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I. The Geometry of Harm
Every description of elder financial exploitation begins the same way. There is a victim. There is a perpetrator. Between them runs a line of harm — financial, physical, emotional, and relational — harm that takes every form the field has named — and the entire apparatus of the field is organized around that line. The advocate names it. The prosecutor charges across it. The researcher measures it. The social worker intervenes along it.
This is not wrong. But it is incomplete in a way that has consequences. When we describe harm as something that happens between two people, we have already made a sociological choice — one that shapes what we see, what we miss, and who we hold responsible.
Georg Simmel, writing at the turn of the twentieth century, called this the dyad. It is the simplest social form: two elements, one relation. Simmel observed that the dyad is also the most fragile. Unlike every larger group, it dissolves the moment either member withdraws. There is no supraindividual structure above the two parties to hold the relation in place, no third element to absorb the shock of conflict or carry the weight of continuity. What the dyad has in intimacy, it pays for in instability. The marriage, the friendship, the business partnership — all are dyadic at their core, and all depend entirely on the commitment of their two members.
Elder financial exploitation, as the field has long understood it, is a dyadic phenomenon. An older adult and an exploiter. A victim and a perpetrator. And that framing, however accurate as a description of what happens in the room, has embedded costs that the field is only beginning to count.
Figure 1. The dyad has a politics: two directions of damage. The dyadic framing of elder financial exploitation does its damage simultaneously in both directions — and the damage is structural, not incidental. The left cell maps the first direction: causation is narrowed. When harm is described as something that happens between two people, the individual exploiter becomes the whole story. The structural and institutional conditions that make exploitation possible at scale — the legal instruments that concentrate access without accountability, the proceedings that remove capable guardians and install strangers, the ageism that makes the removal of an older adult's autonomy seem reasonable — are rendered invisible. The harm appears to have a perpetrator. It does not appear to have a architecture. The right cell maps the second direction: blame is redistributed. When the victim occupies a peripheral or causal position in the description of her own harm — her cognitive decline named as the occasion for the proceeding, her social isolation treated as an individual vulnerability rather than a manufactured condition, her failure to report cited as evidence of complexity rather than as evidence of the exploiter's success — partial responsibility migrates from the person who acted to the person who was acted upon. The bottom bar states the essay's governing claim: the form of the description is not innocent. The dyad, as a way of seeing, has a politics — and that politics has consequences for who the field protects, who it holds responsible, and who it leaves outside the door. Sources: Simmel, Georg. Soziologie: Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung. Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1908. Translated by Kurt H. Wolff as The Sociology of Georg Simmel. New York: Free Press, 1950. Fausey, Caitlin M., and Lera Boroditsky. “Subtle Linguistic Cues Influence Perceived Blame and Financial Liability.” Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 17, no. 5 (2010): 644–651. Luhmann, Niklas. "Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives." In Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, edited by Diego Gambetta. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988.
II. The Blame Embedded in the Form
When harm is described as a two-party event, the structure of the description itself assigns responsibility. Syntactic research on how language frames causation has shown that the choice between active and passive constructions, between agent-first and patient-first sentences, shapes how listeners attribute blame and how much responsibility they assign to the person harmed. “He exploited her” points clearly. “She was exploited” diffuses. “She allowed herself to be taken advantage of” redirects. Each construction inhabits the same dyadic space — two parties, one relation — but distributes culpability differently, and the distribution is almost never neutral.
Figure 2. The blame embedded in the form: three syntactic constructions of the same harm. The three rows map the same event — one person financially exploiting another — through three constructions that distribute blame differently. In the active construction, the agent is named first, responsibility points clearly to the exploiter, and the effect is unambiguous attribution. In the passive construction, the agent disappears and blame diffuses across both parties. In the patient-as-agent construction, the victim becomes the grammatical subject of her own harm and culpability migrates entirely to her — rendered visually in the shift of the blame-weight bar from left to right. The distribution is not a stylistic choice. It is an argument. The field’s historical tendency toward passive and patient-as-agent constructions has had measurable consequences for how older adults are perceived and treated in the proceedings nominally convened on their behalf. Source: Anderson, Kirsty, and John McClure. “Subtle Linguistic Cues Influence Perceived Blame and Financial Liability.” Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 17, no. 5 (2010): 644–651.
