stahr does show how the steadying anchor—or, rather, the one who would then and again rock the ship—was Nellie Herron Taft. Convinced that her husband would one day be President, her role is not so much prescriptive as descriptive in this narrative, seen more as a foil to Taft himself than as the “Big Bang” of his political evolution.
Moving on through the critical period as Solicitor General of the United States, through the Spanish-American War, and then into the period of Taft as Governor-General of the Philippines, Stahr begins to demonstrate the considerable administrative and magnetic personality of this bulk of a man. Through his fair and consistent arbitration of disputes, his legal genius in crafting judicial arguments, and his refusal to be swayed, as Roosevelt would be, by flights of passion, Taft nevertheless earned the love and admiration of everyone he came into contact with.
An interesting contrast here arises between Roosevelt and Taft, both of whom managed to attract a group of admirers and both of whom maintained a constant popularity among the populace, even throughout most of their turbulent presidencies. Yet Roosevelt is justly remembered as the man who could fire up the crowds, whose admirers were as fanatical as they were widespread, and whose ethos pervaded every aspect of his administration following the assassination of President William McKinley in 1901. It would be a mistake to assume that Roosevelt was simply more likable, or to assume that Taft had more enemies. In both cases, the contrary is actually true. How, then, can the duality of this phenomenon be explained? A potential explanation, one which Stahr doesn’t address but which he seems to point to, is that, while earning respect in all quarters and love in some, Taft earned devotion in none. Thus, his friends were more likely to be personally close but his allies politically distant. Whereas Taft’s careful handling of the issues gave him significant influence and standing in both chambers of Congress, Roosevelt’s appeal was undoubtedly more democratic and more demagogic. Taft, for all his charm, lacked the unique ability of Roosevelt to convert personal popularity into political capital.
Stahr’s treatment of Taft shows us a reformer, but not a reformist, a conservative by instinct yet a progressive in principle, and these two come awkwardly together in Taft’s leadership during both administrations. As Secretary of War, but, as Stahr notes, de facto vice-president in the truest sense of the word, Taft’s job was to espouse Rooseveltian and, because of this, progressive policies at home and abroad. Though opposed to independence for the Philippines because he did not think them yet capable of self-government, he was equally opposed to the colonialist impulses of the more conservative McKinley-era Republicans, whose desire was simply to keep the Philippines in a perpetual state of political subjugation. Several times, as with Roosevelt’s order to discharge without honor the Black soldiers of the 25th Infantry Regiment in the now-infamous Brownsville Affair, Taft’s convictions would come into conflict with Rooseveltian decisiveness, even if such decisions were poorly based in reality.
The next myth which Stahr seeks to destroy, one to which even a historian such as Doris Kearns Goodwin has fallen prey, is that Taft never sought the Presidency. With direct letters from Taft’s siblings urging him to run, campaign speeches, and simply the fact that Taft broke custom and actively campaigned for the nomination in 1908, fending off challenges from the popular New York Governor Charles Evans Hughes, Stahr demonstrates that, even though he may have been hesitant at first and certainly preferred a Supreme Court appointment, Taft did seek the Presidency, and he achieved it largely through his own personal gravitas as the public front of many Rooseveltian policies. His victory in 1908, though far from assured, was still decisive, and with a mandate to continue the policies of his predecessor, as well as his predecessor’s full confidence and support, Taft set to work.
So, what exactly went wrong?
In a recent book, though in a different context, historian Arthur Herman has identified and contrasted two types of leaders: the founder and the manager. Through this duality, Herman has pointed out, the duties of the founder are, because of their originality, generally more successful. Further, with the inevitable effects of entropy, the manager is, if not fated, then projected to fail, and his success is rare. Taft had a similar task, and it could be argued that fortune was set against his administration from the start. With Roosevelt changing so much, and Taft agreeing in principle with most of those changes, it was Taft’s job not to start something new, but to preserve something older. The principles and policies of his administration, though Progressive in relation to the country at large, were, by definition, conservative in that they tried to maintain a preexisting structure rather than start from zero. Taft, standing on the shoulders of a giant, was perhaps within reach of great success, but a giant such as Roosevelt was not content to remain still for long, and Taft’s safe perch atop the President’s shoulder became less safe as the political environment became more heated.
