Research
Joint work with Silvia Dominguez Martinez, Jurjen Kamphorst and Otto H. Swank - Journal of Labor Economics 39.2 (2021): 437-460
We analyze the consequences of labor-market quotas for the wages of women in high-level positions. Labor-market quotas create uncertainty about the reason why a woman is promoted. Firms know whether they promoted their female employees because of the quota or their ability, their competitors do not. A winner's curse, reducing competition for women in high-level positions, results. This widens the gender pay gap for these women. Ex ante women are better off without quotas. Next, we investigate how quotas affect incentives for employers to learn the abilities of women to make better job-assignment decisions. Then, under specific conditions women may benefit.
Joint work with Vladimir Karamychev and Otto H. Swank - Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 149 (2018): 294-314
Communication through ordinary talk is very common. Often, the receiver of information has the option to investigate a sender's type. We extend a standard cheap-talk model by giving the receiver this option. We show that when the receiver bears most of the investigation cost, the option to investigate drives away most cheap-talk communication. When the sender pays a substantial part of the investigation cost, the option to investigate disciplines the sender. Introducing an investigation device to a cheap-talk model demonstrates the vulnerability of cheap talk on the one hand, and shows how communication can be improved on the other.
Joint work with Josse Delfgaauw, Vladimir Karamychev and Otto H. Swank (working paper)
Studies on organizational design typically show how the distribution of information and communication costs shape the allocation of decision rights in organizations. In this paper, we follow the opposite approach. For a given decision-making process, in which multiple parties are involved, we analyze how much information is acquired, how communication takes place, and what is communicated to whom. Our paper is a first step towards a positive theory of management information systems. We show how the strength and timing of monetary incentives, the need to persuade external parties, and the cost of more accurate information shape the design of management information systems. Our results highlight the interaction between information acquisition and communication. From a theoretical perspective, we show that by adding information acquisition to a cheap-talk model, the forward induction refinement excludes the babbling equilibrium provided another equilibrium exists.
Joint work with Casper G. de Vries (working paper)
Technological progress spurred the growth of data-driven loan markets for small firms. Asset-based lenders supply these data-driven loans based on floating collateral. Close monitoring of collateral results in information asymmetry and involves third-degree price discrimination. We analyze the effect of loan portfolio composition, competition, and costs on the distribution of interest rates and the mobility of firms. We find that the loan portfolio composition substantially impacts lending rates. Increased competition does not benefit firms through lower expected rates, neither does it improve their mobility. A decrease in monitoring costs may, however, benefit borrowers.
The effect of Immigration Laws on Workplace Safety
Joint work with Caspar D. Peter (work in progress)
Workplace safety in the US has improved dramatically over the last 50 years and as a result the number of work-related fatalities went from approximately 14,000 around 1970 to 5,333 fatal work injuries in 2019. Even though work-related fatalities have decreased in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the work force, the decrease in work-related fatalities percentagewise for immigrants lags behind. Immigrants are over-represented in these statistics; in 2019 20% of fatal work-related injuries concerned Hispanic or Latin employees and 12% Black or African American employees.
In this paper we analyze the effect of local enforcement of immigration laws on workplace safety. We use the implementation of local enforcement of immigration through section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act as a shock during the period 2002-2011. Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act can influence workplace safety in two ways. First, stricter immigration laws result in immigrant families wanting to stay under the radar to avoid possible detention and deportation of unauthorized family members. As a result, immigrant workers in mixed-status households feel less inclined to speak up about workplace safety, which results in less safe working environments. Second, the fear of deportation drives illegal immigrants out of (illegal) labor and hence places an additional financial strain on the income of mixed-status households. The additional financial strain results in more (working hours of) legal immigrants within these mixed-status families in possible hazardous jobs.
We exploit spatial-temporal variation in the implementation of 287(g) within the US. We compare the establishments’ number of work-related reported injuries from counties with 287(g) to establishments from neighboring counties, before and after the implementation of 287(g). We find a 4% increase in (fatal) injuries and illnesses after the implementation of the immigration law. In sum, we show that the implementation of strict immigration laws might result in negative externalities for legal immigrants within mixed status households. This increase in unsafe working environments increases inequality between immigrant and non-immigrant employees.
This paper studies the effect of gender biased ability signals on non-compulsory education attainment by women. Gender biases are assumed to lead to less dispersed ability signals for women in compulsory education in comparison to men. If ability signals for women are more affected by biases, women are more likely to attend low education, in contrast to men. Men are more likely to opt out of education or follow high education. I show that women are less likely to opt out of education, if the education costs rise, but opt out at a higher rate than men if they do. The model also shows that unemployment expectations have a larger impact on the educational attainment of women. Better labor market prospects increase the educational attainment of women at a higher rate than for men. I explore the data of the European Social Survey (ESS) to test the implications of the model.