In elder financial exploitation, the dyadic framing has historically done its damage in two directions at once. It has narrowed the field of causation to the individual exploiter, making structural and institutional conditions invisible — the lawful but awful arrangements that make exploitation possible at scale. And it has repeatedly invited attribution of partial responsibility to the person harmed: her cognitive decline, her social isolation, her failure to report. The form of the description is not innocent. The dyad, as a way of seeing, has a politics.
What the syntactic analysis reveals at the surface, Niklas Luhmann’s sociology of trust explains at depth. Luhmann draws a precise distinction between confidence and trust. Confidence is the expectation that things will hold without any deliberate commitment on your part — you are confident that the financial system will function as it usually does. If confidence is disappointed, the failure is attributed externally: something happened to you. Trust is categorically different. It presupposes a previous engagement on your part — a choice made in spite of the possibility of betrayal, in a situation where, as Luhmann specifies, the possible damage may be greater than the advantage you seek. If trust is betrayed, the disappointment cannot be attributed externally. You made an internal engagement. You took a risk. The betrayal, in some sense, is yours to reckon with.
The older adult who grants a power of attorney, who discloses the location of their assets to a trusted family member, who accepts financial help from someone they have known for decades — is extending trust in precisely Luhmann’s sense. The possible damage is greater than the advantage sought. The engagement is internal. And when betrayal comes, the legal and social response has systematically misread it: converting a trust betrayal into a confidence miscalculation, and then — in the worst constructions — converting the miscalculation into the victim’s fault. “She allowed herself to be taken advantage of” does not merely redirect blame. It retroactively reclassifies an act of trust as an act of negligence. Luhmann’s framework shows why that reclassification is not merely unkind but structurally false.
III. What the Third Element Changes
Simmel’s insight was that the addition of a third element does not merely add a party to an existing relationship. It changes the nature of the relationship itself. The triad introduces possibilities that are structurally unavailable to the dyad: mediation, coalition, and the distribution of power across a more complex field.
The third element, Simmel observed, can function in at least three distinct ways. As the non-partisan — equidistant from both parties — it can absorb the heat of a conflict and return it in more objective form. The vehemence of one party, when routed through a non-partisan, loses the tone that would otherwise provoke matching vehemence from the other. Reconciliation becomes possible not because either party has changed their underlying interests, but because the form of their communication has been transformed. Antagonism of the will is reduced, as Simmel put it, to intellectual antagonism — and reason, unlike will, finds common ground.
The third element can also function as the tertius gaudens: the third who benefits. Where two parties are in conflict, a third who remains unengaged can extract advantage from their mutual preoccupation. Simmel traced this dynamic across scales — from the German Center Party’s parliamentary leverage to England’s centuries-long role as the tongue of the European balance — but its most intimate expression is in personal exploitation: the financial advisor who positions himself as sole manager, gradually edging out the family members who ask too many questions; or, in the most formalized expression of this dynamic, the court-appointed guardian who gains plenary authority precisely because the Concerned Persons who knew the older adult have been excluded from the proceeding.
And the third element can function as the agent of divide and rule: deliberately producing conflict between two parties who, unified, would be a threat to a third. Simmel’s analysis of the Inca strategy — dividing conquered tribes into approximately equal halves and giving their supervisors slightly different ranks, enough to produce rivalry but not enough to permit organic resolution — is an account of manufactured instability as a technique of domination. The key insight is that the slight difference in rank is the instrument. Equal ranks would permit peer collaboration; vastly different ranks would produce clear subordination; only the marginal asymmetry generates the jealousy that prevents coalition. In elder financial exploitation, the same dynamic operates without an architect: siblings placed in competition over a parent’s finances, each one slightly more trusted, slightly less informed than the other — not enough asymmetry to produce hierarchy, enough to prevent the coalition that would check the exploiter’s access. In its most formalized expression, the legal proceeding that converts a family’s concern into adversarial positioning — placing relatives in competition for standing, appointing a stranger as the decisive authority — can function as a structural divide and rule, whether or not any individual actor intends it that way.