Stahr’s treatment of Roosevelt in the post-1908 section of the work is one-sided and almost entirely negative. The Roosevelt of 1912, with his apocalyptic energy and declaration of impending Armageddon, receives little serious treatment, and his policies, radical and perhaps even socialistic, are dismissed out of hand. Stahr, who seemingly shares my own and Taft’s conservative outlook, is perhaps too quick to dismiss Roosevelt’s statements of 1912 as his true political dogma, rather than as an attempt to distinguish himself from his successor’s policies. It is a small inconsistency, but one worth noting: he treats Taft’s political change at length, but seems to project negativity in retrospect, calling into question the policies which Taft supported during the first two Roosevelt terms, and fails to point out that Roosevelt would largely return to his Republican convictions during the tenure of Woodrow Wilson and would, through his alliance with Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, cement the Republican legacy for decades to come.
At the heart of the conflict, even leaving aside any reading of it as an inevitability because of the founder/manager distinction, was a fundamentally different view of what the Chief Executive’s role ought to be. Both men could claim some precedence. Roosevelt could point to Lincoln, with his suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, or even more so to Washington and the Federalists, whose crafting of the job of President largely around the personality of Washington himself contributed to a vision of a robust, powerful, and centralized executive. Taft, more in line with Washington’s later tendencies and the conservative precedents he would set, but also comparable to Calvin Coolidge in the 1920s, saw the Chief Executive primarily as a caretaking position. Roosevelt saw everything as allowable for the President unless forbidden by the Constitution; Taft saw everything as forbidden unless allowed. We should not make the mistake of seeing Roosevelt as parallel to, say, Woodrow Wilson on this. Roosevelt was not advocating for a “living Constitution,” and his respect for the document and for its history is evident. Rather, both Republicans, in trying to remain faithful to the mandate of preserving, protecting, and defending it, drew different conclusions about what was and was not allowed in doing so.
Although focusing briefly on the decade of the First World War, with Taft’s life in retirement, his lobbying for the League of Nations, and his desire to work with both President Wilson and the still largely Rooseveltian Republican leadership, while freely criticizing both, Stahr goes into lesser detail here than elsewhere. Indeed, the reader may wish for a broader treatment of this period of the man’s life, as the extraordinary naivete of President Wilson in advocating for the League must be equally Taft’s to bear and would seem contrary to his more conservative principles.
Stahr’s theme throughout the entire narrative is that, in the modern age, Roosevelt’s vision of the executive role has thrived, while Taft’s has not, thus making Taft’s seem more reasonable and better. This is perhaps true, and would fit the mold of the traditional conservative consensus, but whether or not the executive should be strong or dispersed cannot be separated from the focus of the last decade of Taft’s life: the judiciary, specifically, the Supreme Court.
Undoubtedly, the most enduring legacy of the Taft Court is the 1925 Judges Bill, which would allow the Supreme Court the liberty to choose which cases it would and would not take up. Stahr notes this at the outset of the book, naming it not only as the greatest of Taft’s accomplishments during his years on the Supreme Court, but as perhaps the most enduring legacy of all, whether in the judiciary or the executive. Not only this, but Taft also helped start the construction of a new building for the Supreme Court.
Yet one cannot help but infer that even these two great accomplishments, which would leave a long-lasting influence, pale in comparison to the judicial philosophy and uniting force that Taft had in his decade at the head. Able to construct alliances with each justice at one moment, coming to be respected by judicial geniuses as far removed as Oliver Wendell Holmes and George Sutherland, Taft was still bound by none. His fairness meant that the Court’s reputation increased greatly, especially with the solid accumulation of talent on the Court through the numerous appointments of Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge. Indeed, a solution other than simply inferring that Taft was right about the executive and Roosevelt wrong was that Roosevelt’s vision was better generically, and Taft’s better suited for the Court, an argument which Goodwin seems to make in her treatment of the two. This is not to dismiss Stahr’s point about a limited executive looking better in the age of executive power, but simply to suggest that the executive’s role is to—well, execute, and the judge’s role is to judge.
Stahr’s biography is, from start to finish, a masterful achievement. Like few other historians, he makes his subject come alive in a way that he has even failed to replicate in the past with his solid portrayals of Edwin Stanton and William H. Seward. Managing to contain the wealth of sources on Taft’s illustrious career in a single, 700-page volume without skimping and without overburdening the reader with useless detail is perhaps even more impressive than the sustained and consistent argument which the author makes about the lessons of Taft’s life. If you desire to gain another hero for your personal hall of fame, this book will likely disappoint you, but if, on the contrary, you simply wish to learn about a great American life and its legacy, this book will not disappoint.
Review Written by Caleb A. Gerber
November 16th, 2026
How did our national consciousness evolve? How did our perception of ourselves as Americans form, and from whence did it come? Argues historian Matthew Spalding, it came from the Declaration of Independence.
Before 1776, Americans did not think of themselves as Americans. They were British subjects who were members of their own colony: Virginians, New Yorkers, Pennsylvanians; each colony had its own leadership, its own predominant social class, be it the farmer of Massachusetts, the printer from Pennsylvania, or the Virginia aristocrat. They were brethren, yes, but they were not yet a people. When the immortal words “We hold these truths” were written from the Continental Congress, that all began to change: a new nation would form. By 1863, when President Abraham Lincoln delivered the Gettysburg Address, declaring that "four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent, a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal," the transformation was complete. For Lincoln, as for the founders, America was a nation, but not only a nation, not a mere nation; it was a nation founded upon an idea.
Spalding begins his work by discussing a term we have all heard mentioned: patriotism. Spalding writes that a true understanding of this term, which can mean so many things to so many people, “has always been the civic antidote to what C. S. Lewis called ‘the poison of subjectivism.’” Borrowing from Alexis de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French philosopher who toured America in its first couple of decades, Spalding posits that there are two types of patriotism: the first can breed the nationalism of Otto von Bismarck or the self-serving, self-interested geocentrism that has today gained a foothold in some of our governmental institutions. This is not a patriotism based on anything longstanding or permanent; it is mere loyalty, a sheer blind love based only on a sense of community and on nothing more. The second type of patriotism is the American brand: the type that allows soldiers to fight the Nazis on the beaches of Normandy and to plant the American flag on Iwo Jima. It is not because we hate what is in front of us, as Chesterton wrote, nor yet because we like what is behind us, or feel some sort of emotional attachment; it is because we understand that the principles for which we fight are longstanding, permanent, and true. It is because they are all these things that we can give our last full measure of devotion, as did the Union soldiers during the Civil War.
The clarification of terms, such as patriotism, that Spalding does in the early pages of this work makes it easy to follow, yet not easy to skim. It makes you think, as great books do, yet does not cloud your judgment through vague terminology.
Quoting Augustine, Spalding makes clear from the start what the purpose of this book is. Nothing, according to the great theologian of the early church, can be truly loved unless the object of love is known. For us today, that means that for true patriotism, selfless in its purpose, determined in its cause to exist, we must understand exactly why the Declaration of Independence was written, how it was written, and what that changed.
The story of the Continental Congress is not new. Many books have been written on this critical period. The chapters that Spalding spends discussing the history of the Congress, the roles of its players, the international response, and its broader geopolitical place are clear in purpose but vague in accomplishment. For those well versed in American history, nothing illuminating will be gained from these chapters. Similarly, Spalding focuses a large part of his time on the particulars: what the complaints laid out in the Declaration were. This is, of course, important for a political historian, much less so for a philosophical one or for the average reader. Certainly, the validity of the claims made by Jefferson and others played a central role in their day, yet it becomes difficult to see how they could make any difference to ours.
The real strength of this book is its philosophy. Why is it that there are certain “unalienable rights”? What makes these “self-evident”? Who determines that among these are “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness”? The answer takes us back into intellectual history. From the Greeks' understanding of reason (logos), which was then transmitted down to the Christian church, for proof, simply read John 1:1, came the realization that as human beings endowed with the imago Dei, we have the capacity, through our reason, to reach truths about our life, about the human condition, about our telos. From a Christian perspective, which the author shares, it is this knowledge that enables us to know the moral law in the first place, and then realize that we have transgressed against it, which in turn forces us to recognize our depravity and need for redemption. In the political arena, this means that the law can be known without being spelled out. Critically, before the Bill of Rights, there was already a bill of rights written in the universe. Before the Constitution, there was a constitution written on the mind. For this reason, the founders did not appeal to English common law, as some would have wished them to do. Jefferson understood that even without English common law, even without the Magna Carta or the Glorious Revolution, their cause would still be just; the universe would still have the same moral structure and natural law because it would have the same architect and the same lawgiver.
This understanding carries profound implications for modern political thought, especially in jurisprudence. We have come to see law as simply that which guarantees the greatest good for the greatest number; this utilitarianism would have been alien to the founders. We have also come to see government as the institution that preserves our rights. This is, of course, exactly what the founders intended, yet today, some carry it a step further; they reason, wrongly, that if government preserved the rights, then government gave the rights in the first place. Yet if government gave, government could take away. However, if they originate in nature and nature’s God, then government is subject to a higher tribunal, and the Supreme Court is not really the Supreme Court.