Figure 3. Simmel's three functions of the third element — applied to elder justice. The three columns map Simmel's typology from Soziologie (1908) onto the elder justice context, rendering each function as both a structural description and a practical consequence. The non-partisan — equidistant from both parties — absorbs the heat of conflict and returns it in a form that reason, rather than will, can engage. In the elder justice context, this is the mediating function of the Concerned Person: the family member, friend, or neighbor whose relational knowledge of both the older adult and the family system allows them to absorb conflict before it hardens into the adversarial positioning that protective proceedings often produce. The Tertius Gaudens — the third who benefits — extracts advantage from the conflict of others while remaining unengaged. In the elder justice context, this is the dynamic by which the trusted other consolidates access: edging out the family members who ask too many questions, positioning themselves as sole manager, gaining plenary authority precisely because the Concerned Persons who knew the older adult have been excluded from the proceeding. The divide and rule column names the most deliberately engineered variant: conflict between two parties is manufactured — through marginal asymmetry of rank, access, or information — to prevent the coalition that would check the third party's power. In elder financial exploitation, the architecture need not be conscious: siblings placed in slight competition, each one marginally more trusted or less informed than the other, never coalesce into the protective coalition that would disrupt the exploiter’s access. In its most formalized expression, the legal proceeding that converts family concern into adversarial positioning — placing relatives in competition for standing while appointing a stranger as decisive authority — can function as structural divide and rule regardless of intent. The bottom bar carries the section's governing claim: these outcomes do not require bad actors. They require only people operating inside a form that produces these results regardless of intentions — which is precisely what makes the structural analysis, rather than the moral one, the more powerful instrument for reform. Sources: Simmel, Georg. Soziologie: Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung. Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1908. Translated by Kurt H. Wolff as The Sociology of Georg Simmel. New York: Free Press, 1950. See especially "Quantitative Aspects of the Group," pp. 118–169. Caplow, Theodore. “A Theory of Coalitions in the Triad.” American Sociological Review 21, no. 4 (August 1956): 489–493.
The dynamic is amplified in family systems by a specific psychological condition: the waning authority of an aging parent can reactivate maladaptive patterns formed in childhood — rivalries, asymmetries of trust, competitions for approval that were never fully resolved. Adult children who functioned as peers under the parent's intact authority may find those equilibria destabilized as that authority diminishes. The sibling who consolidates access — who becomes the one the parent calls, the one who manages the finances, the one whose judgment is deferred to — may be exploiting a structural opportunity, a psychological wound, or both simultaneously.
The sibling who consolidates access — who becomes the one the parent calls, the one who manages the finances, the one whose judgment is deferred to — may be exploiting a structural opportunity, a psychological wound, or both simultaneously. The pattern that results has a name.
Figure 4. The Balkanization of the family system: how diminishing parental authority activates latent rivalry, prevents the coalition that protects, and forecloses the space a Concerned Person would occupy. Stage 1 maps the family in equilibrium — the parent’s intact authority holding the adult children in roughly equal relationship, sibling connections present, the structure stable. Stage 2 maps the transition: authority diminishing, lines of access becoming unequal, one child favored, the coalition beginning to fray. Stage 3 maps the consequence: the center vacant, the children fragmented and isolated, no sibling connections remaining, the coalition that would check exploitation structurally prevented — and the space a Concerned Person might have occupied already filled before they can arrive. The center is left empty deliberately — the reader supplies what fills it. The dynamic does not require a conscious architect. It requires only a family system with unresolved asymmetries and a parent whose diminishing authority has removed the force that once held them in check. The pattern has a geopolitical name: Balkanization. The exploiter does not create the rivalry. They inherit it — and use it. Sources: Simmel, Georg. Soziologie. Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1908. Translated by Kurt H. Wolff as The Sociology of Georg Simmel. Free Press, 1950. Caplow, Theodore. "A Theory of Coalitions in the Triad." American Sociological Review 21, no. 4 (1956): 489–493.