Jefferson’s ideas did not simply come from looking up at the sky and racking his own brain, using his own reason to determine that certain rights existed and were being usurped by Parliament and the King. He had come from a rich philosophical and theological tradition that dated back from Augustine and Aquinas, down through Algernon Sidney and John Locke. This was the more political side of philosophy. With natural law come natural rights. Unlike contemporary monarchical systems, which saw the monarch as the divinely appointed leader, the founders saw such a concept as flawed. They saw government as a servant of the people, and the people as servants of God. “But where, says some, is the King of America?” wrote Thomas Paine. “I’ll tell you, Friend, he reigns above, and doth not make havoc of mankind like the Royal Brute of Britain.”
The author dives into the theological background of the Declaration. The fact that the first entity mentioned in the Declaration is not the King of Britain, but the King of Heaven, at least signifies that these were writers who believed in a divine Providence. “As in its opening, the Declaration here appeals to a standard above and beyond human events to vindicate its cause. And the appeal, as before, is not to some overarching sense of history or to ‘the opinions of mankind.’ But it is also not to ‘the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God,’ which man knows through reason. This appeal of the Declaration is to an omniscient God who not only knows all men but also knows the intentions of each man’s heart. While they declared their cause to the opinions of mankind, in the end the Continental Congress seeks a ruling from a higher court.” Spalding goes further, arguing that they had a specifically Christian understanding both of the role of government and of the role of man in relation to government. Writes Spalding: “Only a truly benevolent King, one who is divine and not subject to the passions of man, could be an absolute sovereign. And since governments are instituted among men and not angels, and no individual on this earth has the divine wisdom and authority to rule absolutely, the powers of government must be limited, divided, and checked to ensure the rule of law rather than the arbitrary reign of worldly men.” The Declaration’s signers were not all orthodox Christians; certainly the author, Jefferson, had some unorthodox beliefs, but they were all, down to the last man, versed in the basic presuppositions of Christianity that were predominant in the late eighteenth century, and it was these presuppositions that were basic in the writing, drafting, and approval of this document.
Inextricably linked to a Christian understanding of God is a Christian understanding of man, which the signers also had. These were Protestants, with the exception of Charles Carroll, but they were Protestants familiar and comfortable with the natural law beliefs and writings of Richard Hooker. Man was a rational animal, capable of understanding right and wrong, if not of actually choosing right and eschewing wrong. “It is by his reason, not by allowing the passions to rule or blindly following conventional mores, that man distinguishes between reality and myth, good and evil, the just and the unjust. Nature, as a structure of reality that is unchanging and permanent, and that can be accessed by reason, is the standard of right in making these distinctions. And as man seeks relationships with others to fulfill that nature, man is a political animal, as Aristotle famously observes, men come to live in communities based on agreed purposes and a common understanding of justice.” The author then makes an even more stunning, but likely accurate, claim: “This argument is the basis of Western thought about man and politics.”
Of course, reason is not the only reason. There is a place for faith; in fact, faith is necessary in a Christian society, though not necessarily in the way modern secular critics often imagine. Spalding’s discussion of human nature is especially enlightening in this regard; society today seems to oscillate between two extremes: the utopianism of Marx, Rousseau, and the Romantics, which assumes that human beings are fundamentally good and that social problems can be solved through proper institutions, and, on the other hand, sheer cynicism, such as that found in Thomas Hobbes, which sees humans as utterly depraved, needing a government to compel them to some form of social stability. Instead, Spalding writes, the founders had a diametrically opposed conception of man: “This is not Thomas Hobbes’s brutish world of man against man, violently seeking to avoid death, or of petty man constantly dominated by narrow self-interests and lowly desires. This is a sacred conception of man, altogether human yet willing to sacrifice and suffer for the highest of ends.”
Spalding demonstrates that the Founders understood liberty not as the freedom to do whatever one wishes, but as the freedom to do what one ought. Rights existed alongside duties; freedom existed alongside virtue. The American experiment depended not merely upon constitutional structures, but upon the character of the citizenry itself. People incapable of self-government could not remain free for long. A people who do not know what they love will not love it for long. Failing to understand where we came from will result in a failure to go where we ought.
Review Written by Caleb A. Gerber
June 3rd, 2026
The Supreme Court is an institution filled with history—good, bad, and ugly. It is an institution which has, in its record, handed down decisions both accurate and misguided, well-reasoned and socially legislated. Its justices have at times been well-equipped to address the deepest questions of government’s role, and in other cases, they have been people whose names will forever linger as those who failed to exercise their gift of reason, or who reasoned from faulty premises. In Mollie Hemingway’s most recent book, she does not simply give a history of a justice or a biography of Samuel Alito, but a history of the institution and a biography of the Court itself.
Hemingway has a remarkable gift for making complex subjects simple without losing their complexity. She has gone to great lengths to personally interview those who knew Alito when he was serving on the Court of Appeals, as well as those who have come to know him intimately—not only as a judge, but as a husband, a citizen, and even as a baseball fan. Her facts are well documented, and the one area where there is room for critique is not that she has under-documented the portrait she attempts to paint, but that at times she has over-documented it. In her pursuit of exactitude, she occasionally includes quotes that border on the vulgar. Notwithstanding this, it is admirable that instead of simply presenting Alito the justice, she has also shown us Alito the man.
Certainly, while always remaining within the bounds of the facts—all the facts—Hemingway has arranged them in such a way as to make the reader sympathetic to Alito and his interpretation of the law. She offers many critiques of other justices, both liberal and conservative. Sonia Sotomayor bears a large share of the blame for some of the more controversial decisions made by the Court, as does Chief Justice John Roberts. Neil Gorsuch, Clarence Thomas, Elena Kagan, and Amy Coney Barrett are presented as figures who are at times in real opposition to what Alito considers the necessary course of action. Ketanji Brown Jackson, I must admit, is treated with considerable contempt, and in this I do not disagree. Even someone as widely respected as former Justice Antonin Scalia is, at times, criticized by Hemingway through Alito. Indeed, one of the most interesting aspects of this book is that it not only shows the Court as it is now, but also as it once was, with in-depth descriptions of justices such as Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, John Paul Stevens, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter. This greatly enriches the narrative, as it shows Alito in relation to others who were at times more famous, who at times outshone him, but from whom he always earned respect and admiration.
The name of Justice Samuel Alito will likely be remembered for his opinion in the decision in Dobbs, which struck down a fifty-year precedent that protected what you describe as the right of some human beings to murder other human beings. In some ways, the history of every Court since Roe v. Wade, from Rehnquist down to Roberts, has been the history of a colossal failure to adequately respond to what you view as an egregious abuse of constitutional law and constitutional telos. Samuel Alito was a young man studying at Yale when Roe was handed down. Now in his seventies, he helped to strike it from the record.
The author also devotes a significant portion of the book, intermittently, to Alito’s judicial philosophy. I was quite surprised to learn that Alito is not, as I had imagined, a pure constitutional originalist in the same sense as Antonin Scalia or Clarence Thomas. What Hemingway calls Alito’s “all steak, no sizzle” approach to judicial review is, she argues, his defining characteristic as a Supreme Court justice. He is, in a way, a very original originalist. Unlike Scalia, he takes a more practical approach; he believes in the Constitution and in the values it embodies, but he also believes in common sense. It is not only by reading the Constitution of the United States that we can understand Alito’s philosophy; we must also read what might be called the constitution of nature.
This practicality, without descending into a legal positivism that sees man as nothing more than a subject of law, is what gives Alito’s jurisprudence its distinctive texture. He is not content with a cold recitation of clauses, nor does he wander into the fog of untethered moral invention. Instead, Hemingway presents him as a judge who reads the Constitution with one eye on its text and the other on the enduring realities of human nature. Law, in this view, is neither an abstract game nor a malleable instrument, but a framework built for real people within a real moral order.
This should be required reading in classes on jurisprudence and the American legal system. Hemingway, in a move that is rare among explicitly biased political reporters—even on the conservative spectrum—has managed, to a remarkable degree, to stay out of the political realm, for which she deserves admiration. Certainly, she does not hesitate to call things as she sees them, or as Alito sees them, but her goal is not primarily political, and in reading this book, ours should not be either.
Review written by C. A. Gerber
May 4th, 2026
The Hour of the Madman has arrived.
Carl Trueman once again delivers a stunning, accurate portrayal of the problems facing modern humanity. “We have killed God,” declared Nietzsche, yet we still want to be subject to His laws. No, he urges, we have unbound the earth from the sun, and we must face the consequences of our actions. If we have killed God, we must become gods ourselves. The limits, ends, and obligations given to us by this Higher Being are no longer applicable, but the only way to prove this is to desecrate Him. We must desecrate the holy, trample underfoot the limits, create our own ends, and leave unfulfilled all the obligations that have bound us to each other and to a higher purpose. Only then can we create our own sense of purpose, our own ends, limits, and obligations.