IV. Coalition and the Counterintuitive Advantage of the Weak
Theodore Caplow, building directly on Simmel in 1956, formalized the coalition dynamics of the triad into a predictive theory. His central finding runs against intuition: in the triad, the strongest member often becomes the most isolated. When one member is stronger than the other two but not stronger than their combined force, the two weaker members have every incentive to coalesce. The stronger member, paradoxically, has no reliable coalition partner — no one benefits from aligning with them, because alignment with strength offers no compensating advantage within the coalition. The weak, Caplow concluded, are often the most secure.
This has direct application to protective intervention. The Concerned Person — the neighbor who noticed, the friend who called, the adult child who petitioned — is not, by conventional measures, powerful. They have no legal standing in most protective proceedings. They cannot compel disclosure, cannot require accounting, cannot challenge an appointment they never had the right to influence. And yet, in Simmel’s terms, they occupy the most structurally significant position: they are the third element whose presence or absence determines whether the dyad between the older adult and the exploiter remains unchallenged.
The Concerned Person is the coalition partner the law does not recognize. Their exclusion from formal proceedings is not a neutral administrative decision. It is a structural choice that collapses the triad back into the dyad — and the dyad, as Simmel told us, is the most fragile form, the one that offers no mediation, no distribution of power, no third element to absorb what the two parties cannot resolve between themselves.
Figure 5. Before and after the Concerned Person is excluded. The left side maps the triad intact: the vulnerable older adult, the motivated offender, and the Concerned Person form the three-element structure that Cohen and Felson's Routine Activity Theory identifies as the condition under which exploitation is deterred. With the triad intact, the Concerned Person simultaneously functions as personal handler, capable guardian, and place manager — disrupting all three conditions an offender must overcome, as the companion essay Capable Guardians develops in full. The older adult is protected. The exploitation is deterred. The right side maps the dyad restored: the Concerned Person has been excluded, replaced by a ghost circle. The vulnerable older adult and the motivated offender now face each other directly, with no third element to absorb the conflict, mediate the relationship, or check the exercise of power. The harm line is unobstructed. The structure that Simmel identified as the most fragile form — the only relationship that dissolves entirely when either member withdraws, the only one that offers no buffer against the exercise of power within it — has been reinstated. The bottom bar carries the essay's load-bearing claim: the Concerned Person's exclusion is not incidental to the exploitation. It is load-bearing. The removal comes first. The financial harm follows. Sources: Cohen, Lawrence E., and Marcus Felson. "Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach." American Sociological Review 44, no. 4 (August 1979): 588–608. https://doi.org/10.2307/2094589. Felson, Marcus. "Those Who Discourage Crime." In Crime and Place: Crime Prevention Studies, Vol. 4, edited by John E. Eck and David Weisburd, 53–66. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 1995. Simmel, Georg. Soziologie: Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung. Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1908. Translated by Kurt H. Wolff as The Sociology of Georg Simmel. New York: Free Press, 1950.
Figure 6. From dyad to triad: the structural comparison. The left column maps the isolated dyad: the older adult — trust extended — and the exploiter — trust betrayed — connected by the harm line, with no third element, no mediation, and no coalition. It is, as Simmel observed, the most fragile social form: the only relationship that dissolves entirely when either member withdraws, and the only one that offers no structural buffer against the exercise of power within it. The right column maps the triad restored: the Concerned Person at the apex, connected to both parties by lines that are differentiated — solid to the older adult, the primary protective relationship; dashed to the exploiter, the monitoring relationship. With the triad intact, the Concerned Person simultaneously mediates conflict, builds the coalition that checks the exploiter's access, and observes the exercise of power that the dyad alone cannot check. The middle cell names the operational consequence: exploitation requires isolation to succeed. The Concerned Person's presence is not merely supportive — it is structurally disruptive to the conditions exploitation requires. The bottom bar carries the essay’s two load-bearing formulations: the Concerned Person is the coalition partner the law does not recognize, and their exclusion is a structural choice — not a neutral administrative outcome — that collapses the triad back into the dyad, restoring precisely the fragility the protective proceeding was convened to address. Sources: Simmel, Georg. Soziologie: Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung. Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1908. Translated by Kurt H. Wolff as The Sociology of Georg Simmel. New York: Free Press, 1950. Caplow, Theodore. “A Theory of Coalitions in the Triad.” American Sociological Review 21, no. 4 (August 1956): 489–493.