This is such an accurate portrayal of the modern age. Why is it that there has been such a viciously anti-Christian surge in recent years? Why has that which was held sacred for generations now become commonplace, even vulgar? Why does modern culture deny the basic facts of reality when they are in plain black-and-white letters, staring it in the face?
Yet when we do this, when we defy the sacred and desecrate God, Trueman argues, the end result is very simple: we desecrate ourselves as well. The limits we seek to triumph over are still limiting us. Death is an unavoidable conclusion, a fact of life; biological sex is binding, however much modern culture seeks to claim otherwise. And the cost of denying this is great. We become like the madman; we end up insane, just as Nietzsche did. We reach the bottom, the pit of nihilistic despair.
By desecrating the sacred, we have desecrated ourselves, and the only answer is once more to sanctify the God of our fathers. By doing so, we will find the answer to the question of the ages, the anthropological question: what is man?
The choice is simple. Trueman makes it clear that there is no third route, no alternative. Many have tried, but all have failed. We must either embrace the reality of the Creator of the universe, along with His teleology, or we must go the way of Nietzsche. If we deny the former, we necessarily choose the latter, and in doing so, the madman becomes the only man among us with any sanity.
Review Written by C. A. Gerber
February 27th, 2026
Two great men. Two classics. And a war that brought it all about.
In The War for Middle Earth, Tolkien scholar Joseph Loconte takes a deep look into the defining conflict of the twentieth century and how it shaped the lives, the works, and the ideas of C. S. Lewis and J. R. R. Tolkien. One, a Catholic philologist; the other, an atheist turned Christian apologist, both realizing that the Second World War was not simply a conflict between two entities seeking territorial domination. Rather, it was a conflict between the forces of good, of Western civilization, of honor and of virtue, facing off against the forces of evil represented by totalitarian Germany and, later, Soviet Russia.
Interviewing noted historians of this period, including Sir Niall Ferguson, Loconte looks not only at how the war shaped their perceptions of the world, but how the perceptions of the pre–WWII world shaped the war. Following the killing fields of the Great War, in which both men lost friends, the entire world seemed to reel. Why was war even necessary? Thus, pacifist groups and anti-war advocates began their slow climb to the zenith of their power, to utterly disastrous consequences. Unnerved by his experience in the Battle of the Somme, Tolkien nonetheless realized that sticking his head in the sand would not take away the threat from totalitarian states. To blind oneself to the truth of evil would not make evil blind itself to the truth of good and to its attempt to conquer it.
Loconte does a good job of portraying the grueling reality of war, not as a glorious conflict in itself, but as one which, though bloody, has the potential for glory. He shows how the prevailing narrative of the day, that war was something evil which must be avoided at all costs, ultimately did nothing to prevent the arrival of the bloodiest conflict of the twentieth century, but also the clearest example of a moral war; a war waged by the defenders of Western culture against the wielders of totalitarian evil.
Both intellectual history and historical biography, Loconte treats not only Lewis and Tolkien and their works as directly influenced by the conflict of their age, but he also shows us the presuppositions and ideologies of the day, from Freudian psychoanalysis to the despair of T. S. Eliot, and the works of pessimistic anti-war writers such as Erich Maria Remarque and Ernest Hemingway. Furthermore, he deals with the political machinations of those who desired to avoid war at all costs, such as Neville Chamberlain and Franklin D. Roosevelt before Pearl Harbor, as well as those who sensed the danger coming and spoke about it, Winston Churchill being foremost among them.
The War for Middle Earth should be a book that you read, reread, and read again. It should be a book whose thesis you think about every time you read one of Tolkien’s poems or Lewis’s literary critiques. It should be a book that you place on your bookshelf and show off to your friends. It is a treasure. It will remain such.
The author exposes the heart of the totalitarian state in all its manifestations. It is, he argues, the logical step on the ladder that leads to Nietzsche’s superman; it is, in its basest form, the will to power. The only answer, for Lewis and for Tolkien, and for us today, is the will to fight. We may wish, like Frodo, that we had been born in a different time, in a different place; we may wish that this responsibility had not been assigned to us. “So do all who live to see such times,” as Gandalf states, “but that is not for them to decide.” All that we have to decide is what to do with the time that is given us. The War for Middle Earth did not end at the Gates of Mordor, nor with the surrender of Germany; the war rages on, and we, as in the days of Tolkien and Lewis, are called to fight.