V. The Dyad as Diagnostic
The field of elder justice inherited its dyadic framing from criminology, which inherited it from law. Crime, as Christie argued, is a conflict that the state has appropriated — taken from the parties directly involved and converted into a transaction between the state and the accused. What gets lost in that conversion is precisely the relational web in which the harm occurred: the third parties who witnessed it, the Concerned Persons who tried to intervene, the community whose norms were violated. The victim, Christie wrote, becomes a double loser — first to the offender, and then, often more cripplingly, by being denied the right to full participation in what might have been one of the most important encounters of their life. "The victim," he concluded, "has lost the case to the state."
Elder financial exploitation fits this diagnosis with uncomfortable precision. The legal proceeding that follows a finding of exploitation is organized around two parties — the state and the perpetrator, or the petitioner and the respondent — and the older adult, the person at the center of the harm, often occupies a peripheral position in the very proceeding convened on their behalf. The Concerned Persons who made the proceeding possible are further removed still. The formal structure of the response reconstitutes the dyad at every turn, even when the social reality of the harm was thoroughly triadic. The conflict that belongs to the family — the question of what happened to the savings, who had access, how the transfers were authorized — is taken from them and converted into a legal proceeding in which they have no standing, no voice, and no recognized role. The technical vocabulary of fiduciary duty, power of attorney, and authorized signatory becomes the instrument of expropriation.
Christie's structural thieves argument explains why this pattern is not incidental. Age segregation — the systematic separation of older adults from the networks that would make their conflicts visible and manageable — is not an accident of modern life. It is a structural feature of industrialized societies that Christie identified in 1977 and that has deepened in the decades since. The more isolated a segment is, the more the weakest among parties is alone, open for abuse. Isolation is not merely a risk factor for elder financial exploitation. It is the precondition Christie describes: the mechanism that removes the third element before the harm begins.
The dyad is manufactured before the exploiter arrives. Professional thieves and structural thieves operate in sequence — the structural conditions produce the isolation, and the professional apparatus then takes what remains.
The dyad, then, is not merely a description. It is a diagnostic. When a protective system consistently fails to keep the Concerned Persons in the room — when it excludes the family member, marginalizes the neighbor, denies standing to the friend — it is not failing incidentally. It is expressing the dyadic logic of a legal system that has not yet learned to work in three dimensions.
Figure 7. How the legal response restores the dyad. The left side maps the triad intact before the legal proceeding begins: the Concerned Person is present, the guardian function is active, exploitation is deterred. The social reality of the harm is thoroughly triadic — the older adult, the offender, and the Concerned Person whose presence constitutes the protective third element that Simmel's sociology of forms identifies as the condition under which mediation, coalition, and the checking of power become possible. The right side maps what the legal proceeding produces: the justice system and the alleged offender form the active dyad; the vulnerable older adult is rendered peripheral; the Concerned Person is excluded entirely. The ghost circles on the right — dashed, gray, labeled peripheral and excluded — render Christie’s double loser argument visually. The older adult loses first to the offender, and then to a proceeding that removes them from the center of their own case. The Concerned Person — the third element whose presence would restore the triad, whose relational knowledge of the older adult constitutes the most effective form of capable guardianship Felson’s hierarchy identifies — loses their role, their access, and in most jurisdictions their legal standing to challenge any of it. The Christie quotation in the bottom bar names the mechanism precisely: the proceeding is converted from something between the concrete parties into a conflict between one of the parties and the state. What Christie called the conflict's rightful owners — the people to whom it belongs by virtue of their direct stake in its outcome — are expropriated by the professional apparatus that takes it from them. The technical vocabulary of fiduciary duty, power of attorney, and authorized signatory becomes, in Christie's terms, the instrument of structural theft. The Concerned Person has no recognized role in that conversion. Their exclusion is not a procedural oversight. It is the dyadic logic of a legal system that has not yet learned to work in three dimensions. Sources: Christie, Nils. “Conflicts as Property.” British Journal of Criminology 17, no. 1 (January 1977): 1–15. Felson, Marcus. “Those Who Discourage Crime.” In Crime and Place: Crime Prevention Studies, Vol. 4, edited by John E. Eck and David Weisburd, 53–66. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 1995. Simmel, Georg. Soziologie: Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung. Leipzig: Duncker und Humblot, 1908. Translated by Kurt H. Wolff as The Sociology of Georg Simmel. New York: Free Press, 1950.
VI. Safety Nets Require Safety Networks
The companion essay Capable Guardians develops Routine Activity Theory and its application to elder financial exploitation in full. Its central finding is directly relevant here: Cohen and Felson’s capable guardian and the law's court-appointed guardian are not merely different in degree but opposite in kind. That essay also establishes that Felson ranks personal guardians the most effective category of capable guardianship, while the legal system too frequently grants plenary power to the category he ranks least effective: the stranger with a court appointment.
Simmel’s sociology of forms explains why this inversion is not merely ironic but structurally consequential. The dyad between the older adult and the court-appointed stranger is not embedded in a network. It has no third element, no mediating presence, no coalition to check the exercise of power. It replicates, with official sanction, exactly the isolated dyadic structure in which exploitation flourishes. And research on third-party intervention in conflict — including Corbetta and Grant’s demonstration that the structure of triadic relations shapes not only whether a third party intervenes but what kind of intervention they choose — confirms that structural position is not incidental to protective outcomes: it is constitutive of them.
In Luhmann’s terms, the system that produces this outcome has already begun the vicious circle. When the system consistently fails to protect — when the stranger with a court appointment proves less effective than the personal guardian who knew the older adult, when the family’s concern is dismissed rather than incorporated, when the proceedings produce outcomes that the community around the older adult recognizes as wrong — the result is not merely a failed intervention. It is an erosion of confidence in the system itself. And the erosion of confidence, Luhmann shows, degrades the conditions under which trust becomes possible at all. The older adult who might have reached out does not. The Concerned Person who tried once and was turned away does not try again. The network that might have formed around a vulnerable person contracts instead. The isolation deepens. The dyad closes. The vicious circle completes itself.
A genuine protective response would have a different geometry. It would not merely supplement the dyad with a supervised stranger. It would restore the triad — and beyond the triad, the network — by bringing the Concerned Persons back into structural proximity with the older adult. It would treat the mediation function Simmel describes not as a threat to the proceeding’s efficiency but as the precondition of its legitimacy. What capable guardianship looks like in practice — who qualifies, how they are recruited, how they are supported — is the question Capable Guardians takes up directly.
Safety nets require safety networks — a claim the companion essay Circles of Support develops in full.
Sources
Caplow, Theodore. “A Theory of Coalitions in the Triad.” American Sociological Review 21, no. 4 (August 1956): 489–493. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2088718
Christie, Nils. “Conflicts as Property.” British Journal of Criminology 17, no. 1 (January 1977): 1–15. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23636088
Cohen, Lawrence E., and Marcus Felson. “Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach.” American Sociological Review 44, no. 4 (August 1979): 588–608. https://www.jstor.org/stable/i336514
Corbetta, Renato, and Keith A. Grant. “Intervention in Conflicts from a Network Perspective.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 29, no. 3 (July 2012): 314–340. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26275300
Fausey, Caitlin M., and Lera Boroditsky. “Subtle Linguistic Cues Influence Perceived Blame and Financial Liability.” Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 17, no. 5 (2010): 644–651. https://doi.org/10.3758/PBR.17.5.644
Luhmann, Niklas. “Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives.” In Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, edited by Diego Gambetta, 94–107. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Diego-Gambetta/publication/242591079_Trust_Making_and_Breaking_Cooperative_Relations/links/56ab47be08ae8f386568be63/Trust-Making-and-Breaking-Cooperative-Relations.pdf
Simmel, Georg. “The Triad.” Chapter 4 in The Sociology of Georg Simmel, translated and edited by Kurt H. Wolff. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1950. https://ia801404.us.archive.org/34/items/in.ernet.dli.2015.215265/2015.215265.The-Sociology.pdf
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